Irfan Mohammad vs State Of Himachal Pradesh

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 145/2025, dated 01.07.2025, registered at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 333, 109, 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 351(2), 61(2) and 117(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

It has been asserted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated at the instance of his enemies. The petitioner was beaten, and he had sustained injuries. The informant lodged the FIR to pre-empt any other proceedings against him. The police have completed the investigation, and the petitioner’s custody is not required. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.

The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant Harpal Chaudhary and Vikram were present in the informant’s house on 01.07.2025. Vikram had met with an accident, and his leg was plastered. His friend Surjeet, Vaibhav, Vishal, Sunil and Anas Khan had visited the informant’s house to inquire about Vikram’s well-being. All of them were talking to each other. Five people armed with sticks and an iron rod came to the house at 5:40 pm. They had covered their faces. They gave beatings to the informant and other persons. The informant party shouted for help, and the villagers gathered on the spot. One person, who identified himself as Irfan (the present petitioner), was apprehended. The injured were taken to the hospital for treatment. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. Irfan revealed during the investigation that Sandeep, Nigam, Adil, Ashu and Sohail Khan were involved in the incident. Police arrested Sohail Khan. He revealed during interrogation that he had handed over his motorcycle bearing registration no. HP17C-0390 to Adil. Adil, Irfan, Ashu, Sadakat, Sandeep and Nigam drove two motorcycles to the spot. They returned at about 6:30 pm and revealed that Irfan was apprehended on the spot. FIR No. 190/2023, dated 02.12.2023, is registered against the petitioner in Police Station Kala Amb. As per the report of the Medical Officer, the injured had sustained grievous injuries. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of similar offences and intimidate the witnesses, in case of his release on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have heard Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel, with Mr Kush Sharma, Advocate, for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The status report shows that the petitioner was apprehended on the spot, as well as the fact that the assailants escaped on the motorcycle. Both these facts are contradictory to each other and cannot stand together. The petitioner was beaten by the villagers, and he was falsely implicated to save the villagers. There is insufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of crime. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was caught red-handed on the spot, and the plea taken by him that he is innocent is not acceptable. He disclosed the name of the other co-accused, and the police recovered various articles based on the disclosure statement made by the co-accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:-

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborat-ing on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also perti-nent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant juris-diction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habitu-als, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail dis-cretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be ex-tracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the cir-cumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the ac-cused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the wit-nesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the pub-lic or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judi-cious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Need-less to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the mat-ter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, how-ever, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (em-phasis supplied)

In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application can-not undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with re-gard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or reject-ing bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic princi-ples laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an applica-tion for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of convic-tion;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if re-leased on bail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being in-fluenced; and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)

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One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of ap-plication of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the ac-cused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an in-dividual is an invaluable right, at the same time while con-sidering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexa-tious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be sup-ported by reasons and must be arrived at after having re-gard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the na-ture of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an ac-cused.” (emphasis supplied)

The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The status report shows that five persons came to the informant’s room armed with iron rods and sticks. They gave beatings to the informant and other persons present in the room. When the informant party shouted for help, the villagers came to the spot, and the assailants sped away on two motorcycles. However, one of the assailants was apprehended on the spot, who identified himself as Irfan (present petitioner).

This report clearly shows that the petitioner was apprehended on the spot. The submission made by Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Counsel, that a person cannot be apprehended while others have escaped amounts to hairsplitting because it is possible for one of the assailants to be apprehended on the spot and for the others to escape on the motorcycle. There is nothing inherently improbable in the apprehension of one person.

It was submitted that the petitioner was beaten by the villagers, and he was falsely implicated to save the villagers. This submission is not acceptable. The Court has to accept the allegations in the FIR and the result of the investigation as prima facie correct while deciding the bail petition unless these are inherently improbable. The allegations in the FIR and the status report clearly show that the petitioner was apprehended when he was trying to escape with the other persons. The copy of the MLC of the petition was not brought on record to show the nature of injuries sustained by him, and it is difficult to believe that the petitioner would be falsely implicated by the villagers to save themselves.

The petitioner and the co-accused had inflicted grievous injuries on the informant party. The petitioner named the other co-accused, and the police effected the recovery of weapons of offence from those persons, which prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. Keeping in view the nature of the crime, the petitioner is not entitled to bail.

The status report shows that the petitioner has criminal antecedents, and FIR No. 190/23 dated 02.12.2023 was registered against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 149, 323 and 506 of IPC. This Court exhaustively dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents in Aminodin vs State of H.P. 2024: HHC: 6091 and held, after referring to various judgments, that a Judge must consider the criminal antecedents of the accused, the nature of offences and his general conduct while considering the bail petition. Bail should not be generally granted to an accused with criminal antecedents when there is a likelihood of the commission of the crime.

It was held in V. Senthil Balaji v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, that where the petitioner can become a threat to society because of her criminal antecedents, she should not be released on bail. It was observed:

“27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.”

Similarly, it was held in Union of India v. Barakathullah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: -

“20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA.

Similarly, it was held in Union of India v. Barakathullah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: -

“20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion, the High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA.”

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 that the liberty of a person has to be balanced with peace and harmony in society. Liberty cannot be elevated to such a high pedestal as would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. It was observed at page 384:

“65. We are absolutely conscious that the liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt with, for the deprivation of the liberty of a person has an immense impact on the mind. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of emptiness. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law, an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society, an individual is expected to live with dignity, having respect for the law and also giving due respect to others' rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve their individual as well as social interests. That is why Edmond Burke, while discussing liberty, opined, “it is regulated freedom”.

It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal that it would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and order prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude, but the adjudication should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised society, the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing, J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.”

Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one, and no element in the society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or anti-collective act. (See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172.).

Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents as well.

No other point was urged.

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.