I.S.Verma vs Harbhajan Singh Kalra

Pritpal Singh, J.

The petitioner I.S. Verman has sought the quashing of complaint dated July 30 1983 of the respondent Harbans Singh Kalra (Annexure P.I) and the order dated March 1, 1984 of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Faridabad, (Annexure P.5) by which, in pursuance of the said complaint, the petitioner and his coaccused were summoned.

The relevant facts of this case are that the respondent Harbhajan Singh Kalra and the coaccused of the petitioner, namely, Amir Chand, Mehar Singh, Uma Bhutani and Asha Nand were partners in a Firm. A dispute arose between the partners and dissolution deed was executed on October 31, 1982, dissolving the Firm (Annexure P.2). According to the petitioner a memorandum of understanding was also executed by the partners on November 1, 1982 (Annexure P.3) by which he was appointed as an arbitrator to decide the dispute. In pursuance of this memorandum the petitioner issued a notice to the partners of the Firm, including the respondent, on March 5, 1983 to appear before him for arbitration. The respondent, claiming the memorandum (Annexure P.3) to be a forged document, filed a civil suit on June 23, 1983 seeing a declaration that this document, being forged and fabricated, can not be acted upon. It was further prayed that the petitioner be permanently restrained from proceeding with the arbitration. Shortly thereafter the respondent filed the impugned complaint on July 30, 1983 against the petitioner and the coaccused to be prosecuted undersections 420, 465, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The Judicial Magistrate I Class, Faridabad taking cognizance of the complaint, passed the impugned order of summoning of the petitioner and his coaccused on March 1, 1984 (Annexure P.5).

The petitioner in the petition put forward various grounds on merits for quashing the impugned complaint and the proceedings taken by the Magistrate in pursuance thereof. These grounds have not been pressed into service before me because admittedly a similar petition of one of the coaccused of the petitioner, namely, Mehar Singh has since been dismissed by M.M. Punchhi, J. on April 4, 1984 (Criminal Misc. No. 201M of 1984) The only point of law urged on behalf of the petitioner now is that the respondent''s complaint is barred under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Hereinafter called as ''the Code)'' This legal objection had not been taken by Mehar Singh in the aforesaid petition so this Additional objection is now being urged by the petitioner.

It is contended by the learned petitioner''s counsel that under section 195(1) (b)(ii) of the Code the complaint regarding the document (Annexure P.3) could be filed only by the Court in which the above mentioned civil suit is pending and that the respondent had no locustandi to file the complaint.

A perusal of section 195 of the Code would show that his objection is void of merit. The relevant part of Section 195 is as follows :

" 195. (1) No court shall take cognizance

(b) (i)

(ii) of any offence described in Sec. 463, or punishable under Section 475, or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or

(iii)

except on the complaint in writing of that Court : or of some other court to which that Court is subordinate".

The intention of the Legislature is clear that if a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court as genuine is found to be forged then a complaint regarding the offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Sections 471, 475 or Section 476, Indian Penal Code, could be filed by the Court and none else. In the present case these ingredients are missing. The memorandum (Annexure P 3) has not been produced as evidence in any case as genuine and no Court has held it to be forged. Actually, in pursuance of this document the petitioner had issued notice to the respondent and other partners of the Firm to appear before him to participate in arbitration proceedings and on the receipt of notice the respondent filed the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) alleging that the notice is based on a forged document. In other words it is not such a case where any document produced in evidence as genuine was declared as aforged document by the Court. No doubt a suit for getting the document declared as forged was also filed by the respondent, but evidently the complaint (Annexure P 1) was filed by the respondent independently of the civil suit and so it cannot be said that the offence is alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and his coaccused in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in proceeding before the Court.

I am, therefore, firmly of the view that Section 195 of the Code has no application to the impugned complaint or the proceeding taken by the Magistrate in pursuance thereof. I am, thus, unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that the impugned complaint is barred by Section 195 of the Code. Consequently, this petition stands dismissed.