High CourtsSingle Bench

Ishwar Singh Punia vs Atma Ram Mittal

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 25 October 1985 · Citation: (1986) 1 RCR(Rent) 229

HON’BLE JUDGES
I.S. Tiwana, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 — Section 1(3)
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 2457 of 1985
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Judgment

12 paragraphs · 1,284 words

I.S. Tiwana, J.—The respondent landlord file a suit on 15th June, 1982 for the ejectment of the petitioner tenant from the shop situated in Raj Guru Market, Hissar, which had been rented out to the later in the year 1978. The case pleaded was that since the tenan was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 2400/-for the period 1st December, 1981 to 1st May 1982 and his tenancy had been terminated with the service of a legal notice on him, the landlord was entitled to seek his eviction. The suit obviously was filed in the light of section 1(3) of the Harayana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which exempted any building constructed on or after the commencement of the Act from the operation of the Act for a period of ten years To be precise, the language of this sub-section is "nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction of which is completed op or after the commencement of this Act for a period of ten years from the date of its completion". Since by 9th November, 1984, the landlord failed to secure a decree in his favour and the period of time exempting the building from the provisions of the Act, i. e., ten years from the date of completion had expired, the petitioner tenant moved an application before the trial Court claiming that with the above noted efflux of time no proceedings against him could be continued in the civil Court and the landlord has essentially to seek his remedy under the Act. This prayer of the petitioner was turned down by the lower Court with the observation that what the language of the statute and more particularly section 1(3) of the Act requires is that the suit should have been filed within ten years from the date of completion of the building and the decree of ejectment need not be passed within that period of exemption. The petitioner impugns this order.

2.

The sole submission of Mr. J.S. Wasu, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner is that the interpretation placed by the lower Court on section 1(3) of the Act is palpably wrong in the face of latest pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Vineet Kumar Vs. Mangal Sain Wadhera, . Though that case was under a different statute, i e. UP Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (13 of 1972), yet the relevant provision of the statute, i. e., sub-section (2) of section 2 is almost similar to the language of section 1(3) of the Act. The relevant part of sub section (2) of section 2 of the former Act reads as follows :--

(2) Except as provided in sub-section (5) of section 12, sub-section (1-A) of section 2 sub-section 1(2), of section 24, sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed.

While interpreting this section their Lordships recorded a conclusive finding that "the moment a building becomes ten years old to be reckoned from the date of completion, the new Rent Act would become applicable." It was further opined that with the expiry of the exemption period the tenant would become entitled to seek the protection of the Act even during the pendency of the proceedings against him. As a result of this conclusion the decree of the civil Court ordering the eviction of the tenant in that case was set aside by their Lordships.

3.

Faced with this situation, Mr. Mittal, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent, vehemently urges that an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Firm Amar Nath Basheshar Dass Vs. Tek Chand, , supports the interpretation placed by the lower Court on section 1(3) of the Act and in view of that order deserves to be sustained. Having perused the said judgment I do not, however, feel impressed with the submission of the learned counsel What was considered by their Lordships in that judgment was the notification issued by the State Government u/s 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949) which reads as follows:--

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act J949 and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to direct that the provisions of section 13 of the said Act shall not apply in respect of decrees for ejectment of tenants in possession of building which satisfy the following conditions, namely:

(a) Buildings constructed during the year 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 are exempted from all the provisions of the said Act for a period of five years to be calculated from the dates of their completion, and

(b) During the aforesaid period of exemption suits for ejectment of tenants in possession of those buildings were or are instituted in civil Courts by the landlords against the tenants and decrees of ejectment were or are passed.

While interpreting this notification, it was observed by the Court that "it is clear from the language of the notification that what is exempted is the deccree for ejectment of a tenant from the application of section 13". The Court further concluded that:--

It is obvious that the filing of a suit by itself does not confer any exemption because what is exempted from the provisions of section 13 is the decree. A suit filed, therefore, must end in a decree though that decree may be passed subsequent of the expiry of the 5 years'' period during which exemption from the application of section 13 has heen granted.

It is apparent that the language of the notification in that case exempting the decrees relating to buildings constructed during the five years'' specified in that notification bears no similarity to the language of section 1(3) of the Act which has already been reproduced above. It is, therefore, manifest that the reliance placed by Mr. Mittal on this judgment of the Supreme Court is simply futile in the light of the observations made in Vineet Kumar''s case (supra). It may be observed here that Mr. Mittal even goes to the extent of submitting that the interpretation placed on the exempting provision in Vineet Kumar''s case is likely to lead to anomalous results as according to the learned counsel it is not within the power of a landlord to secure a decree of ejectment within the period of ten years and he cannot be non-suited for no fault of his. Be that as it may, it is not for me to opine or comment upon the above noted judgment which concededly has a binding effect.

4.

In view of the observations made in Vineet Kumar''s case (supra) and the accepted factual position that the building in question had been completed in June, 1974 and by 9th November, 1984 the exemption period was over, I have no option but to allow this petition The net result is that the proceedings taken against the petitioners subsequent to 9th November, 1984, have been rendered as without jurisdiction and are set aside. It is again the undisputed position in the light of the observations made in Sawan Ram v Gabinda Ram (1980) 82 P.L.R. 271 that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to order the eviction of a tenant from a building covered by the Act. In view of that the suit filed by the respondent landlord has obviously to be dismissed and I order accordingly. I, however, pass no order as to costs.