Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs Authority under the Minimum Wages Act-cum-Assistant Labour Commissioner and Others

A.P. Sahi, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Arvind Goswami, learned Counsel for respondent No. 5 and the learned Standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

This petition has been filed on the short ground that keeping in view the provisions of Rule 30 of the U.P. Minimum Wages Rules, the application moved on behalf of the contesting respondent for recall of the order dated March 30, 1992 was heavily time barred and was neither entertainable nor maintainable before the Prescribed Authority. It is contended that the order impugned being in violation of the said Rules, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

I have heard Shri V.R. Agrawal for the petitioner and Shri Goswami for respondent No. 5.

It appears that the authority under the Minimum Wages Act passed an order on October 5, 1990 for computing the wages payable to respondent No. 5. The said order is said to have been passed after having put the contractor to notice. It is further indicated in the said order that the contractor had tendered the receipts indicating the payment of wages to respondent No. 5.

After a lapse of considerable time and taking aid from the trade union respondent No. 5 moved an application for recall of the order on March 30, 1990 that the said order has been passed on account of certain fake receipts having been produced by the contractor. Accordingly, the Labour Inspector moved an application on March 30, 1992 before the Prescribed Authority for recall of the order dated October 5, 1990. The same was recalled on May 26, 1992 against which a review application was filed by the petitioner which was rejected on June 27, 1992.

The submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner are, that the application moved by the Labour Inspector on March 30, 1992 was far beyond limitation as prescribed under Rule 30 of the Minimum Wages Rules as such the proceedings are vitiated in law. The Authority, it is contended, has totally overlooked the said provision and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In response learned Counsel for the respondent No. 5 contends that the rule is directory and not mandatory and therefore, the Prescribed Authority was well within its jurisdiction to exercise its discretion for recall of the order dated October 5, 1990. It is contended that the fake receipts had brought about the order dated October 5, 1990 which deserved to be recalled.

Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, Rule 30 is quoted below for ready reference:

Appearance of parties-(1) If an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 or Section 21 is entertained, the Authority shall serve upon the employer by registered post, a notice in Form VIII to appear before him on a specified date with all relevant documents and witnesses, if any; and shall inform the applicant of the date so specified.

(2) If the employer or his representative fails to appear on the specified date, the Authority may hear and determine the application ex parte.

(3) If the applicant or his representative fails to appear on the specified date, the Authority may dismiss the application.

(4) An order passed under Sub-rule (2) or Sub-rule (3) may be set aside on sufficient cause being shown by defaulting parties within one month of date of the said order and the application shall then be re-heard after service of notice on the opposite party of the date fixed for re-hearing in the manner specified in Sub-rule (1).

Sub-rule (4) of Rule 30 clearly mandates that an order passed by the Prescribed Authority may be set aside within one month of the date of the said order for sufficient cause being shown. It is therefore, evident that the rule prescribes a time limit for moving of an application. The said rule does not provide for any relaxation to the said limitation of 30 days and therefore, the said rule restricts the right of an aggrieved person to move an application 35 beyond the said period. It is sealed principle of the law of limitation-that whenever some limitation is prescribed, then upon the expiry of the period of limitation, certain rights are vested, or otherwise a person who could have claimed any relief stands divested of such right. The rule of limitation is a rule of procedure and it provides for certain matters being taken up within a prescribed time. Once the time so prescribed under law expires then such a rule of procedure stands converted into a substantive rule. A right which vests in a person on account of passage of time and expiry of limitation, is a vested right and that can be reversed only in accordance with law and not otherwise.

In the instant case, it is not disputed that the application was moved on March 30, 1992. In view of this, there is no scope from the conclusion that the application was moved heavily time barred and the rule aforesaid became mandatorily operative and could not be avoided as a directory procedure, once the period had expired. Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that moving of the application upon the expiry of the said period was an erroneous exercise and the prescribed Authority committed error in entertaining the same. The order impugned is liable to be set aside as no other authority has been shown to the Court which may run to the contrary. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the orders dated May 26, 1992 and June 27, 1992 (Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition) are hereby quashed.