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Judgment
S. Govindasamy, J.—Petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act, having its registered office at Dhun Buildings, Mount
Road, Madras. The petitioner-company is engaged in the manufacture and sale of portland cement. The petitioner has its factory at Shankar
Nagar, Tirunelveli, Sankaridurg, Salem District. India Cement''s Workers'' Union, Shankar Nagar, which is one of the trade unions for the workers
(third respondent herein) submitted a proposal to the Certifying Officer - second respondent, under S. 10(2) of the Industrial Employment
(Standing Orders) Act, (hereinafter referred to as the ""Act"") seeking modifications of Standing Orders 10 and 12(b) which are as follows :
Standing Order 10 - The scales of pay and the rates of wages will be fixed by the management and altered from time to time according to the
circumstances with the consent of the recognised union. Those relating to workmen will be posted on the notice board of the time office"".
Standing Order 12(b)-Workmen shall be liable to be transferred from one department or section to another or from one shift to another by the
management or by officers empowered in this behalf whenever it is found necessary in the interest of the company in consultation with the
recognised union, subject to the condition such transferred workers service, status, seniority, emoluments are protected"".
The second respondent-Certifying Officer on receipt of the said proposal, called upon the petitioner to submit their objections for the proposed
amendment. The petitioner objected to the aforesaid amendment. The second respondent-Certifying Officer after giving notice to the parties
concerned, by order, notice to the parties concerned, by order, dated 1st September, 1982, held that there are no ground to interfere with the
existing Standing Orders and hence, declined to accede to the request of the third respondent-union to amend the Certified Standing Order in the
manner suggested. Aggrieved by the said order of the second respondent, the third respondent-union preferred an appeal before the appellate
authority under S. 6 of the Act. The appellate authority by the impugned order, dated 20 December 1983, in Standing Order Appeal No. 1 of
1982, accepted the finding of the second respondent-Certifying Officer in so far as the amendment that was sought for to Standing Order 10 is
concerned and allowed the appeal filed by the third respondent-union in so far as the amendment sought for in respect of Standing Order 12(b) is
concerned, while allowing the said amendment, the appellate authority considered the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that
when a Standing Order is formulated with reference to a matter falling outside the items enumerated in the schedule to the Act, the Certifies such
Standing Order and that such certification could, therefore, be null and void and of no effect. The appellate authority also observed that in the
instant case, Certified Standing Order 12(b) deals in part with the matters falling outside the schedule to the Act and consequently, the third
respondent-union is entitled to delete a portion of Standing Order 12(b) and in absence of any legal bar to such a request, the same cannot be
denied to the third respondent-union and therefore, held that in the Standing Order 12(b), the words.
From one department or section to another, or from this works to other units under the Manager or the Head Officer and vice versa"".
should be ordered to be deleted. In these circumstances, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition of the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash
the aforesaid order of the appellate authority.
Sri. S. Jayaraman, learned counsel for the petitioner, represents that after the amendment of Section 4 of the Act, the Certifying Officer has
jurisdiction to consider the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed amendment, even though if it is not included as one of the items to the
schedule to the Act, in respect of which the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rohtak and Hissar
Districts Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 966 II LLJ 330, wherein it is held that the amendment to S. 4 of the Act enables
the Certifying Officer to adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed Standing Order, and that the Jurisdiction of the certifying
authorities has become very much wider and the scope of the enquiry has also become correspondingly wider. Replying upon the said observation,
learned counsel for the petitioner represents that the transfer from one unit to another unit, etc., is incidental and consequently, the fairness and
reasonableness of transfer should be considered and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.
In reply, Miss Naga Saila, learned counsel for the third respondent, refers to the definition ""standing Order"" in S. 2(g) of the Act, which is as
follows :
Standing Orders means rules relating to matters set out in the schedule.
Then, the learned counsel refers to the schedule to the Act, wherein there is no provision with reference to transfer. It is the case of the learned
counsel for the third respondent that in the absence of any provision in the schedule to the Act with reference to transfer, the Certifying Officer has
no jurisdiction to include a clause with reference to transfer. In that context, the learned counsel refers the very same Rohtak Hissar District
Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Utter Pradesh and Others, , and relied on the following passages in the said decision :
The second aspect of the matter which is relevant on this point is that the Standing orders have to cover the matters specified in the schedule
attached to the Act. Item II in the said schedule refers to any other matter which may be prescribed. We have already mentioned the fact that S.
15 confers power on the appropriate Government to make rules. Section 15(2)(a) provides that the appropriate Government may, by rules,
prescribe additional matters to be included in the schedule, and the procedure to be followed in modifying Standing Orders certified under this Act
in accordance with any such addition. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Act contemplates that the Standing Orders must cover matters initially
included in the schedule as well as matters which may be added to the schedule by the appropriate Government in exercise of the authority
conferred on it by S. 15..... The next contention which Sri Setalvad has raised is that the appropriate authorities under the Act were in error in
insisting upon conformity with the Model Standing Orders under S. 3(4). His argument is that in certifying the Standing Orders, the appropriate
authority may, no doubt, compare them with the Model Standing Orders, but they need not insist upon strict compliance with them. He also
suggested that it could not be open to the employers to include matters in the Standing Orders which may not strictly be included in the schedule.
In this contexion, he relied on the fact that the draft Standing Orders, which the appellant and submitted for certification, had been assented to by
the employees. In our opinion, this contention is misconceived and must be rejected....... Then in regard to the matters which may be covered by
the Standing Orders, it is not possible to accept the argument that the draft Standing Orders can relate to matters outside the schedule. Take, for
instance, the case of some of the draft Standing Orders which the appellant wanted to introduce. These had reference to the liability of the some of
the draft Standing Orders which the appellant as 10 and 11. These two provisions do not appear to fall under any of the items in the schedule; and
so, the certifying authorities were quite justified in not including them in the Certified Standing Orders.
In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, the learned counsel represents that the Certifying Officer has no jurisdiction to
incorporate any order, which does not contain in any one of the items of the schedule to the Act.
Considering the aforesaid rival contentions of the parties and considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court I am of the view that the
Certifying Officer has no jurisdiction whatever for approval of any of the orders which does not include in any one of the items of the schedule to
the Act. While so, it cannot be said that the impugned order in any way suffering from any infirmity. The question of consideration of fairness and
reasonableness with reference to the proposal for amendment will arise only with reference to the amendment sought for in relation to any one of
the items included in the schedule to the Act. In the instant case, in so far as the proposed amendment is concerned, that is not the item included in
the schedule to the Act and consequently, the impugned order of the appellate authority is sustainable in law and consequently, there is no warrant
to interfere with the same. Hence, this writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.