Indira Devi vs The Special Tahasildar (L.A)

Viswanatha Iyer, J.—Important questions regarding the applicability and scope of Section 28A of the (Central) Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act) arise for Consideration in these cases.

Writ Appeal No. 835 of 1989 is against the judgment of a learned Single Judge in O.P. No. 6536 of 1989 dismissing the original petition filed challenging the order of the "Collector" rejecting the Appellants'' application u/s 28A, for re-determination of the compensation payable to her. Another Single Judge had rendered a decision in Kunjamma Rajamma v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), Vaikom I.L.R 1990 Ker 434 holding that Section 28A can be invoked only in cases where the award of the Collector was itself passed after September 24, 1984, when the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 introducing Section 28A in the Act came into force. The correctness of this decision was doubted by Ramakrishnan J. who referred the writ petitions, namely O.P. Nos. 2115, 2126, 2127, 2168 and 4350 of 1989 for decision by a Division Bench. That is how the writ appeal and the writ petitions are before us.

Now to the facts. We shall first advert to the facts in Writ Appeal No. 835 of 1989 as it involves two of the three questions which primarily arise for consideration in this batch of cases. Indira Devi, the Petitioner in the original petition, is the Appellant.

Forty cents of land in Thrikkakara village had been acquired for the purpose of the Suburban Housing Accommodation Scheme pursuant to proceedings initiated by notification issued u/s 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 (Act 21 of 1962) (the Kerala Act) in the Kerala Gazette dated, December 20, 1977. The land belonged to the Appellant''s mother Subhadra, who died subsequently on November 12, 1980. The Appellant and her father one Govindan, were the legal heirs of Subhadra, and they put forward their claim for compensation before the (Land Acquisition) functioning as Collector under the Act (hereinafter referred to as the Collector) in response to notice Under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Kerala Act. The award was passed on May 27, 1982. Neither the Appellant nor her father applied for reference to court u/s 20 of the Kerala Act (which corresponds to Section 18 of the Central Act) and the matter rested there. There were other lands covered by the same notification u/s 3(1), the owners of which had sought reference to court for enhancement of the compensation. Those references, namely L.A.R. Nos. 237 and 239 of 1983 were disposed of on February 28, 1986 by the Sub Court, Ernakulam, the court invested with the jurisdiction of a Land Acquisition Court u/s 58 read with Section 2(5) of the Kerala Act, awarding larger amounts by way of compensation than those awarded by the Collector.

In the meanwhile, and pending the proceedings in the Sub Court, the (Central) Land Acquisition Act was amended by the. (Central) Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984. The Act stood extended to the whole of India. Various beneficent changes were introduced in the Central Act, by the amendment, namely, award of additional amount u/s 23(1A), enhanced solatium u/s 23(2) and larger amount of interest Under Sections 28 and 34. The transitory provision, namely Section 30 of the amending Act gave limited retrospectivity to these provisions, in the manner indicated therein. The amending Act also conferred a right to claim re-determination of the compensation awarded, in the light of subsequent award made by court by introducing a new provision, namely Section 28A, which runs thus:

28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.-(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector u/s 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification u/s 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector u/s 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application of the Collector shall be made under this Sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Section 18 - 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference u/s 18.

The Kerala Act ceased to operate in this State by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution on the extension of the Central Act to the whole of India by Act 68 of 1984 (vide the judgment dated September 19, 1989 in the Kanthimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala C.A. No. 3999 of 1989 where the Supreme Court observed:

The Act of 1984 extended the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 to the whole of India excepting the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The provisions were substantially different from the provisions in the Kerala Act. In view of the fact that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was extended to the whole of India excepting one State, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 became applicable to the State of Kerala and in view of the repugnant provisions, in terms of Article 254 of the Constitution the Kerala Act stood repealed. There is no provision made in the Amending Act to indicate repeal of the State law but application of Article 254 is automatic to situations where it is applicable and by the operation of the Article the State Act stood repealed and the Central Act became applicable.

The Appellant and her father took advantage of the provisions of Section 28A and made application oft March 30, 1989 for re-determination of the compensation payable to them on the basis of the award of the Court in L.A.R. Nos. 237 and 239 of 1983. They claimed that they came to know of the court''s award in L.A.R. Nos. 236 and 237 of 1983 only on December 2, 1988. On the very next day, they got their lawyer to issue notice Ext. P-1 to the Collector calling upon him to make payment of the amounts due under the amended Act, and also to refer their claim for enhanced compensation to Court. The Collector replied by his letter Ext, P-2 on December 9, 1988 stating that the amounts due under the amended Act had been deposited in Court on January 19, 1988. He pointed out however that he was not in a position to make reference of the claim for enhanced compensation as the claimants, namely the Appellant and her father, had failed to make written application for reference as contemplated by the Act, at the time he made his award on May 27, 1982. The Appellant had, in the meanwhile on December 7, 1988 applied to court for a certified copy of its award. Having obtained the same on January 24, 1989, the Appellant and her father made application u/s 28A (copy Ext. P-3), on March 30, 1989 calling upon the Collector to grant them compensation at the enhanced rate awarded by the Sub Court in L.A.R. Nos. 237 and 239 of 1983. This was rejected by the Collector by his proceedings Ext. P-4, dated July 3, 1989, on two grounds. First lie stated that the application was belated, being filed beyond the period of three months prescribed by Section 28A. He stated that there was a delay of 1012 days in making the application. It was his case that "the statement" of the claimants that they applied "immediately" for copy of the award of the Sub Court on coming to know of the same "cannot be taken as a ground for the delay in preferring the application". Second, it was stated that notice of the Collector''s award had been served on the Appellant''s father u/s 12(2) of the Kerala Act on June l8, 1982 and in the absence of an application for reference, it had to be presumed that the claimants were not aggrieved by the award and therefore the application u/s 28A did not deserve consideration.

The Appellant challenged these proceedings by filing writ petition O.P. No. 6536 of 1989 under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was dismissed by the learned Single Judge with the observation that there was no statement in the writ petition "about the time of knowledge" except a general statement that the Petitioner came to know from Ors. that award had been passed, and that, she then made the application. It was also stated by the learned Single Judge that the Appellant waited for two months and six days after the award of the Sub Court was received on January 24, 1989 and that this was indicative of "the style of functioning". In that view of the matter, the original petition was dismissed in limine. The appeal is filed therefrom. The contention raised is that no question of delay arises in this case, as the period of three months prescribed by Sub-section (1) of Section 28A runs only from the date of knowledge of the award of the Court, namely December 2, 1988, and if so computed, the application was well within time.

Since the original petition was dismissed in limine, the pleadings of the Respondent were filed only in the writ appeal. The Respondent has disputed the Appellant''s claim that she knew about the award of the Court only on December 2, 1988. According to him, the Appellant should have known about the award much earlier as some of the claimants who got enhancement from Court were her neighbours, and there was therefore, no reason why she did not know about the Court''s award before December 2, 1988. An additional counter-affidavit was filed raising the fundamental question about the applicability of Section 28A itself to this case, on the ground that the award of the Collector had been passed before September 24, 1984, when Section 28A was introduced in the Act. According to the Respondents, Section 28A could be invoked only in cases where the Collector''s award itself is passed after that date and that therefore, the Appellant had no right to any relief, the Collector''s award in this case having been made as early as on May 27, 1982.

In the related original petitions referred by Ramakrishnan, J. the applications u/s 28A had been rejected on the ground that the Collector''s award in all these cases had been made prior to September 24, 1984 and therefore, the Applicants could not avail of the benefit of Section 28A.

The common question which therefore arises for consideration in all these cases is whether Section 28A can be availed of in cases where the Collector''s award had been passed before September 24, 1984, when Section 28A was introduced into the Act. The further question which arises in W.A. No. 835 of 1989 is regarding the terminus aquo of the period of three months prescribed for making the application in Sub-section (1) of the section, whether it is the actual date on which the award of the Court is passed or the date on which the applicant had knowledge of the said award. This question arises for the reason that the application u/s 28A in that case was filed only on March 30, 1989 while the basis of the application, namely the award of the Sub Court in L.A.R. Nos. 237 and 239 of 1983 was made on February 28, 1986. If the date on which the Sub Court passed the award, namely February 28, 1986 is the crucial date, the application Ext. P-3 filed on March 30, 1989 is hopelessly barred by time, whereas if the date of knowledge is the crucial date, the question will arise as to when the Appellant had knowledge of the Sub Courts award and as to whether the application Ext. P-3 was in time.

There is a further ramification in O.P. No. 4350 of 1989, whether only, the award of the reference Court furnishes the cause for an application under the section or whether even the decision of the High Court or of the Supreme Court in appeals arising out of such an award could be availed of. We shall refer to this later.

Before we proceed to deal with these questions, we shall briefly refer to the scheme of the Act and the circumstances in which Section 28A was introduced therein.

The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was enacted to amend the law for the acquisition of land for public purposes, and for companies, and for determining the amount of compensation to be paid on such acquisition. The Act is divided into eight parts of which Part III relates to the steps for acquisition, including preliminary investigation, objections to acquisition, declaration of intended acquisition and enquiry into measurement, value and claims, and award of the Collector, as also taking possession. The entire procedure relating to acquisition is laid down in Sections 4 - 17. We may refer to Section 11 which provides for an enquiry by the Collector into the various aspects mentioned, after which the Collector makes an award of the compensation which, in his opinion, should be allowed for the land. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 requires the award to be filed in the Collector''s Office and States that the award shall, except as thereinafter provided in the Act, be final and conclusive evidence, among Ors. , of the true area and value of the land. Sub-section (2) of the section requires the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to such of those persons interested who were not present personally or by representatives when the award was made. We may note here that the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Kerala Act are identical in all material particulars with Sections 11 and 12 of the Central Act before the amendment by Act 68 of 1984.

A person interested who has not accepted the award may, u/s 18, apply to the Collector in writing to refer the matter for die determination of the Court. This application has to be made within the time specified in the section, Part III of the Act comprising Sections 18 - 28 deals with reference to Court and the decision of Court on the reference. The Court makes its award in writing, signed by the Judge, specifying the amount awarded, together with the grounds for awarding the amounts falling under the various clauses of Sub-section (1) of Section 23.

"Court" is defined in Section 3(d) as meaning the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed a special Judicial Officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. So far as this State is concerned, the Courts of the Subordinate Judges have been vested with the jurisdiction to deal with references under the Act.

Section 54 of the Act provides for an appeal to the High Court from the award of the reference Court. From any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court, subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLV thereof.

As the law stood before the amendment in 1984, the position therefore was that any person aggrieved in regard to the amount of compensation awarded to him by the Collector had perforce to apply, within the time specified, to refer the matter to the Court for its determination. In the absence of any such request for reference, the award made by the Collector became final and conclusive so far as the value of the land was concerned. In other words, the only mode of getting enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Collector was by seeking reference to Court u/s 18, and if no such reference was sought or made, the claimant landowner had no other remedy to get enhancement of the compensation even if it turned out subsequently by awards of Court in other proceedings that the land value awarded was inadequate.

This was considered an unsatisfactory State of affairs having regard to the ongoing philosophy that the individual and institutions who were unavoidably deprived of their property needed to be adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of the community [See objects and reasons of Land Acquisitions (Amendment) Act, 68 of 1984]. The poorer sections of the people, in particular, did not usually take advantage of the remedy u/s 18 to get enhancement of the compensation either because of ignorance or out of sheer poverty. In the circumstances, it was felt that some remedial action was called for to enable the aggrieved landowners to avail of the benefits of higher compensation awarded by Courts for lands covered by the same preliminary notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill introduced in Parliament on April 30, 1982 therefore proposed the introduction of Section 28A in Part III of the Act, by which an award already made and became final u/s 12(1) could be reopened, and the compensation re-determined, in favour of person, who had not sought reference u/s 18, if subsequently the Court passed an award granting compensation in excess of that awarded by the Collector, for other lands covered by the same preliminary notification u/s 4(1). There is a detailed statement of objects and reasons leading to this Bill of which Clause (ix) is relevant as relating to Section 28A. We shall extract the same:

(ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil court u/s 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court u/s 18 of the Act.

The Bill was enacted as Act 68 of 1984 and it came into force on September 24, 1984. We have already referred in paragraph 5 to the liberal provisions in the amending Act and to the limited retrospectivity given to some of them.

We shall now proceed to deal with the questions arising for consideration in these cases, which we have formulated in paragraphs 11 and 12 supra. These questions, so far as we could see, are res integra, not covered by any decisions, except the one appealed against, and that in Kunjamma Rajamma''s case ILR 1990 Ker 434 the correctness of which has been doubted by Ramakrishnan, J. We have therefore, to traverse virgin ground in dealing with these questions.

We may advert here to the requirements of Section 28A which are as follows:

(a) There should be an award of the "Court" under Part III of the Act;

(b) The court should allow the applicant Compensation in. excess of that awarded by the Collector u/s 11;

(c) There should be other land covered by the same notification u/s 4(1);

(d) The persons interested in that land should not have made application tinder Section 18; and

(e) Such person should make his application for re-determination of the compensation within three months from the date of the award of the court.

The fundamental question which arises for consideration is whether Section 28A is applicable to those cases where the award of the Collector had been made before the date of its commencement, namely September 24, 1984. The contention of the applicants is that the primary condition required for availing the benefit under the section is the making of an award by "Court" after the date of its introduction m the Act, namely September 24, 1984, and if that condition is satisfied, the date on which the Collector made his award, whether before or after the said date, is immaterial. It is pointed out that no such condition is imposed by the section. On the other hand, its language is plain and simple, not warranting the imposition of any further condition that those imposed by it. Therefore, as soon as the Court passes an award after September 24, 1984 granting compensation in excess of that awarded by the Collector, the right to invoke the section accrues. It is further pointed out that the section was introduced for the benefit of inarticulate and poor persons, who do not take advantage of the provisions of Section 18 to get enhancement of the compensation. Their position has to be ameliorated under the beneficent provisions of the Act. That avowed object as set forth in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, has to be advanced with a purposive approach, even assuming that there, is any ambiguity in the language of the section. Counsel relies on the decision Union of India v. Philip Tiago De Gama AIR 1990 S.C. 981 to contend that the court should adopt an interpretation which effectuates the purpose of the legislation.

On the other hand, the learned Advocate General, who appeared for the Respondents, is emphatic in his submission that Section 28A cannot be invoked in cases where the Collector''s award had been made before September 24, 1984. According to him, the language of the provision does not admit of the construction canvassed by the applicants. In support, he refers to the omission of Section 28A from amongst those provisions which have been made retrospective by Section 30 of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984.

We have already referred to the purpose for which the provision was introduced in the Act, namely to come to the aid of inarticulate and poor persons, who do not usually take advantage of Section 18 to get enhancement of compensation. It is also the evident intent of the law makers to be fair and just to the land owners, who were being deprived of their lands under the compulsive provisions of the Act for the sake of the larger interests of the community. Fairness and justice inform the provisions of the Amendment Act which inter alia conferred substantial benefits by way of additional amount, extra solatium and higher rates of interest to those deprived of, their lands. It is in this background that we have to construe Section 28A.

The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. The intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of the enactment in question, but that does not mean that the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose without reference to its nature or purpose. Statutes have to be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them. See Union of India v. Philip Tiago De Gama AIR 1990 S.C. 981. It is also well established that for the sure and true interpretation of any statute, it is just and proper to keep in mind the mischief which was sought to be remedied and the true reason of the remedy. Heydon''s case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, Black Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerkewaldhof-Aschaffenburg Ag. 1975 (1) All E.R. 810 and Goodyear India Ltd., Gedore (India) Pvt. Ltd., Kelvinator of India Ltd. and the Food Corporation of India and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Another, . As Justice Felix Frankfurter put it:

Legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn like nitrogen out of air, it is evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the Judge must seek and effectuate. (Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes).

It was reiterated by the Supreme Court, on the basis of the decision in K.P. Varghese Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another, that the objects and reasons of the act "should be taken into consideration in interpreting the provisions of the Statute in case of doubt". Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, . It is with this background of the law that we have to tackle the problem raised before us.

On a plain reading of Section 28A, all that it requires basically for its operation is an award of the court made after its commencement, by which compensation in excess of that awarded by the Collector u/s 11 is allowed. Though certain other requirements are also laid down as analysed by us in paragraph 22, a requirement regarding the date of the Collector''s award, that it should be after the commencement of the section is nowhere stipulated. The section is explicit in what it requires and on what it operates. When it has expressely set out the conditions necessary to attract its operation, it is not possible, nor is it permissible, to read a further condition into it, that the award of the Collector u/s 11 should also be made only after the section came into force. It is not for the court to add such a condition, and confine the applicability of the section to cases where the award of the Collector itself is made after September 24, 1984.

We do not find anything compelling in the language of the section, or in the attendant circumstances, to accept the construction suggested by the Respondents. It is not as if the section is being rendered retrospective by the construction placed by us. If the contention of the Respondents, namely of retrospectivity, is carried to its logical limits, the provision may well have to be limited in its application only to those cases where the acquisition proceedings themselves are initiated after it came into force. Even the Respondents have no such case. At the same time they have not pointed to us any particular reason why the applicability of the section should be geared also to the date of the making of the award by the Collector.

Apart from the absence of any provision in the section itself, the construction placed by us advances the spirit, the philosophy and the legislative purpose behind it, of according fairness and justice to those who are deprived of their lands. As the Supreme Court stated in Skandia Insurance Co. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan AIR 1987 S.C. 1184.

In order to devine the intention of the legislature in the course of interpretation of the relevant provisions, there can scarcely be a better test than that of probing into the motive and philosophy of the relevant provisions keeping in mind the goals to be achieved by enacting the same.

Parliament has not chosen to make any distinction between landowners in whose cases the award of the Collector was made before September 24, 1984, and those, in whose cases, the award is made after that date. The intention is clear, namely to benefit all persons in whose cases the Court''s award is passed after September 24, 1984 irrespective of the date on which the Collector''s award was made. If the poorer sections were intended to be benefited by the amendatory exercise, there is no reason why we should cut down the ambit of the provision and deprive one section alone of the benefit conferred.

The learned Advocate General was at pains to point out that some of the provisions of the Amendment Act had been given retrospective effect from April 30, 1982, but not Section 28A. This was commented on as a pointer to its not operating on Collector''s awards made earlier. We are not in a position to agree.

Four classes of cases can be postulated while dealing with Section 28A:

(1) cases where the very initiation of the proceedings is after September 24, 1984;

(2) cases where the acquisition proceedings were initiated before September 24, 1984 but awards were passed by the Collector after that date;

(3) cases where the proceedings were initiated, and had culminated in an award by the Collector before that date but the reference court rendered its award afterwards; and

(4) cases where the proceedings had terminated before September 24, 1984 and no proceedings by way of reference or appeal were pending on that date.

There can be no controversy about the first and fourth categories of cases. While the section undoubtedly applies to the first category, it does not at all apply to the fourth. The learned Advocate General has no complaint about the second category to which he agrees, the section is attracted. His complaint is only about the third category.

It has to be presumed that parliament was well aware of all these contingencies when it enacted Section 28A. Nevertheless it has chosen to stipulate only one condition as the basic requirement of its applicability, namely that the award of the Court should be after its commencement. If the award of the Collector had also to be after that date, it would have stated so. The very absence of such a provision is clear indication that the date of the Collector''s award, before or after September 24, 1984, was considered irrelevant, the stress being that the award of the Court should be afterwards. Evidently, no express provision for retrospective operation of Section 28A was made, because the section was only prospective in its operation, applying only to those cases where the award of the court was after it came into force.

The fact that the Collector''s award is treated as final and conclusive evidence between the Collector and the persons interested, of the value of the land, u/s 12(1) of the Kerala Act does not in any manner affect our conclusion. In fact, not much stress was laid by the Respondents on this aspect at the hearing. Section 12(1) of the Kerala Act itself make the finality and conclusiveness of the evidence liable to divestiture in the manner thereafter provided in the Act. Section 28A is one of these provisions contained in the Act, though it was not in the statute book at the time the award was passed. If Section 28A, on its terms, applies to such cases, the finality and conclusiveness stand divested.

We may now refer to the decision of the learned Single Judge in Kunjamma Rajamma v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), Vaikom ILR 1990 Ker 434 which has taken a contrary view. The learned Judge struck the right note, stating that the extent to which parliament went to confer a benefit is to be gathered primarily from the expres language of the section. According to him, however, the section on its own plain reading, did not extend the benefit to all persons whose lands have, been acquired, regardless of the date of coming into force of the amending Act. According to the learned Judge, it was not as if every provision of the amending Act was retrospective. The decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., was itself illustrative of the limited retrospective effect available to those whose lands have been acquired. The learned Judge observed that though this decision did not as such have any effect of the interpretation of Section 28A, an understanding of the scheme of the amended Act in its entirety, was available from the discussion therein. He therefore held that Section 28A cannot have application to awards of the Collector passed prior to September 24, 1984 when the amending Act came into force.

For the reasons already stated by us, we are not in a position to accept the view taken by the learned Judge. It is only necessary to add that the decision in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. Etc., does not in any manner afford any guidance for the decision of the point in issue before us. In that case, the question debated was whether the transitional provision, Section 30 of Act 68 of 1984, attracted the provisions of Section 23(2) to awards passed before April 20, 1982, the date on which the amendment bill was introduced in parliament. The decision of the Supreme Court stressed on the word " such" occurring in Section 30(2) and held that Section 23(2) applied only to those cases where the award of the Collector or the reference Court had been made after April 30, 1982, or to an appellate decision arising from such award. It was in that context that the Court made some observations about the restricted retrospectivity of the Amendment Act. The applicability or scope of Section 28A was never in issue, nor was it considered. It is not possible to understand stray observations made in the context of certain other provisions as indicative of the Court''s mind in relation to Section 28A, when the Court''s attention was not at all riveted to the particular problems raised before us in these gases. We feel that the reliance placed on this decision in Kunjamma Rajamma''s case ILR 1990 Ker. 434 was misconceived. We hold that Kunjamma Rajamma''s case ILR 1990 Ker. 434 was wrongly decided, and we overrule the same.

L.A.R. No. 92 of 1983 was Anr. decision on which reliance was placed by the learned Advocate General. It is seen reported as Mathai Thomas v. State of Kerala 1989 (2) KLT 732. That again does not deal with the point in issue nor do we find anything in that judgment relevant or supporting the stand of the Respondents.

We have therefore, no hesitation in holding that Section 28A can be invoked in all cases where the award of the Court is passed after the date of commencement of Act 68 of 1984, irrespective of the date on which the award of the Collector was passed, whether it was before or after that date.

This takes us to the question as to which is the award of Court that is made the basis of the re-determination contemplated by Section 28A. The further question which arises is whether the benefit of the provision could be availed of in cases where the award of the reference court is before September 24, 1984, and the decision on appeal therefrom is after that date.

As we had indicated earlier, these questions arise in O.P. No. 4350 of 1989 where the awards of the Collector as well as the reference court were both made before September 24, 1984. The Court had granted enhancement of the compensation. An appeal by the State, L.A.A. No. 182 of 1982 was however pending in this Court against the said award at the time Section 28A came into force. That was disposed of on August 20, 1987 affirming the enhancement granted by the reference court. The applicant purported to avail of this decision, and, based thereon, applied for re-determination of the compensation payable to him. That was rejected by the proceedings Ext. P-3 in the view that Section 28A was inapplicable, the Collector''s award having been passed long prior to September 24, 1984. Ext. P-3 is challenged in the Original Petition. Respondents contend, in addition to their general plea regarding the applicability of Section 28A to such cases, that the decision of a Court, other than the reference court, cannot form the basis of a re-determination under the section. The subsidiary contention raised is that in any case, Section 28A cannot be invoked unless the decision of the reference court itself is after September 24, 1984.

The contention is developed by the learned Advocate General this way. The award of Court which gives rise to the right u/s 28A is an award made under Part III of the Act. An award under Part III is only the award of the reference court. The decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal u/s 54 is not an award under Part III. The submission on these premises is that only the award of the reference court could form the basis of re-determination of the compensation payable Secondly, the application u/s 28A has to be made within three months of the date of award of the reference court-otherwise, it gets belated. In any case, the question of invoking Section 28A does not arise, unless the award of the reference court is itself after September 24, 1984. A decision in appeal rendered after that date, when the award of the reference court was made earlier, cannot form the foundation for re-determination of the compensation u/s 28A. It is stated therefore, that the Petitioner in O.P. No. 4350 of 1989 is not entitled to any relief.

The first question for determination is what is the basis of the re-determination of the compensation-whether it is only the decision of the reference court or whether it could also be the decision in appeal u/s 54. An award of the Collector is subject to appeal to the High Court and to second appeal to the Supreme Court, in appropriate cases, and in specified Circumstances. If the basis of re-determination contemplated by Section 28A is limited to the award of the reference court, absurd and anomalous situations will ensue. If, in a given case, the reference court rejects the reference and refuses to grant enhancement of compensation, or grants enhancement to a lesser extent than that claimed by the landowner, and this award is reversed in appeal either by the High Court or the Supreme Court, if we go by the case of the Respondents, the position will be that the benefit of Section 28A will be denied to all those who could otherwise have availed of the same, had the enhancement, as claimed, been made by the reference court itself.

Taking a converse case, the award of enhanced compensation by the reference court may get set aside, or reduced, in appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court. If, in the meanwhile, a Section 28A applicant has been granted the benefit, based on the award of the reference court, there is no machinery in the Act to reopen the award in his favour, and to cancel or modify it in the light of the appellate decision or, for that matter, to get refund of the excess paid. The position is truly anomalous in that the diligent applicant u/s 18 fails to get any enhancement, or gets a reduced enhancement, while the Section 28A applicant who takes advantage of the reference court''s decision, enjoys compensation in excess of that paid to the Section 18 applicant himself. Such an absurd situation could not have been posited by Parliament. It is possible to multiply such instances.

We cannot understand Parliament to have enacted a law which operates on chance, or differentially in similar situations, leading to anomalies and absurdities. The court has to avoid a construction that produces an absurd result, since that is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament (Bennion: Statutory Interpretation: 1984 Edition, Paragraph 141 page 336). The court has to place itself in the position of the law makers and decide whether they would have intended such an unreasonable result, abounding in anomalies and absurdities.

The award of the Court which constitutes the basis of the re-determination of compensation should therefore, be that award or decision which lends finality to the determination of the compensation. It is that decision which becomes final and conclusive and on the basis of which the claimant in the reference is paid compensation. The application u/s 28A could be made on the basis of such decision within the period stipulated in the section.

The reference to "Court", in speaking of the award under Part III does not in any manner affect this conclusion of ours. "Court" is no doubt defined in Section 3(d) as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriate Government has appointed a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. This is however subject to anything repugnant in the subject of context, so that if the context of Section 28A requires a different connotation for the word "Court" that will have to be accepted. For the reasons set forth earlier, an expanded meaning of the word "Court" as including the High Court and the Supreme Court is called for in Section 28A. This is necessary to effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid unintended results. The words "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" permit such a course as was explained by the Supreme Court in The Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., Madras Vs. Fraser and Ross and Another, .

It is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore in finding out the meaning of the word ''insurer'' in various sections of the Act, the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause. But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this qualification, the court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collection and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances.

For the reasons stated above the use of the expression "award under this Part" also does not in any manner advance the case of the Respondents. It has to be read and understood in the context of re-determination of the compensation payable as referring to that award by which the question of compensation attains finality.

We do not therefore, find anything in the words "award under this Part" to support the contention of the learned Advocate General. The construction placed by us avoids absurdities and anomalies.

This does not however mean that a decision in appeal, from an award of the reference court made prior to September 24, 1984, can be availed of, for an application u/s 28A. It is true that the decision of the appellate court is in law one passed by the reference court, but when once the decision is rendered, it relates back to the date of the decision of the reference court. Therefore, the requirement of Section 28A will be satisfied only if the decision of the reference court is itself after September 24, 1984, though an appellate decision therefrom could form the foundation of a re-determination u/s 28A.

Though the award of the court for purposes of re-determination of compensation comprehends the decision in appeal as well, having regard to the circumstances pointed out by us earlier, we do not find any justification to extend its scope (as referring normally to an award passed by a "Court" as defined in the Act, namely the reference court) for any other purpose. The very basis of applicability of Section 28A is an award passed by the "Court" after it came into force. An appellate decision made after that date on an award of the reference court made earlier cannot be treated as an award made after the commencement of the section for this purpose, whatever be the nature of the said decision. We are therefore, of the opinion that to sustain an application u/s 28A, the award of the reference court should be after September 24, 1984, though the basis of the re-determination of the compensation will be the ultimate decision which renders finality to the determination of the compensation.

We, therefore, hold that the award of court contemplated by Section 28A for re-determination of the compensation includes also the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court, in appeal from the award of the reference court. But, the award of the reference court must have been made after the Act came into force, though the basis for re-determination is the award of that court which renders finality to the determination of the compensation.

We now come to the third point as to the terminus aquo for an application u/s 28A. According to the Appellant in W.A. No. 835 of 1989, the period of three months has to be computed from the date of knowledge of the award of the court, as in the case of references under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18, while according to the learned Advocate General, the actual date of the award of the court itself is the starting point.

The expression "date of the Collector''s award" in the aforesaid proviso was the subject of discussion in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, . The proviso requires an application for reference to be made, in a case falling under Clause (a), where the landowner was present or was represented at the time the award was made by the Collector, within six weeks of the date of the award and in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of notice from the Collector u/s 12(2), or within six months from the date of the Collector''s award, whichever period shall first expire. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, , no notice u/s 12(2) had been served. The reference application was made on February 24, 1953, while the award had been passed on March 25, 1951, that is well beyond the period of six months from the actual date of the award. The Collector refused to make the reference, as the application was made beyond the outer limit of six months prescribed in Clause (b) of the proviso. In the appeal, it was contended that the Appellant had knowledge of the award only on or about January 13, 1953, and if time was reckoned from that date, the application was in time. The court upheld the plea and observed:

The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice the expression ''the date of the award'' used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words ''from the date of the Collector''s award'' used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.

This decision was considered and affirmed, and the amplitude of the expression "date of the Collector''s award" extended, in the later decision in State of Punjab Vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another, , where the court went on to hold that knowledge of the award was not mere knowledge of the existence of the award. It must relate to its essential contents, and therefore time starts running only from the date on which the person concerned had knowledge of the essential contents of the award.

These decisions stand accepted for the past over twenty-seven years. The amendatory exercises in the Act in 1967 and 1984 have left this construction untouched and the expression "date of the award" continues to carry the meaning "date of knowledge of the award" for purposes of Section 18 as held in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, . It is in this background that the expression "date of the award" in Section 28A has also to be construed.

The provision has been primarily introduced with a view to help the unfortunate have-nots (the inarticulate and poor people) who have been denied the rightful compensation due to them by the award of the Collector. There is no machinery to get information about the award of the court in the normal course as and when it is made. It is not published and there is no obligation to communicate information about the award to other landowners covered by the same notification. Knowledge of the award is an imperative before the landowner can exercise his right u/s 28A. It is an elementary rule of fairness and justice (as stated by the Supreme Court) that the party affected should have knowledge of the proceeding which gives him the right. It is only therefore proper to treat the date of knowledge of the award of the court as the starting point of the period of three months for an application u/s 28A. Else it may verily deprive the Contemplated beneficiaries of the benefit of the legislation.

The provision is one intended to confer a benefit on the less affluent and less knowledgeable segments of the people. It should therefore receive a liberal interpretation. As observed in Bharat Singh Vs. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis center, New Delhi and Others, .

Now it is trite to say that acts aimed at social amelioration giving benefits for the have-nots should receive liberal construction. It is always the duty of the Court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or object of the Act. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided.

Sections 18 and 28A are pari materia and there is no reason why the interpretation given to the expression "date of the award" in Section 18 should not be applied to Section 28A as well. When the legislature has chosen to use the same expression in an analogous provision, fully aware of the meaning placed on it by the Supreme Court, it must be presumed that they intended the expression to have the same meaning in the new provision as well.

The learned Advocate General relied on the exclusion of the date of the award in the computation of time, with the contention that the starting point of limitation must be such a date as was liable to be excluded i.e. the actual date of the award. We do not agree. Cases can be postulated where the party has knowledge of the award on the very day on which it is rendered. In such cases, that date is liable to be excluded. This factor does not, therefore advance the case of the Respondents. Nor do we find any support for the contention of the learned Advocate General in the decision Kaliyappan Vs. State of Kerala and Others, . As pointed out in the decision itself, there is no analogy between Section 18, and Sections 11 and 11A. The court was concerned with the expression "make an award" which it was pointed out meant ''sign the award'' in the context. Since Section 28A is analogous to Section 18, the inspiration drawn by the learned Advocate General from this decision appears to be misconceived.

The construction placed by us is in consonance with the object of Section 28A, and advances its purpose. We are therefore of the view that the period of three months limited by Section 28A runs from the date of knowledge of the award of the court subject to the exclusions contained in the proviso to Section 28(1).

We therefore, overrule the contentions of the learned Advocate General. Before going into the facts of each case, we may briefly touch upon one facet of the section which caused considerable difficulty in interpretation. We are referring to the expression "in all the other land" occurring in the section. The words appear to be quite inartistic. What was the purpose intended in using the words "all" and "the"? And then, why "land" not "lands"? Do they imply that the person interested, to avail of Section 28A, should be interested in the entirety of the other land (lands?) covered by the notification u/s 4(1) with the consequence that a person interested only in one of the numerous items covered by that notification is precluded from availing of the provisions of Section 28A? The parties were not able to enlighten us on this point; nor could we get any light from any other source. We feel however that the proper way of reading the expression will be to treat it as "in any other land" so that a person interested in any of the other lands covered by the same notification could get the benefit of the section. This appears to be the reasonable way of reading the benevolent provision.

We may also briefly advert to the basis on which the re-determination of the compensation is to be made under the section. There is no automatic re-determination of the amount of compensation on the mere passing of an award by the court, and the application being made u/s 28A. The Collector has to apply his mind to the facts of the case and adjudicate whether the said award is liable to be applied to the case of the applicant. There is also no total setting aside of the original award or reopening of the matters covered by it, merely on the basis of the award of the court. On the other hand, what the provision contemplates is a re-determination of the amount of compensation, and compensation alone, on the basis of the award of the court. In other words, what the section requires is to treat the award as an additional item of relevant evidence and to have the compensation re-determined accordingly, taking that also into account.

The relevancy and applicability of the court''s award will arise in a variety of circumstances like the similarity of the lands or their being neighbouring ones, adoption of same basis for fixing the compensation earlier, adoption of a different multiplier by court for capitalisation, and Ors. . The true basis of the re-determination will be to ask: What would have been the compensation the Collector would have awarded had the award of the court been available at the time he made his original award? That will be the re-determined compensation payable to the Applicant. It does not mean that compensation should be fixed at the same rate as awarded by the court in every case. To put it differently, the Collector has to relate the award of the court back to the date on which he made his original award and ascertain what amount he would have awarded as compensation if this piece of evidence had also been available to him at that time.

We may also mention that there was no contention raised that Section 28A cannot be invoked in the cases before us for the reason that the Collector''s awards had been passed in proceedings under the Kerala Act. Rightly so, according to us, in the light of the decisions of a Division Bench of this Court in O.P. No. 6455 of 1985 and O.P. No. 3771 of 1985 to both of which one of us, the Chief Justice was a party, the latter of which was also affirmed by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 3999 of 1989, already referred to in paragraph 6 above, therefore notifications issued u/s 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act must be deemed for the purpose of Section 28A to be notifications issued u/s 4(1) of the Act.

We shall summarise our main conclusions as follows:

(1) Section 28A is attracted in all cases where the award of the reference court is made after the Act came into force on September 24, 1984 irrespective of the date of the making of the award by the Collector.

(2) What affords the basis for re-determination of compensation is the award by which the determination of the compensation attains finality whether it was made by the Reference court, or the High Court or the Supreme Court, u/s 54.

(3) Section 28A can be invoked only if the award bf the reference court is made after it came into force. It will not apply to cases where the award of the reference court is before and the appellate decision is after the section came into force.

(4) The period of three months for making the application u/s 28A has to be computed from the date of knowledge of the award of the court by which the determination of compensation attains finality, whether it be that of the reference court or of ah appellate court.

(5) Only a person interested in arty of the other lands covered by the same notification u/s 4(1) can make an application under the section.

(6) The re-determination of compensation is not automatic. The applicability of the award of the court and the rate of compensation to be awarded on re-determination have to be adjudicated upon by the Collector taking into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances.

We shall now examine the facts of each case. In Writ Appeal No. 835 of 1989, the Appellant claims to have had knowledge of the award of the Sub Court in L.A.R. Nos. 237 and 239 of 1983 rendered on February 28, 1986 only on December 2, 1988. She applied for a copy of the award on December 7, 1988 and obtained it on January 24, 1989. Application u/s 28A was made on March 30, 1989. There is denial in the counter-affidavit of the claim of the Appellant about the date of knowledge with a further averment that the Appellant would have had knowledge of the court''s award even earlier. It is for the applicant u/s 28A to plead and prove that the application was in time. If, therefore, the application is made beyond three months from the actual date of the award, it is for the applicant to state and prove as to when she had knowledge of the award, and place the facts required to prove that the application is in time. It will then be for the Collector to enquire and decide whether the application is in time. The Collector has not, in this case, considered the question as to when the Appellant had knowledge of the award. The fact relied on by the learned Single Judge that the Appellant filed the application u/s 28A only after a period of two months of receiving the certified copy of the award of the Court is irrelevant in the decision of the question whether the application was in time. The crucial question is as to when the party had knowledge of the court''s award. Since that question has not been decided, the matter has to go back for consideration of the question. The Collector will deal with the matter afresh and ascertain whether the application is in time, in the light of what we have stated above, and if so, as to whether the Appellant is entitled to any relief u/s 28A. The writ appeal is allowed to this extent. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Ext. P-4 is quashed and the matter is remitted to the Respondent for decision on this question and for further consequential action, if any.

P.P. Nos. 2115, 2126, 2127 and 2168 of 1989. In all these cases there is no dispute that the application was filed in time and that the lands of the applicants were covered by the same notification as those involved in the awards of the court. All these applications have been rejected only on the ground that the Collector''s awards had been passed before September 24, 1984 and therefore, Section 28A was inapplicable. Since we have held otherwise on this point, the applications filed u/s 28A were maintainable in all these cases. The original petitions are therefore allowed. The orders impugned in each of the cases are quashed and the Collectors concerned are directed to re-determine the compensation payable to the Petitioners in the light of the awards rendered by the court in the respective cases.

In O.P. No. 4350 of 1989, the decision relied on is that of this Court in appeal. Admittedly the award of the reference court had been made before Section 28A came into force. In the view we have taken, such a case is not covered by Section 28A. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief. The original petition is therefore, dismissed.

No other points have been raised before us. The writ appeal and the original petitions are disposed of in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.