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Judgment
9 paragraphs · 1,262 wordsChakravartti, C.J.—Only a short point is involved in these two groups of revision cases and the point is one concluded by authority. It appears that in both cases applications were made by the landlords for the standardisation of rent in respect of the premises occupied by the several tenants and those applications were made when the Rent Act of 1948 was in force. The Rent Controller made certain orders and thereupon appeals were preferred by the landlords and in some cases also by the tenants. The appeals were transferred by the learned chief Judge of the Small Cause Court to the fourth bench of that Court and were ultimately heard and disposed of by the presiding Judge Mr. B.P. Buxi. Against the decisions of Mr. Buxi two sets of Rules were obtained from this Court-the first set being Civil Revision Cases, Nos. 161 to 183 of 1951, in which Rules were issued on January 21, 1951, and which related to premises No. 38, Armanian Street, and the other set was Civil Revision Cases, Nos. 199 to 220 of 1951, in which Rules were issued on February 22, 1951, and which related to the premises No. 14, Nurmall Lohia Lane. All those Rules came to be heard and disposed of by Mr. Justice Das on August 31, 1951. His Lordship held that inasmuch as the proceedings had been commenced at the time when the Rent Act of 1948 was in force, the appeals world be governed by the provisions of that Act, and consequently Mr. B.P. Buxi to whom the appeals had been transferred had dealt with them without any jurisdiction to do so. In spite of his having arrived at that decision, however, the learned Judge felt unable to interfere, because, in his opinion, if the appeals were heard by an incompetent Court, so were the revision gases incompetent, because under several decisions which had been given earlier, the High Court would have no jurisdiction to interfere in revision in such cases. In that view he discharged the Rules, and thereafter the present Rules were obtained under Article 227 of the Constitution against the appellate orders of Mr. B.P. Buxi.
It is well-settled that appeals in standardisation cases commenced under the Act of 1948 must be governed by the provisions of that Act and if that be so, they can only be dealt with either by the chief Judge of the Small Cause Court or a person specially nominated by the Government, as provided for in Section 32(2) of the Act of 1948, if any such person exists at the time. It is not disputed that Mr. B.P. Buxi was not such a person and, therefore, it is not even arguable that Mr. Buxi had any jurisdiction to hear the appeals.
The above would have been sufficient to dispose of these Rules, but Mr. Sen on behalf of some of the tenants opposite parties contended that although the lower appellate Court might have had no jurisdiction to hear the appeals that it did hear, still this Court was not bound to interfere under Article 227 as a matter of course and if on the merits he could satisfy us that an order for a rehearing of the appeals would serve no useful purpose, it would not be proper for us to add another chapter to the proceedings by directing a useless rehearing. In support of that contention Mr. Sen drew our attention to a decision of Harries C.J. and Das J., in the case of Indra Narayan Kundu v. Girindranath Mitra (1951) 6 D.L.R. Cal. 148, decided on June 27, 1951. It appears that the application there made was an application u/s 32(4) of the Rent Act and on that application being held to be not maintainable, the Court was invited to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution. Delivering the judgment of the Court, the learned Chief Justice said that the jurisdiction under Article 227 had to be exercised most sparingly and in cases where there would be a grave miscarriage of justice, if the Court did not interfere. But if it appeared that the impugned decision was right on the merits, the Court would not be called upon to set it aside even though the tribunal giving the decision might have had no jurisdiction. As against that decision Mr. Mukherjee, appearing on behalf of the landlords Petitioners, drew our attention to another, delivered by the same learned Judges about a month earlier. The case referred to was that of P.C. Guha v. B.A. Basil ILR (1952) 2 Cal. 360 : (1951) 55 C.W.N. 611, decided on May 31, 1951. That case, like the case cited by Mr. Sen, is precisely on all fours with the cases before us and there the Court held that once it was established that the tribunal which had dealt with the appeals had no jurisdiction to deal with them, interference under Article 227 would at once be called for, because otherwise the Court would be maintaining the results of cases heard and determined by a person who was not competent under the law to hear and determine them.
It appears to me that if one has to make a choice between these two decisions, the better choice would undoubtedly be the case last cited. Nobody would like to lay it down as an absolute proposition of law that in every case the High Court would be bound to interfere under Article 227, if irregularity or want of jurisdiction was established. There may be some very exceptional case in which the Court would not feel disposed to interfere, even if lack of jurisdiction was proved beyond doubt, but as a rule it is essential to good administration of justice that the various Courts and tribunals should be kept in their proper places and none allowed to exceed its jurisdiction. If the principle contended for by Mr. Sen were to be accepted, this Court would be committed to the extremely difficult position of having to consider all cases that might be brought to its notice on the merits and then decide whether it would not or would set aside the decision of the incompetent tribunal, according as the decision was or was not on the merits right. I am quite clear in my mind that to maintain decisions, rendered by persons having no jurisdiction under the law to deal with the cases decided by them, decisions so to speak of a man in the street, would be fraught with possibilities of great public mischief and no such rule should obtain any assent from any Court of law, at least as a rule.
In my opinion cases of this type are precisely cases which Article 227 has in contemplation and when they are brought to the notice of the Court, the Court ought to set aside decisions of incompetent tribunals and remit the appeals to be heard and determined by tribunals to which the law of the country has assigned the jurisdiction to try and determine them.
For the reasons given above, these Rules, in my opinion, must be and they are hereby made absolute. The judgments and orders of Mr. B.P. Buxi, Judge, fourth bench, Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, dated June 30, 1950, are set aside and the cases are sent back to the learned chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, in order that he may hear and determine them in accordance with law.
There will be no order for costs in these Rules.
Sinha, J.
I agree.
