Ishwar Dutt vs Smt. Dilbhari

M.R. Sharma, J.—The grievance made in the petition is that many adjournments were granted to the respondent to lead her evidence and after the close of the case the petitioner led evidence and the case was again adjourned from time to time for enabling the respondent to adduce evidence in rebuttal. At that stage the respondent applied that the earlier order closing her case may be reviewed and she be allowed to lead additional evidence. Before the learned trial Judge reliance on behalf of the respondent was placed on a Single Bench decision reported as State of Punjab v. Radha Kishan (1978) 80 P.L.R. 454. That case was decided by Gurnam Singh, J., who followed an earlier decision rendered by R.S. Narula, J., (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in Smt. Dakhri and others v. Munshi and others (1967) 69 P.L.R. 149, and held that provisions of Order 17, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are penal in nature and if the Court while declining to grant an adjournment decides the case on that very date, no fault can be found with its order but in case it adjourns the case to a later date it is bound to give the parties an opportunity of leading evidence. Order 17, rule 3, of the CPC reads as under:--

Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc:--

Where any party to a suit to, whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may, notwithstanding such default:--

(a) if the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forthwith; or

(b) if the parties are, or any of them is, absent proceed under Rule 2.

A plain reading of this rule shows that it vests the Court with the discretion to decide or not to decide the case forthwith. It nowhere provides that where a party has been given a large number of adjournments to adduce proof in support of its case its evidence should not be closed and if the case cannot be finally decided for one reason or the other on that date the party concerned must of necessity be allowed to produce evidence on the adjourned date of hearing. In my considered opinion, if this view is allowed to prevail it would tend to unnecessarily lengthen the procedure in trial of the cases. For that reason I was initially inclined to refer this case to a larger Bench but the facts disclosed by Mr. Sarin are somewhat different. These facts indicate that no material injustice has been caused to the petitioner. It is stated by Mr. Sarin that the respondent has filed a suit that the petitioner had fraudulently obtained an adoption deed executed by her she filed an earlier suit to challenge that deed in which she could not produce certified copies of certain documents. That suit was dismissed with the observations that it would be open to her to file a fresh suit. She availed of that option by filing the instant suit and could not get the certified copies of the earlier judgments and statements of the parties to be produced in the suit out of which this revision arises at the appropriate stage and that she made the aforementioned application only for the production of these documents. In the circumstances explained by Mr. Sarin and the observations made by me earlier that the production of certified copies of the documents is not going to materially prejudice the case of the petitioner, I decline to exercise my revisional jurisdiction. This petition, is therefore dismissed. It is however, being made clear that the respondents shall only produce certified copies of the documents on the next date of hearing.

The parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned Court below on 16th January, 1979.