Isolators And Isolators vs Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. And Another

Petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, claiming for following relief(s):

“(i) To set aside the impugned order dated 13.02.2020 (Annexure P-22);

(ii) Grant any other relief that this Honourable Court deems fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case.â€​

The petitioner who is in the business of manufacturing and repairing of transformers has challenged the impugned order dated 13.02.2020 (Annexure

P-22) passed by the respondent No.2 by which the petitioner has been debarred/blacklisted from participating in further tenders of the respondents for

a period of three years. The petitioner has also filed a representation dated 27.02.2020 (Annexure P-23) requesting the respondents to consider and

recall the order dated 13.02.2020. However, no action on the said representation has been taken so far.

Learned counsel for the petitioner inter-alia submitted that the order impugned Annexure P-22 is not a speaking order as it does not assign any legal

reasons before blacklisting the petitioner. Reference was made to the operative portion which reads thus:

“Your firm vide letter no.I&I/BPL/19-20/reply/1025 dated 30.11.2019 has submitted reply to debarring notice and your firm could not produce any

document/statement which restrains the firm from debarring. Your firm has violated Tender conditions as stipulated in TS-494 and TS-532.

Therefore, after given fully opportunity and due consideration, the competent authority has accorded approval to recover penalty on rejected and unsupplied DTRs

from the firm. Further, M/s Isolators & Isolators, Bhopal and its subsidiary/affiliated Company/Firms should be debarred for future business for the period of 3

(Three) years.

Accordingly, your firm M/s Isolators & Isolators, Bhopal having registered office at Plot No.-83 Sector-1, Industrial Area, Govindpura, Bhopal â€" 462023 (M.P.) is

hereby debarred for participating in tenders of MPMKVVCL for a period of 3 (Three) years from the date of issuance of this letter. All of your associated concerns

and their Business dealings with this company have also been banned for the same period.

We find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Income Tax Appeal (ITA) No. 40 of 2013 (Commissioner of Income Tax-II, Amritsar vs. Indra Sen

Aggarwal), decided on 27.08.2015 has set aside the order of ITAT while remanding the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication on the

ground that it was not a speaking and reasoned order as per the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has said that even administrative order requires to record reasons. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Kranti Associates Pvt.

Ltd. and another v. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 while dealing with the requirement of passing a reasoned order by an

authority whether administrative, quasi judicial or judicial, had laid down as under:-

“17. The expression 'speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chan-cellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the

ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See

1878-97 Vol. 4 Ap-peal Cases 30 at 40 of the report).

This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must

speak. It must not be like the 'inscrutable face of a Sphinx'.

19 to 50 XX XX XX 51.

Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect any-one prejudicially.

 (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

 (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding ex-traneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable component of a decision making process as observing principles of natu-ral justice by judicial, quasi-judicial

and even by administra-tive bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.

This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common

purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been ob-jectively considered. This is important for sustaining the liti-gants' faith in the

justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial ac-countability and transparency.

(k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding

is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or 'rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision

making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in deci-sion making not only makes the

judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100

Harward Law Review 731-737).

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said re-quirement is now virtually a component

of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of Ox-ford, 2001 EWCA

Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Ar-ticle 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which re-quires, ""adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for

judicial decisions"".

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for develop-ment of law, requirement of giving

reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of ""Due Process"".

In view of the above, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Annexure P-22 may be treated to have been withdrawn and liberty be

granted to the respondents to pass a fresh order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in accordance with law.

In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order Annexure P-22 dated 13.02.2020 is set aside and respondents are permitted to pass a fresh order within

fifteen days after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner through video conferencing, in accordance with law.

The writ petition stands disposed of.