Ishwar Dayal vs The Union of India (UOI) and Others

J.N. Bhatt, C.J.—Upon joint request of the parties, this matter was taken up for final hearing on 23.5.2007 at the admission stage itself in view of the involvement of a sum of the amount of Rs. 25,000/- only, by way of 50% of the back wages in respect of the writ petitioner, a Class IV servant of the Union of India, working in the Postal Department. Therefore, today, the judgment is being pronounced.

In this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the only question which is urged is that though by the impugned judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna ("Tribunal"), dated 23.11.2004, passed in O.A. No. 29 of 2003, on reinstatement, the petitioner has been treated as on duty for all purposes including back wages for the period from 18.11.2002 to 14.6.2004 but, the Tribunal has restricted the payment of back wages to the extent of 50% only, due and payable to the petitioner. Therefore, the main grievance voiced in this petition is only with regard to legality and validity of that part of the impugned order of the Tribunal.

Before the Tribunal, the writ petitioner raised a question by filing an application u/s 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, against the order dated 18.11.2002 of the respondent - authority.

By virtue of the impugned order, dated 18.11.2002 of the respondent authority, the petitioner was made to retire with effect from 22.11.2002 on the basis of his date of birth being 22.6.1937, whereas, the petitioner having filed the original application before the Tribunal claimed that he was made to retire early, as his actual birth date, as per the record, is 22.6.1941, and, upon examination of such dispute and grievance raised by the petitioner, the impugned order of the respondent came to be passed revoking the earlier order of retirement and reinstating him treating his date of birth as 22.6.1941, as per the contention. This order came to be passed during the pendency of the original application before the Tribunal. It is in these contexts, the Tribunal passed the aforesaid order treating the period between 18.11.2002, the date of termination, to 14.12.2004, the date of reinstatement in service, as on duty for all purposes including the back wages. However, an observation came to be made that there should be restriction of the actual monetary benefit which shall be only 50% of the amount.

This observation and the view is taken by the Tribunal without any supporting reasons. It is not clear from the impugned order of the Tribunal as to how 50% amount is only directed to be paid and not the full amount, though there was no mistake on the part of the petitioner who belongs to a poor strata of the society, being a class IV employee, whose service is not even pensionable.

It is the cardinal principle of the service jurisprudence that when a particular view is reached by the decision making authority on judicial adjudication, it has to be supported by reasons. In absence of any reason in exercise of the discretion of granting back wages up to 50% only, this Court is not in a position to appreciate as to whether exercise of discretionary jurisdiction is in consonance with the provisions of law, justice and equity, more so, when there is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner, who belongs to Class IV category, is mail carrier, who is supposed to transmit the mail from one Post Office to other and was not allowed to work from 18.11.20.02 till the date of superannuation, i.e. 14.6.2004, as per the birth date and he was wrongly made to retire on the date which was not correct. The gesture and approach of the authority can be appreciated but at the same time the authority has not directed for payment of the salary which is stated at Bar to be around Rs. 3000/- per month without any pension, as if it is a legacy of the imperial regime.

Accordingly, we have no option but to allow this petition and direct the respondent authority to make complete payment, without any restriction, of the amount due and payable to the petitioner during the aforesaid period and the same may be recovered as directed by the Tribunal from the concerned officer after fixity of the responsibility. Obviously, therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent, We direct to make payment of the remaining 50% amount within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court.

In the result, this application shall stand allowed, with costs.