Inderjit Singh vs M/s Sidhu Transport Service and another

C.S. Tiwana, J.—This appeal by Inderjit Singh is u/s 30 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, as the Senior Sub Judge, Sangrur, acting as the Commissioner under the said Act, by an order dated September 2, 19 6, disallowed the compensation amounting to Rs. 9,700/- which was claimed by him.

The Appellant was employed as a conductor by Messrs Sidhu Transport Service Respondent No. 1. A certain bus upon which the Appellant was working met with an accident as a result of which he received an injury on his left thigh on March 22, 1974. There was a fracture of a tone which according to the Appellant, united subsequently butled to the shortening of the log According to him, the log became ''unserviceable'' and he could not, therefore, attend to ordinary routine of life. He considered the loss to be such which entitled him to such compensation as he would have bees entitled to as if his leg had been amputated He asserted that his monthly wages at the time of the accident were Rs 200/-.

Respondent No. 1 before the Commissioner admitted this fact that the Appellant was employed by it and that the injury had been caused during the course of its employment. However, liability for the payment of compensation was denied. Respondent No. 2 also denied its liability

The Commissioner gave this finding that there was no permanent disability arising out of the alleged injury and for that reason he disallowed the claim of the Appellant.

On behalf of the learned Counsel for the Respondents this preliminary objection has been raised that the appeal u/s 30 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act could only lie if there was a substantial question of law involved. He then cited N.L. Lalan v. V.A. John 1972 A.C.J. 248, wherein It was explained as to what question could be designated as a substantial question of law. In order that a question may be designated as a substantial question of law it should be of great public importance or it should arise so frequently as to affect a large class of people, or it should be basic to the operation of the Act itself. He also referred to Parakkandiyil Kutti and Another Vs. Kakkat Kunhammad and Others, , which plays down that no interference in appeal is possible unless the finding of fact is so incorrect and opposed to the evidence or so perverse as to be brought into the category of a question of law. What we find in the present case is that no mention of this fact was made in the memorandum of appeal that any question of law, what to say of a substantial question of law, arose for consideration in appeal, In answer, the learned Counsel for the Appellant urged that it was required to be decided in this appeal whether there was any permanent total disablement of the leg by taking into consideration the evidence given by Dr. Trilock Chand PW 3 which was not relied upon by the Commissioner. It was Dr B. L. Jindal AW 1, Civil Surgon, Sangrur, who had examined the Appellant on the date of the accident when he had been admitted at the Civil Hospital, Barnala. It would all be a question of fact as to what is the extent of the disability by taking into consideration the evidence of both the witnesses. Dr. Tirlock Chand was such a witness who had been only examined before the filing of the application for compensation for creating some evidence in favour of the Appellant. He gave this evidence that he examined the Appellant on September 7, 1974. The witness was at that time employed us the Medical Officer in charge of the Civil Hospital, Dharamkot. What he said was that the Appellant had a mal-united fracture of the lower end of the femur. He then deposed that this injury resulted in shortening and weakening of the leg. Further, according to the witness the Appellant was unable to bend his knee joint. Before the Appellant could be awarded any compensation by virtue of Section 4 of the Workmen''s Compensation Act it was required to be proved as to what was the proportionate degrees in his earning capacity. On this material point Dr. Tirlock Chand said that be could not tell the extent of the disability or the percentage of the disability. His statement even if believed, could not have been of much help to the Appellant. The Commissioner, however, placed reliance on the statement given by Dr. B.L. Jindal and he being directly concerned with the Appellant at the time when he was being treated was in a better position to tell about the extent of the injury. According to him, the Appellant was discharged from the hospital on May 6, 1974, as cured. He also mentioned that no disability had been noticed in the treatment chart at the time of the discharge. He then referred to this practice that if there was any obvious disability it would have been mentioned therein. Thus even if the question of fact were to be gone into, no sufficient reason exists for disbelieving Dr. B.L. Jindal. This finding of the Commissioner is unassailable that the Appellant had no permenent disability of the leg, Furthermore, he did not lead any evidence for showing as to what was his earning capacity at preset He simply said during the court of his statement given as AW 5 that he was employed nowhere. this piece of evidence cannot be considered sufficient for holding that the bring(sic) capacity of the Appellant has been refused to nil.

I thus do not see nay force in the present appeal and the same is dismissed but without any order as to costs.