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Judgment
Pratap Singh, J.—Petition under S.482, Code of Criminal Procedure, praying for the direction to the respondents to restrain the first and
second respondents from giving any police protection to the third respondent-Management either in removal of goods, whether finished or semi
finished machineries and raw-materials from its factory at Thiruvottriyur or to interfere with the peaceful demonstration by the third respondent''s
workers at or near the said factory in exercise of the trade Union rights.
The General Secretary of the petitioner has filed an affidavit in support of the application. The allegations in it are briefly as follows:-
(i)The petitioner Union represents a majority of the Employees in the 3rd respondent factory. The long term agreement dated 24.12.1988 between
the Management and the workers relating to wages, work-load etc., expired on 30.11.1992. The Union issued notice dated 1.10.1992 under
S.19(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, terminating the settlement. The Union submitted a fresh charter of demands by its letter dated 7.10.1992.
The Union requested the Management to start negotiations on their demands by several letters and requested the Management to fix a time and
place for discussion on the charter of demands. The Management continuously dodged. On 8.12.1992, the Management came up with a counter
proposals of its own, whereby they sought for introduction of a modernisation and rationalisation scheme which would result in retrenchment of
existing workers. Moreover, numbers of crew to man the machines as suggested by the Management were below the numbers prevailing in other
factories of the I.T.C. itself. This was not acceptable to the Union. But, however, they were willing to negotiate. So they requested the
management by their letters to start negotiations whereby the demands raised by them and the proposals given by the Management could be
discussed and an amicable settlement reached. The Management was evading negotiations. In the elections held for the office-bearers of the
Union, the same office-bearers were re-elected. In view of the evasive attitude of the Management and refusing to negotiate with the Union, they
issued strike notice dated 20.5.1993 in which they stated that they would strike work from 3.6.93.
(ii) Pursuant to the strike notice, the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Madras, Vide his letter dated 26.5.1993 initiated conciliation talks as per the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The last of the meetings took place on 15.10.1993. Conciliation talks are still pending. Since the response was
cordial, the Union did not proceed with the proposed strike. On 6.9.93 the Management unilaterally insisted on running certain new machines
according to the manning norms set by it. The said machines were bought by the Company some time ago, but since working the machines meant
introducing new manning norms, it was being negotiated upon between the Management and the Unions. If the manning norms suggested by the
Management was implemented, it would result in retrenchment of workers, Hence, this was negotiated till 6.9.1993. No settlement was reached.
This is the subject matter of the conciliation proceedings also. Hence, the unilateral action of the Management of introducing the new machines is
contrary to S.9-A read with item 10 of Schedule IV of the Industrial Disputes Act.
(iii) The Management wanted to rationalise the work force also. This is a major issue in the conciliation proceedings. In this back ground, when the
Management insisted on introducing the new machines, the workers refused to operate them. They were not trained to do it. The Management
then illegally terminated the services of six workmen on 7.9.1993, for the refusal to operate the machines. 30 other workmen were suspended from
service. So the workers commenced a stay-in-strike from 8.9.93 which continued till 18.9.93.
(iv) On 19.9.93 the Management put up a notice asking the workers to give an undertaking before entering the factory that they would do their
work once inside the factory. The entry was blocked to those who did not give the undertaking. The workers refused to give any such undertaking.
The Management closed down the canteen and illegally locked out the factory. On 23.9.93, before the Joint Commissioner of Labour, the Union
agreed to call of the strike if the status-quo on 4.9.93 was restored. The Management was not agreeable to this.
(v) On 25.9.93,15 union members were arrested by the police on a complaint by the Management alleging that they had gheraoed some officers.
Those allegations are not proved. On 27.9.93, the Management called the Union for talks. Conciliation talks were held before the Joint
Commissioner of Labour on the first, 8th and 15th October 93. On 17.10.93 police were found near the entrance of the factory while they were
carrying on their peaceful demonstrations. The Management produced an order of this Court in Crl.O.P. No. 11720 of 1993 dated 15.10.93
granting Police protection to the Management to remove finished products from within the factory. The Union was not made a party to the Criminal
O.P. The 3rd respondent has deliberately misrepresented facts to the Court, as if an interim injunction granted by the Civil Court in 1981 is still in
operation. It is not so. Though the suit is still pending, for all practical purposes it is redundant since the dispute, between the Management and the
Union over which the stalmate arose in 1981 was later settled between the parties by a settlement dated 10.2.82 under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. In any case, the said interim injunction can in no way be said to cover any goods or materials that are presently within the factory''s
premises. They were not paid their wages for the month of September, 93 for the period they worked. The finished and semi-finished goods inside
the factory have been produced with their labour and they have a prior charge over them. The raw-materials that are inside are meant for being
used for production. The Management wants to remove them and have the work done elsewhere which it cannot legitimately do. The workmen
have a right to insist on the work being done by them in accordance with agreed norms and as per the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.
The right to strike is a recognised trade Union rights and as long as there is no commission of illegal acts, the police cannot interfere. Hence the
petition.
The Branch Manager of the third respondent''s packaging and printing factory at Thiruvottiyur has filed the counter affidavit. The allegations in it
are briefly as follows:-
(i) The Long Term Agreement dated 24.12.88 was signed between the petitioner and this respondent. The period of operation of this settlement
was set out in Clause 6 of Part II of the Memorandum of Settlement. The Company did not dodge negotiations. The Union was delaying the
process by not restoring normalcy in the factory, not stopping the ""go-slow"" indulged in by them and not agreeing to run the new machines. By their
letter dated 12.10.92, they have acceded to the request of the union by lifting the suspension of the 14 employees. There was no reciprocation
from the side of the Union. By letter dated 23.10.92 they advised the Union to fix a convenient date and time to discuss all the matters mentioned
in their letter dated 12.10.92. By letter dated 9.11.92 they urged the workers to avoid industrial sickness. But the Union conveyed their decision to
observe one day''s strike on 24.11.92 by their letter dated 7.11.92 that was replied by letter dated 10.11.92 expressing their commitment to
mutual negotiations and urging the Union not to go on strike by letter dated 10.11.92. The Company has expressed its eagerness in holding early
discussions in a conducive atmosphere. Despite various notices, the Union had been indulging in go-slow activities. By letter dated 5.12.92, the
Company made it clear that it had no pre-conditions for talks. Finally the Union came forward with a specified date and time by their letter dated
7.12.92. The Company denies the allegations that modernisation and rationalisation scheme would result in retrenchment of existing workers. The
Company had clarified that the Management proposals cannot be deemed to add additional work-load to the employees. The Company made a
conditional offer to Rs. 352/- per capita per month increase in the wage packet on 9.12.92, eight days after the expiry of the agreement dated
24.12.88. The Union''s letter dated 17.12.1992 contained provocative utterances and at this stage the Company had commenced the process of
explaining the Management proposals to the Union and Committee Members. The process was gone through till the end of January, 1993.
(ii) Between 15.2.1993 and 19.2.1993, the employees resorted to an illegal and unjustified stay-in-strike by refusing to operate various machines
in the factory, which were in operation early. This coupled with their refusal to interact with the co computer terminals had brought the entire
factory to a grinding halt. This stay-in-strike continued upto 3.3.93. Based on the assurances of the office-bearers of the Union, the Company had
reciprocated, in terms of negotiations taking the initial offer to an even more substantial level by the middle of March, 93. While negotiations were
in progress, the Union to pressurise the Management gave a strike notice by their letter dated 20.5.93. Several rounds of talks were held by the
Joint Commissioner of Labour for an amicable settlement. Even as the matter was under discussion, the Union went on an illegal and unjustified
strike from 8.9.93.
(iii) This respondent denies that the Management unilaterally insisted on running of certain new machines without discussion the crewing norms.
Several months before the arrival of the new machines, the Company discussed with the Union about the crewing pattern of the various new
machines. Understanding was also reached between the Company and the Union on this during March-April, 1993. In fact two new machines
were being run by the workmen from August, 1991 and April, 1990 respectively. The manning norms suggested by the company will not result in
retrenchment of workers. This has been reiterated before the Joint Commissioner of Labour on several days during the negotiations before him.
The allegations that the Company introduced new machines contrary to S.9-A read with item 10 of Schedule IV of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
are denied.
(iv) The rationalisation and re-organisation is a normal feature in the Company''s Long term agreement and these have been followed for the past
several years and workmen were adequately compensated for this. The services of five workmen were terminated as their services were not found
to be satisfactory on completion of their probationary period. With regard to the 6th Workmen, he was dismissed for proven misconduct i.e.,
sabotage of machinery after full-fledged and proper enquiry. That has nothing to do with their refusal to operate new machines. 29 workmen were
suspended, pending enquiry, since they refused to obey the lawful orders of the superiors. The Union resorted to an unjustified stay-in-strike from
8.9.93.
(v) By notice dated 19.9.93, this respondent stated that if workmen desired to continue their strike, they can do so, while remaining out-side the
factory premises and they will be permitted to enter into the factory only if they give a written declaration that they are entering the factory with the
intention to work and carry out their duties as per the legitimate directions of the Company. On 20th and 21st of September 1993, none of the
striking employees entered the factory premises, but on the 22nd morning at the instigation of the Union, the employees scaled over the turnstiles at
the security gate and forced their entry into the factory premises. They continued to remain in the factory, but without working for the next few
days. During this period the canteen could not be run. Canteen facilities are provided for the employees when they are on duty and not when they
are on strike. The said allegation that the factory was looked out is denied. It is only the workmen chose to remain outside the factory premises on
strike.
(vi) The Management were not agreeable to revert to the status quo on 4.9.93, as demanded by the Union as it would have amounted to their not
running the machines at the full rated capacity and the go-slow situation as existing on that date. On 24.9.93, the Union had insisted the employees
to gherao the security officer and prevented the Managers and their vehicles from entering and leaving the factory premises, effective 08.00 hours
on 25.9.93 though indulging in using filthy and abusive language against the Management staff. This is in violation of the injunction granted in the
Applications in O.S. Nos. 1505 and 1506 by the District Munsif, Ponneri. The company was constrained to inform the police. When the efforts of
the police in persuading the Union members not to resort to illegal behaviour failed, they were forced to arrest 15 such employees. During the
bilateral meetings held on 27th/28th September, 93, the Union agreed unconditionally to resume work, restore the normal output in the factory and
run all the new machines. But before the Joint Commissioner of Labour on 1.10.93, the Union went back on their commitments and imposed
various unreasonable conditions for calling off the strike.
(vii) There is no infirmity in the order dated 15.10.93 in Criminal O.P. No. 11720 of 1993 of this Court. The said order continues to be in full
force and operation. The petitioner has not sought to be impleaded in the said matter, not challenged the said order. The interim injunction granted
by the District Munsif, Ponneri, is in force. The orders of interim injunctions cover the circumstances present to-day and are not limited to the
events of 1981.
(viii) With regard to para 15, the wages are payable on 30th of the month for which work had been done. Since the employees are on illegal and
unlawful strike and since the law permits a deduction of eight days wages for such illegal strike the workmen were not entitled to any wages for the
seven days they worked in September, 1993. The workers cannot have any prior charge on finished and semi finished goods. They belong to the
respondent''s company. Hence the dismissal of the petition is prayed for.
Ms. Vaigai, learned counsel appearing for M/s. Row and Reddy has submitted that the long term agreement entered into between the Union and
the Management came to an end on 30.11.92, but even prior to the expiry date, the Union has got the charter of demands on 7.10.92 that the
Management gave the counter proposals on 8.12.92 whereby they sought introduction of a modernisation scheme which would result in
retrenchment of the existing workers and it was not acceptable to the Union, since the work-load would be high. Since the Management was
unreasonable, strike notice was sent on 20.5.93 and in the meanwhile, the Joint Commissioner of Labour initiated conciliation talks and so strike
was deferred. The learned counsel would further submit that on 6.9.93 the Management insisted running of certain new machines, according to
meaning norms set out by it, that the workers refused to operate on it and on 7.9.93 six workers were dismissed and 30 were suspended. She
would further submit that this order is an illegal one and so it was decided to place those matters before the conciliation proceedings and in view of
the provocation by way of dismissal and suspension, the workers went on strike. The learned counsel would submit that the management insisted a
written undertaking being given by the workers before entering into the factory premises and they are not entitled to insist on such a condition and
the Management has closed the doors and this would amount to an illegal lock-out. She would further submit that the workers have got a charge
over the finished and semi-finished goods in the factory premises and as such they have got every right to obstruct the removal of the said goods
from the factory premises and if they are allowed to be removed, the efficacy of the strike will be affected.
Per contra Mr. Govind Swaminathan, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the third respondent, would contend that the strike resorted to
by the Union during the conciliation talks is illegal. He would submit that the injunctions granted in the application in the suit filed in the court of
District Munsif, Ponneri are still in force. He would add that the order of this court passed in Crl.O.P. No. 11720 of 1993 granting police
protection to remove the finished and semi finished goods from the factory cannot be set at naught by passing an order in this petition and that if the
petitioner is aggrieved by that order, the remedy open to the petitioner is to get itself impleaded in that petition and urge its contentions. He would
also state that because it is an illegal strike, the wages for 8 days in the month of September, 93 had been deducted and the workmen are not
entitled to any wages for the days in September, 93 and they cannot have prior charge over finished and semi finished goods.
Regarding the suit pending in the District Munsif s Court, Ponneri, Ms. Vaigai states that it does not have any application to the goods in the
premises as on today. Regarding the Crl.O.P. No. 11720 of 1993 of this Court, the learned counsel would submit that the petitioner herein is not a
party in that petition and the third respondent herein has deliberately omitted to implead the petitioner as a party in that petition and in the
circumstances there is no need for the petitioner to get itself impleaded as a party in the prior petition and seek for an order in it.
I have carefully considered the submissions made by the rival counsel. The third respondent is heavily relying upon the orders passed in I.A.
Nos. 1280 and 1281 of 1981 in O.S. No. 1505 of 1981 on the file of the District Munsif, Ponneri. In I.A. No. 1280 of 1981, the prayer is for an
injunction restraining the defendant, its office bearers, members, servants, agents and representatives from in any manner preventing the movement
of the finished goods, semi finished goods, raw materials and other goods, to and from the premises of the plaintiff Company at Thiruvottiyur. In
I.A. No. 1281 of 1981, the prayer is for an interim injunction restraining the aforesaid defendant from in any manner holding out threats,
intimidating, gheraoing or wrongfully confining the plaintiffs Management staff, Officers, lady Secretaries, non-striking employees and other persons
in or around the plaintiffs premises. In both the petitions, the learned District Munsif had initially passed an order of ad- interim injunction and later
after hearing the arguments of both the sides, he had passed a common order whereunder interim injunction already granted in both the petitions
were made absolute. The suit is still pending and as such the aforesaid two orders are still in force. There is an order passed inter parties is still in
force regarding the movement of goods and other prayers containing in those petitions. These orders passed in I.A. Nos. 1280 and 1281 of 1981
is a strong factor against the prayers sought for in this Criminal O.P.
Ms. Vaigai would contend that O.S. No. 1505 of 1981 was filed with regard to the situation when prevailing, that subsequent to that suit, the
parties had entered into a long term agreement and their disputes were resolved and as such these orders of injunction would no longer hold good.
She would further contend that any way, these orders of injunction do not cover the finished goods and semi finished goods etc., now lying within
the factory premises. In the plaint in O.S. No. 1506 of 1981 in para 15 it is stated that the defendant''s members are not entitled to prevent the
entry and exit of raw materials and other goods and that if the plaintiff is not allowed to move these goods, it will not be able to accept supplies and
thereby further loss will be caused to the plaintiff. It is further averred that the defendant''s workmen are not entitled to prevent the entry and exist
of the plaintiffs managerial staff and Officers etc., and they have got right to enter and leave the plaintiffs premises and their obstruction amounts to
the commission of criminal and tortious acts. In para 11 of the plaint it is averred that in addition to going on strike and ceasing work the defendant
and its members have resorted to illegal acts. The illegal acts are listed in para 11. They are obstructing the movement of the goods belonging to
the plaintiffs customers and raw materials and other goods, obstructing the entry and exit of the plaintiffs customers, suppliers, contractors and their
men to and from the plaintiffs premises. The above allegations had been included in the plaint and the applications were filed and injunction orders
were passed, as mentioned above. While so, I am unable to ignore totally the orders as in I.A. Nos. 1280 and 1281 and 1981. Those orders
cannot be considered as non-est.
Mr. Govind Swaminathan would contend that in Crl.O.P. No. 11720 of 1993, this Court has passed an order directing the 2nd respondent
namely, the Inspector of Ponce Ennore Police Station, Ennore, Madras, to give adequate police protection to the petitioner in that case namely the
third respondent herein to move the finished the semi finished goods from the petitioner''s factory at Thiruvottriyur and their men and vehicle while
transporting. While so if the petitioner herein is aggrieved by that order, the petitioner should have impleaded itself as a party in the said Criminal
O.P. and sought for modification or cancellation or other appropriate orders and that they cannot come byway of separate criminal O.P. and seek
a direction which will virtually nullify the direction given in Crl.O.P. No. 12516 of 93. The order passed in Crl.O.P. No. 11720 of 1993 read as
follows:
Therefore, I hereby direct the second respondent to give adequate police protection to the petitioner to move the finished and semi finished goods
from the petitioner''s factory at Thiruvottiyur and their men and vehicle while transporting.
The prayer in this petition is for a direction restraining the respondents 1 and 2 who are Superintendent of Police, St. Thomas Mount, Madras-16
and Inspector of Police, Ennore Police Station, restraining them from giving any police Protection to the third respondent Management or removal
of goods, finished or semi finished and raw-materials from its factory at Thiruvottiyur etc. The learned senior counsel would submit that if this
direction is given, that would virtually amount to cancelling the directions given in the earlier criminal O.P., at the same time not cancelling it
specifically and that would lead to an anomalous situation and conflicting directions.
Miss Vaigai relied upon Prabodh Verma and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, . In it the Apex Court has held that the High
Court sought not to decide a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment
being before it as respondents or at least by some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large to
join as respondents individually and if the petitioners refused to join them, the High Court ought to have dismissed that petition for non-joinder of
necessary parties. In Abdul Malick Vs. The Collector of Dharmapuri and Others, Mr. Justice P.S. Kailasam, as he then was, held as follows:-
Whatever may be the value of a judgment rendered without hearing arguments in full when parties are present, judgment rendered without notice or
in the absence of the contesting party will not be entitled to any weight as a precedent. In cases when petitions are dismissed at the admission
stage, the respondent is not present and has no opportunity to put forth his case. Admittedly, whatever observations may be made they will not
bind the respondent and the judgment cannot be a precedent, because it is a judgment rendered on hearing only one side.
Miss Vaigai also relied upon Superintendent And Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh (1975 11 S.C.J. 478) In that case an
application under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the applicants was rejected on the ground the petition was
pre-mature and thereafter the criminal case dragged on for a period of one and a half years without any progress at all and in the circumstances the
applicants made a fresh application under S.561-A to quash the proceedings. The Apex Court has held that it could not be contended that what
the High Court was being asked to do by making the subsequent application was to review or revise the order made by it on the earlier
application. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application and consider whether on the facts and
circumstances then obtaining, the continuance of the proceedings against the applicants constituted an abuse of the process of the Court, its
quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice. This ruling is not applicable to the facts of this case. But the rulings in 1984 4 S.C.C. 311
supra and 1968 I M.L.J. 9 supra have got a direct bearing on this case. In the first Criminal O.P., the petitioner herein was not made a party,
though it is vitally interested in the reliefs sought for in that case. So it cannot be said that it is binding on the petitioner herein. This Criminal O.P.
was filed by the petitioner after impleading all the necessary parties namely, the Police Officials as well as the Management. So, though in the first
flush, it may appear that the orders passed in these two Crl.O.P. may lead to the conflicting directions, on a close scrutiny, it would be clear that
the petitioner herein, being not a party to the earlier Criminal O.P., in not having impleaded in the petition is not bound by it. But in this Criminal
O.P., the petitioner has impleaded the management who is the petitioner m the prior O.P., and the first respondent in the prior O.P., and
concerned police and thus has impleaded all the necessary parties and so can seek these reliefs. It cannot be said that the petition is not
maintainable.
Miss Vaigai submits that after the conciliation proceedings had commenced, the Management had directed the workers to work in the new
machinery and thus sought for a change in the condition of service and so it was an illegal order and so rightly disobeyed by the workers and for
this disobedience, 6 workers were dismissed and 30 were suspended and these two circumstances namely, direction to work in the new machines
contrary to the earlier conditions of the service and dismissal of 6 employees and suspension of 30 for disobedience of the same had prompted the
workmen to strike. Miss Vaigai would further contend that during the conciliation proceedings, these two acts on the part of the Management
ought not have been done. Regarding this, the Management had stated in para 5 of the counter affidavit that the modernisation and rationalisation
scheme would not result in retrenchment of the existing workers. In para 7 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that the Management denies that they
unilaterally insisted on running certain new machines without discussing the crewing norms and that several months before the arrival of the new
machines the matter was discussed with the Union and an understanding was reached between the Company and the Union during March April,
93 and in fact these two new machines were being run by workmen from August, 91 and April, 90 respectively. Regarding the dismissal and
suspension of the workmen, in para 8 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that the services of 5 workmen were terminated as their services were not
found to be satisfactory on completion of their probationary period and with regard to the sixth workman, he was dismissed for proven misconduct
namely, sabotage of machinery after full-fledged and proper enquiry and that it has anything to do with the workmen''s refusal to operate the new
machines, as alleged by them. Regarding the suspension, it is stated that 29 workmen were suspended pending enquiry, since they refused to obey
the lawful and reasonable orders of their superiors. After this dispute, stay-in-strike was resorted and on that the Management had put up a notice
that the workmen desired to continue their strike, they can do so while remaining outside the factory premises and they will be permitted to enter
the factory only if they give a written declaration that they are entering the factory with the intention to work and carry out their duties as per the
legitimate directions of the company. The Management has denied that there was any lock-out whereas according to the union, there was a
lockout. Now the workers are on strike. In the circumstances, the directions, as prayed for are sought.
In National Textile Workers'' Union and Others Vs. P.R. Ramakrishnan and Others, the Apex Court had held as follows:
We are concerned in these appeals only with the relationship of the workers vis-a-vis the company. It is clear from what we have stated above that
it is not only the shareholders who have supplied capital who are interested in the enterprise which is being run by a company but the workers who
supply labour are also equally, if not, more interested because what is produced by the enterprise is the result of labour as well as capital. In fact,
the owners of capital bear only limited financial risk and otherwise contribute nothing to production while labour contributes a major share of the
product. While the former invest only a part of their moneys, the latter invest their sweat and toil, in fact their life itself. The workers therefore have
a special place in a socialist pattern of society.
The Apex Court has held that the workers in a Company are entitled to appear at the hearing of winding up petition whether to support it or
oppose it so long as no winding order is made by the Court and they have locus standi to appear and be heard in the winding up petition, before
the winding up petition is admitted and after admission. This ruling recognises the right of labourers to participate in the proceedings for winding up
of a factory because they are vitally concerned with it. So they have a say in such matters.
In Gwalior Rayons Silk Manufacturing (Weaving) Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. District Collector and Others, a learned single Judge of Kerala
High Court had observed that if the executive arm of the state decides that in a dispute between Labour and Capital, the state should as far as
possible not step in with its police power to tilt the balance in favour of the capital, the court shall not act as a spoke in the wheel to interfere with
such policy. The learned Judge has also stated that the police cannot be told that they should not take action when an offence is committed and the
police officer is answerable to the law and to the law alone. At this juncture, I would like to mention as Miss Vaigai stated that if any offence is
committed, the police is at liberty to take appropriate steps and that the Union will not stand in that way. The learned Judge has also observed as
follows:-
The Management can certainly claim that the ingress and agress to their business premises should be protected from obstruction. Police should
certainly interfere if there is any imminent danger or peril to life and property.
The prayer in that petition was for police protection in the matter of removal of the viscose stape fibre from the godown alleging that the workmen
are preventing the removal of such fibre from the godown. But there was no prayer regarding the removal of finished products as the 2nd petitioner
therein has proposed to move a separate writ petition for that relief. So the prayer was mainly for police protection for removal of 279 bales of
viscose staple fibre stored in godown No. 2A at the factory premises of the 2nd petitioner which belongs to the first petitioner. Such a direction
was not given by the learned Judge. In this case, there was no prayer regarding the removal of finished products. In Sri Rama Vilas Service
Limited v. Simpson and Group Companies Worker''s Union (1979 II L.L.J. 285) it was held that no permission can be granted for removal of the
goods which would render the strike inefficacious and to achieve that purpose, the Court should not lend its hands. But this judgment was taken on
appeal to Division Bench and these observations are vacated. In Rama Vilas Service Ltd. and Another Vs. Simpson and Group Companies
Workers'' Union and Another, and had pointed out that on appeal to Division Bench, the observations contained in Rama Vilas Service Ltd. and
Another Vs. Simpson and Group Companies Workers'' Union and Another, were vacated. The appeal judgment was found in 1980 II L.L.W.
So the observations in the former ruling will no longer hold good. In B.R. Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others, a Division Bench of
the Apex Court has observed as follows:-
Strike in a given situation is only a form of demonstration. There are different modes of demonstrations, e.g., go-slow, sit-in, work-to-rule,
absentism, etc., and strike is one such mode of demonstration by workers for their rights. The right to demonstrate and, therefore, the right to
strike is an important weapon in the armoury of the workers. This right has been recognised by almost all democratic countries. Though not raised
to the high pedestal of a fundamental right, it is recognised as a mode of redress for resolving the grievances of workers. But the right to strike is
not absolute under our industrial jurisprudence and restrictions have been placed on it.
Mr. Govind Swaminathan would fairly concede that the right to strike is a recognised trade union right and as long as no commission of offence the
police cannot interfere.
In Chelpark Company v. Commissioner of Police (A.I.R. 1969 Mad 33) Justice Krishnaswamy Reddy has held that by virtue of relationship
as employer and employees, the employees have got a right to enter the factory premises at the commencement of working hours and stay and
work during working hours and leave at the closing of working hours. Either before or after the working hours, they have no right to occupy the
property of the employer. As the employees are entitled to work during working hours, they can refuse to work only during working hours, while
they stay and strike. After the closing hours, the employer has to close the factory and make arrangements for the protection of the property. The
act of the striking workmen in remaining after the working hours will amount to seizure and holding of the building, preventing the use of the
premises by the employer in a lawful manner. In that case, the order of injunction was passed against the striking workmen from collecting in the
factory premises after the working hours. It was held that police should have given effect to the order of injunction by dispensing the striking
workmen against whom the order was passed. In the instant case before me also there is an order of injunction by a Civil Court which was
referred to at the out-set. The learned Judge had dismissed the writ petition in the nature of a mandamus, but had allowed the Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition. In K.C.P. Limited v. The Inspector of Police, Thiruvottiyur (1991 WLR. 562) in para 12, this Court has laid as follows:
The principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Coimbatore Periyar District Motor Transport Munnetra Sangam by its President v.
Sivakumar Transports Tirupur is very clear on this aspect, viz., if the preventing of removal of the goods would involve only the monetary interest
of the management and no public interest is involved, the Court may consider not helping the management and not interfering in the dispute by way
of any injunction orders, and that if the facts and circumstances are such as that it is just and necessary to permit the goods to be removed in order
to prevent any waste or loss of goods, or that the acts in relation to which injunction is prayed for will have no effect on public interest, then,
injunction against interference with the removal of goods should not be granted. I am of the view that if not granting an injunction will tantamount to
affecting public interest, the Court is duty bound to give such protection as is needed.
In para 1 in Crl.O.P. No. 11720 of 1991, the third respondent herein, who is the petitioner in that Criminal O.P. has stated as follows:-
The petitioner makes cartons and other packaging materials for a range of industries and users. Some of the petitioners'' products are exported in
packaging from itself; other products of the petitioner''s are used to package commodities made by the petitioner''s customers which are then
exported. These products earn substantial revenue in foreign exchange for the country. Many of these products are of vital necessity to the general
public.
In para 3 of that petition, it is stated as follows:-
At any amount of time the petitioner holds finished goods worth about Rupees one crore and the petitioner would have to write off these goods if
they cannot be despatched to its customers within the specified time.
In the plaint in O.S. No. 1506 of 81, in para 3 it is stated that 60 per cent of the production is manufactured on specific orders of parties who
manufacture a vide variety of products of vital necessity to the general public and that some of the plaintiff''s customers are companies like Indian
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited etc. It is also stated that some of the products are exported and they earn substantial revenue in foreign
exchange for the country. These allegations are made by the petitioner in the prior Criminal O.P. and in the plaint in O.S.1506 of 1981, which is
inter parties that public interest is involved.
In Audco India Ltd. Vs. The Audco India Employees'' Union and Others, , the prayer was for order of injunction restraining the defendant and
other members of the union from preventing or obstructing casual, temporary and contract workers etc., from having ingress to and egress out of
the factory premises preventing or obstructing the movement of the vehicles or materials or raw-materials or some finished goods and from its sub-
Contractors for processing. These two prayers were granted by this Court. In that case, workers employed in a public utility service struck work
without issuing notice of strike as required by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 at a time when the conciliation proceedings were pending. When
the workmen prevented the movement of the finished goods to the respective customers, a writ petition was filed by the company seeking police
protection to enable the removal of the finished goods. The Court ordered provision of police protection for removal of the finished goods subject
to the condition that the sale proceeds should be kept in a separate Bank account, and the removal should be effected after notice to the General
Secretary of the Workers'' Union. Afterwards a suit was filed by the Management seeking injunction as referred to supra and orders were passed.
Miss Vaigai contended that wages for the days the workmen had worked in September was not paid and they have got the charge over the
finished products, and so that cannot be permitted to be removed with the police protection. In para 15 of the affidavit filed in support of the
petition, it is stated that they have not been paid their wages for the month of September, 1993 for the period they worked and further factory have
been produced with their labour and they have a prior charge over them. It is not their case that the 3rd respondent does not have funds to pay the
wages for the period they worked. According to the Management, their wages are deducted since they went on an illegal strike. I am not
considering the correctness of this claim made by the Management in this petition. But the important factor to note is that it is not the petitioner''s
case that the Management does not have funds to pay the wages. While so, the claim that only by obstructing the removal of the finished goods,
the rights would be safe guarded is not acceptable. In Workers of Rohtas Industries Ltd. Vs. Rohtas Industries Ltd., , it was held that salaries and
wages due to workers will have priority over other creditors like Banks and financial institutions. Such is not the case here. It is not the case of rival
claims between the workers and the financial institutions. Miss Vaigai relied upon S.18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. That provides for immunity
from the civil suit in certain cases against any registered Trade Union or any office-bearers or members of a Trade Union. I opine that this right
does not have any relevance, in so far as the direction claimed in this petition is concerned.
In Joy Mathew v. Superintendent of Police and others (1991 1 L.L.J. 518), Justice K. Sreedharan of Kerala High Court, had found that the
Union of Head load Workers have no legal right to insist that the work of unloading the goods should be done by the workers of the Union
themselves and not by the workers of the master''s choice. On that finding, the learned Judge held that the petitioner is entitled to carry on the
loading and unloading work in his establishment with his permanent employees and the police is duty bound to product the said right. Finally the
learned Judge had directed the respondents 1 to 3 to afford sufficient effective police protect to the petitioner to carry on business in the
establishment without any interference from the 4th respondent or any other labour union or its followers and that they cannot and should not shirk
from their legal duties and responsibilities under the cover that the dispute is purely a labour dispute.
On the materials placed before me, it emerges:-
(i) There is a strike from 8.9.1993. The Management contends that this is an illegal strike.
(ii) Conciliation proceedings are pending before the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Madras.
(iii) According to the petitioner, only the Management had illegally locked-out the factory. According to the Management, since the stay-in-strike
was resorted to by the Union, they had given notice dated 19.9.93 that if workmen desired to continue their strike they can do so, while remaining
outside the factory premises and they will be permitted to enter the factory only if they give a written declaration that they are entering the factory
with the intention to work and carry out their duties.
(iv) The wages for 7 days in September, 1993 are not paid to the workers. According to the Management the law permits deduction of eight days
wages for such illegal strike. There is no allegation that the Management does not have funds to pay the said wages.
(v) According to the Management they have to move these goods out of the factory to supply to customers who have placed orders for such
goods and severe loss would be suffered if supply was not made. The claims for damages are also possible. The business prospectus would be
affected. Some of the products are exported and earn substantial revenue in foreign exchange for the country.
(vi) In the suit in O.S. No. 1506 of 81, which is between the parties, orders of injunctions were passed, as referred to supra and they are still in
force.
(vii) The third respondent had addressed the police authorities seeking police bandhobust, setting out complaints, the copies of which have been
filed in the typed set filed by the third respondent.
On the facts and circumstances of this case, mentioned above, the petitioner cannot claim that they have a right to obstruct removal of the
goods and consequently the direction prayed for to restrain first and second respondents from giving police protection for removal of the goods
cannot be granted and it is rejected. But the petitioner''s claim for their peaceful demonstration at the said factory from a reasonable distance in
exercise of their trade Union rights cannot be interfered by the first and second respondents. Consequently direction is given to first and second
respondents not to interfere with the peaceful demonstration by the third respondent''s workers near the factory, from a reasonable distance, in
exercise of their trade Union rights. This petition is ordered accordingly.