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Judgment
The above Appeal Suit is directed against the Judgment and decree dated 18.8.1983, made in O.S. No.1277 of 1980 by the XVII City Civil
Court, Madras, thereby dismissing the suit filed by the appellant herein praying thereby to pass a decree directing the respondent herein to pay sum
of Rs.50,000 together with interest at 6 per cent per annum and to pay the costs.
The plaint averments are, that her husband D. Jagannathan took a Life Insurance Policy in Policy No. 42818571 on 13.5.1975 with the
defendant/Corporation for a sum of Rs.50,000 appointing the plaintiff as the nominee; that her husband who was hardly 41 years of age died on
8.12.1976 at C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore; that the plaintiff as the nominee has become entitled to claim the amount due under the policy and that she
filed her claim as per letter dated 11.12.1976, furnishing all the details required by the defendant together with the original policy, but by the letter
dated 17.6.1977, the defendant rejected the claim of the plaintiff on ground that the deceased was already suffering from diabetes mellitus and
branchial asthma and that he did not disclose these facts in his personal statement at the time of taking the policy.
The further case of the appellant/plaintiff is that, she issued a registered Lawyer''s notice dated 10.8.1977 setting out therein the facts of the case
and calling upon the defendant to pay the amount, but the defendant in his reply dated 22.8.1977 repeating the same grounds on which he refused
to pay the amount of the policy, repudiated their liability to pay under the policy. The appellant/plaintiff further contending that her husband was
maintaining a good health till June 1976 when he was admitted in the C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore; that never before he had any complaint as
attributed by the defendant such as, diabetes, hypertension, pulmonary Tuberculosis or bronchial asthma, and there had been absolutely no
suppression of any material fact so as the policy to become vitiated; that at the time of taking the policy, all the stringent formalities were duly and
strictly complied with and the correctness of the particulars were scrutinised and certified by the defendant''s Medical Examiner, who personally
examined the deceased and therefore she became entitled to the assured sum of Rs.50,000 and claiming the same, would file the suit before the
lower court.
During trial, the appellant/plaintiff besides examining herself as P.W.1, would further examine two Doctors as P.Ws.2 and 3 for oral evidence
and would also submit four documents as Exs.A.1 to A.4. Likewise, on the part of the defendant/Corporation, 3 witnesses would be examined as
D.Ws.1 to 3 and 18 documents would be marked as Exs.B.1 to B.18 and on the part of the Court, 5 documents would be marked as Exs.C.1 to
C.5. The court below in consideration of the above evidence and applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the case and appreciating the
said evidence in its own way, has ultimately arrived at the conclusion to dismiss the suit with costs. It is only testifying the validity of the dismissal of
the suit as per the judgment and decree passed by the lower court, the plaintiff therein has come forward to prefer the above appeal on certain
grounds as offered in the memorandum of grounds of appeal submitted by her.
The learned counsel, Thiru. G. Rajan appearing on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff would contend that the plaintiff had filed the suit for recovery
of policy amount of Rs.50,000 with interest; that the L.I.C. policy had been taken by the deceased husband of the appellant on 13.5.1975; that
from 13.5.1975 till 20.6.1975, he had been examined by two L.I.C. Doctors thoroughly; that on the same day, the appellant''s husband''s brother
also took a policy for Rs.50,000 in his name; that on 8.4.1976, her husband got admitted at C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore and after being treated for 8
months, on 8.12.1976 he died; that as early as on 11.12.1976 itself, entrusting the original policy as nominee appointed u/s 39 of the Insurance
Act, the appellant claimed the said policy amount; that keeping the matter pending for six months, on 17.6.1977, her claim got rejected by the
respondent/Corporation.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would further contend that on two counts, the respondent refused to pay the amount (i) that the
appellant''s husband suppressed the material facts at the time of giving personal declaration while the policy was applied for, (ii) that in spite of her
husband suffering from diabetes, and bronchial asthma, concealing the same he had taken the policy. On the part of the appellant, it would be
vehemently contended that before issuing the L.I.C. policy, her husband was thoroughly examined by two Doctors of their choice and after
checking him, they opined that he was keeping good health and not suffering from any illness and there is absolutely no suppression of fact. At this
juncture, the learned counsel would bringforth the documents marked through this witness on her side i.e. Ex.A.1 dated 11.12.1976, the claim
made by her; Ex.A.2 dated 17.12.1977, the rejected letter; Ex.A.3 dated 10.8.1977, the legal notice of demand and Ex.A.4, the reply
emphasising suppression. The second ground on which the respondent/Corporation declined to pay the policy amount of her husband is that, at the
time that her husband got admitted in C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore, some Doctors had opined that for the past two years, he was suffering from
diabetes. For this contention, the learned counsel would point out that P.Ws.2 and 3 are the Doctors, who got appointed by the L.I.C. before the
policy was taken by her husband, examined him and they would come and depose to the effect of the true case of the appellant.
The learned counsel would then contend that on the respondent''s side, the Doctor of C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore, has been examined as D.W.1
and yet another Doctor as D.W.2 and the Departmental Officer of the L.I.C. as D.W.3; that a letter alleged to have been written by one
Dr.Sundaresan to the defendant is Ex.B.17; that three months after the demise of the husband of the plaintiff, he would contend that himself and her
husband were permanent residents of Tiruvarur; that the plaintiff''s family Doctor had been examined, but the said Doctor Sundaresan was not at
all examined; that in these circumstances, relying on the said Doctor Sundaresan''s letter in Ex.B.17 and a certificate issued to the plaintiff''s
husband on 11.1.1977 under Ex.B.11, the court below has arrived at the conclusion to dismiss the suit.
The learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that, the two questions that are to be answered are (i) whether the plaintiff''s
husband suppressed the material facts at the time of taking the policy and (ii) whether the plaintiff''s husband was really suffering from the disease
even before taking the policy, and would answer for the first question that the plaintiff''s husband never knew that he had any such disease; that the
disease diabetes is also not a family disease so far as the plaintiff''s husband''s family is concerned and that his elder brother who is 68 years of age
is still alive without any such disease at all; that the deceased was hardly 41 years at the time of taking policy and died at the age of 42. For the
above contentions, the learned counsel for the appellant would cite three judgments, the first one reported in Lakshmi Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Bibi
Padma Wati, regarding misrepresentation suppression of facts or fraud-Burden on the person to prove, has held as follows:
As to the rule of burden of proof in a suit on a life insurance policy, the plaintiff has to prove facts necessary for establishing his cause of action,
but the burden of proving affirmative defences is on the insurer. In cases, where the policy has lapsed, the plaintiff has to prove the truth of
statements in declarations made by him when applying for revival or reinstatement of his policy, but the insurer who alleges fraud and
misrepresentation in procuring revival or reinstatement has to establish his defences. In other words, it is for the insurer to show, that the insured
knew or should have known of the falsity of statements made in the application for revival. The insurance company has also to discharge the onus,
that the representations alleged to be fraudulent were material and made with the insured''s knowledge and wrongful intent regarding the condition
of his health, family history, age, habits, occupation etc. the insurer must show that the statements made by the insured were such which he knew or
should have known that they were untrue and were made wilfully in bad faith and with intent to conceal or deceive. Such defences, insofar as they
result in forfeitures, have to be proved affirmatively by a preponderance of the evidence"".
No embargo, therefore, can be placed on the insured, in not declaring occasional physical disturbances of a trivial character. These terms are to
be restricted to such illnesses which impair the constitution of the insured or interrupt the performance of vital functions"".
Bad faith can be imputed to the insured only when he fails to disclose a disorder of which he was aware. He might have had a suspicion of a
disorder and might have simply believed that it was a transitory trouble which would soon pass off.
A charge of fraud, naturally, requires a high degree of probability. The courts will not be satisfied with proof which falls short of showing that
intentional misrepresentation was made with the knowledge of perpetrating fraud. The onus probandi in all such cases rests heavily on the party
alleging fraud. AIR 1941 93 (Privy Council); Smt. Benarasi Debi Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., .
The second judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in Saraswati Devi Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India,
wherein it is held as follows:
To avoid the contract it is imperative for the insurer to prove that material facts have been suppressed and that either the suppression of material
facts or the fraudulent representation of material facts occurred with the full knowledge of the assured"".
It is difficult to say for how long the patient was suffering from diabetes. There have been cases where patients have been suffering this disease,
but still then may not know that"".
The third judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in State Vs. Bhasusa Hanmantsa Pawar, which also
emphasizes the burden of proof lying on the prosecution, or the person who alleges fraud or suppression of facts thereby the learned counsel for
the appellant saying that the onus is heavily cast on the insurer to prove the allegations and ultimately saying that the respondent has miserably failed
to prove the said allegations, would end up his argument with the prayer to allow the appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower
court.
The Court below, in consideration of the respective pleadings of parties, has framed five issues for determination, which are:
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought for?
Whether in the agreement entered into between the plaintiff''s husband and the defendant-Corporation, the husband of the plaintiff has wilfully
suppressed the diseases said to have been had by him, prior to the date of agreement?
Whether there is any bar for the Corporation to agitate the items, which find place in the declaration of the personal details, declared by the
husband of the plaintiff?
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the interest, as prayed for?
To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to?
The plaintiff would examine herself as P.W.1 and would also examine two Doctors, who examined the husband of the plaintiff on 14.5.1975
and 13.5.1975 respectively, as P.Ws.2 and 3. These two witnesses, who examined the husband of the plaintiff thoroughly have issued the
certificate under Exs.B1, dated 14.5.1975 and Ex.B.4, dated 13.5.1975 respectively and would submit their confidential report to the Corporation
and the husband of the plaintiff gave declaration under Ex.B.9 on 14.5.1975. All the above three documents have come into existence in a couple
of days i.e. on 13.5,1975.
So far as the evidence of P.W.1 is concerned, she would ascertain that to her knowledge and information, her husband was not suffering from
any ill-health or diseases, as mentioned in the questionnaire form in Ex.B.8, dated 13.5.1975, as a result of which only Ex.B.10 policy had been
granted in favour of her husband; that only long after taking the policy, on certain complaints, her husband was admitted in the C.M.C. Hospital,
Vellore, wherein certain diseases were detected consequent to which and inspite of intensive treatment imparted therein, her husband passed away
on 8.12.1976 and on 11.12.1976, she had written to the Corporation, claiming the policy amount, for which the defendant-Corporation replied
under Exs.A.1 and A.2, dated 16.12.1976 and 17.6.1977. She would further depose that since the policy amount was not paid to her, as the
nominee of her husband, she issued a legal notice to the defendant-Corporation in Ex.A.3 dated 10.8.1977 for which the defendant-Corporation
issued a reply under Ex-A.4, dated 22.8.1977 declining to pay the same on ground that she is not entitled for the policy amount, as her husband
suppressed the facts.
In her cross examination, this witness would authoritatively deny the suggestion put by the defendant that prior to taking treatment in C.M.C.
Hospital, her husband was under treatment for some diseases. She had been examined throughout in the cross examination only regarding the
treatment taken by her husband in April 1976, June 1976 and thereafter till his death and there is no iota of evidence available from the cross
examination of P.W. 1, to the effect that prior to the taking of the policy in May, 1975, her husband had any disease of it had been attended to
much less to the knowledge of P.W. 1 and hence it should be admitted that the defence, so far as the evidence of P.W.1 is concerned, has drawn
a blank.
P.W.2 in his evidence would depose to the effect of his examination of Jagannathan and issuance of the report in Ex.B.1 for taking the L.I.C.
policy; that before issuing Ex.B.1 certificate, he personally examined him and certified that his was 1st class life; that at the initial stage, a person
who is suffering from diabetes, may not be aware of it; that even without taking drugs, the patient can be normally adopting diet restrictions; that at
the time he examined the said Jaganathan, he did not see any symptom of diabetes and when questioned, the said person informed that he was not
suffering from any disease. Through this witness, Ex.B.2, the copy of the letter from L.I.C. and Ex.B.3 the reply by the witness to Ex.B.2 would be
marked; that he did not ask the said Jaganathan whether he had any family Doctor, non particularly a Doctor by name Sundaresan. In the re-
examination, this witness would depose that he has been authorised by the the L.I.C. to issue certificate in fit cases for the insurers of L.I.C. policy;
that he was working in such capacity as the L.I.C. Doctor from the year 1971 onwards.
P.W.3, Dr. S.M. Basheerudeen, would depose that he was the Doctor approved by L.I.C. and has been authorised to examine the assured
and issue certificates for insurance of L.I.C. policy; that he was working as a Doctor for L.I.C. from 1958; that he examined Jaganathan and sent
Ex.B.4 report to the L.I.C; that he gave a 1st class certificate to the said person; that he did not see any symptom of diabetes in his body and also
that the deceased told him that he did not have any previous history of diabetes and this witness would also depose to the effect that at the early
stage of diabetes, the patient may not be aware of it; that by clinical test, he did not see anything abnormal and the patient even with the restricted
diet without taking drugs could be normal.
In the cross-examination, this witness would depose that he did not conduct glucose tolerance test, nor tested the blood sugar, nor did the
patient tell him that was suffering from diabetes; that he got Ex.B.5 letter from LIC and Ex.B.6 is the reply given by him to the L.I.C.; that if the
patient comes with empty stomach or taking drugs, the urine sugar cannot be detected. The evidence of these two witness if put together, they
convey one and the same message to the effect that regarding the test held by them, the deceased Jaganathan was not found to be a diabetic
patient and that they issued Class-I certificate to him resulting in his life getting assured by the L.I.C. and that they have been in long service as
Doctors of the L.I.C. They would also adduce evidence to the effect that at the initial stage of the disease, neither would it be known to the patient,
nor could it be detected by clinical tests as they have held.
Coming to the evidence of the defence witnesses, D.W.1 is Dr. M. Kirubakaran, working as Associate Professor of Nephrology in C.M.C.
Hospital, Vellore, and this witness would depose that he examined Jaganathan in April 1976; that Exs.C.1 to C.4 are the history sheets entered in
his own hand-writting; that in answering his questions the assured stated that he was suffering from diabetes for two years, known as amatic for 4
years and that he had hyper-tension for one year; that he had albuminemia for four years; that when he examined him, he was a confirmed diabetic
patient because there was functus changes in his eyes. In the cross-examination, this witness would depose that he has not noted in the records
Exs.C.1 to C.4 as to who gave the information to make the entries therein; that on his examination, he found the assured to be suffering from
diabetes for two years; that two months after diagnosing diabetes mellitus, the hyper-tension was detected; that he had no personal knowledge of
the health of Jaganathan before examination.
D.W.2 is the Development Officer in L.I.C. and he would depose that he knew the deceased Jaganathan, who was from Tiruvarur; that it was
he who filed up Ex.B.8 and had also attested the same; that for all queries, only asking the deceased and as per his answer, especially to question
nos.6 and 7, he filled up the necessary columns; that even Ex.B.9 had been written by him which was signed by Jaganathan and this document was
also attested by him; that Dr. Sundaresa Iyer of Tiruvarur since passed away besides getting it ascertained through his wife, he also obtained the
death certificate and sent it to the zonal office which is Ex.B.16; that Ex.B.17 is the letter given by Dr. Sundaresa Iyer to their Branch Manager. In
the cross-examination, this witness would depose that to his knowledge, the deceased Jaganathan was keeping a normal health and he could and
not have uttered falsehood regarding his health; that Dr. Sundaresa Iyer who passed away 2 or 3 years back was the L.I.C. Doctor; that Ex.B.17
document had been obtained from Dr. Sundaresa Iyer after the death of Jaganathan.
D.W.3, Dr. S. Sambamoorthy has been examined, and this witness would depose that he was the Administrative Officer in the L.I.C., Madras
Divisional Office; that Ex.B.18 is the xerox copy containing the pages 161 and 162 of the Manual for the Guidance of Agents and this exhibit also
relates to insurance of Diabetics. In the cross-examination, this witness would depose that the said manual is marked as confidential and it is used
only for the guidance of the agents.
Prior to appreciating the above evidence placed on record, it is relevant to point out that since it is a case preliminarily not revealing any
disease in the body of the deceased Jaganathan, nor by himself declaring any disease in the ordinary course of getting declaration from the assured
and the medical examination that is usually held, as a result of which the life of the said Jaganathan had been assured for the amount of Rs.50,000
and in less than two years, he had passed away on account of diabetes and hyper-tension at C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore in spite of intensive
treatment imparted in the said hospital.
It is a case of suppression of facts on the part of the deceased/assured whereas as per the agreement, the assured should have revealed the
diseases that he had prior to getting himself insured; that he had categorically stated that he was not suffering from any disease such as diabetes,
hyper-tension, asthma, etc. and after having been insured, within 3 years he had passed away, as a result of which on ground that he had already
been suffering from diabetes and hyper-tension, concealing which and wrongly stating that he did not suffer from any disease, he had got his life
assured and hence it is a case of suppression of facts prior to insuring him and hence he is not entitled to get the assured amount is the firm case of
the respondent/Corporation before the lower court.
It is a fact that based on the declaration filed by the assured Mr. Jaganathan and on medical examination held on his body by D.Ws.2 and 3,
the L.I.C. Doctors, destined for the purpose of holding such examinations on those who come forward to insure their lives and admittedly these
witnesses are there working in such capacity of conducting examinations on those who come forward to assure their lives for a long time and they
come forward to depose to the effect that to the examinations conducted by them, there was no disease revealed much less, diabetes, hyper-
tension and asthma, and hence the respondent/Corporation insured the life of the deceased for Rs.50,000 as on 13.5.1975. Hence, having
preliminarily accepted not only the statement of the assured, but also their own Doctors, D.Ws.2 and 3 based on the medical examination held on
the assured and later on when the person died because of certain diseases since it was in a very short period after the life being assured on ground
that he had suppressed the facts of his diseases in spite of knowing the same prior to getting his life insured, now the Corporation has come
forward to deny the money assured to the deceased when it comes to be demanded by his nominee and wife, the plaintiff. Hence the onus is
heavily on the defendant/LIC to prove to the effect that the deceased Jaganathan was really suffering from diseases, such as, diabetes, hyper-
tension,etc. and that suppressing those facts knowingly and intentionally and giving false assurance to the effect that he was not suffering from any
diseases, had got his life insured. Unless by positive evidence, the defendant/Corporation is able to prove that (i) deceased Jaganathan was
suffering from diseases, such as, diabetes, hyper-tension, etc. even prior to getting his life assured on 13.5.1975 and (ii) knowing that he was
suffering from such diseases, suppressing the facts intentionally offered false declaration that he was not suffering from such diseases, by positive
evidence there is absolutely no case for the defence to deny the amount assured to the plaintiff, the nominee of the deceased Jaganathan.
In the evidence of P.W.1, the taking of the policy by her deceased husband in the year 1977 and at that time he was not suffering from any
diseases such as, diabetes, hyper-tension, etc, that a sum of Rs.50,000 having been assured, that she was the nominee and when it was demanded
after the death of her husband, the assured sum having not been paid she was constrained to file the suit claiming the said sum with interest are
brought to light. The evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3 have deposed very well in support of the evidence of P.W.1 to the effect that they being the
Doctors of the L.I.C. and being experienced in such examination of the health of the assured, they would give a clean chit to the husband of the
plaintiff on medical examination as held usually by them and that based on such reports only the defendant/Corporation had come forward to
assure the life of the assured for an amount of Rs.50,000.
It is only the defence witnesses who should come to the rescue of the stand taken by the L.I.C. D.W.1 would come forward to depose to the
effect of diagnosing and treating the deceased Jaganathan from April 1976 and since it is an admitted fact on his part that prior to attending to him,
he did not know about Jaganathan at all he is not a fit witness to speak to the condition of Jaganathan that was prevailing before 13.5.1975 i.e.
prior to insuring the life of the deceased. But at the same time, this witness would come forward to state that he had put entries what the assured
stated to him as per the entries effected in Exs.C.1 to C.4, history sheets, wherein the deceased Jaganathan was said to have told him that he was
suffering from diabetes for two years and asthma for four years and was suffering from hyper-tension for one year and that he had albuminemia
urine for four years. Prior to entering into discuss the evidenciary value of such entries said to have been effected by D.W.1 in the case sheet as
though they were told by the patient to him which is hearsay evidence and not directly known by him, it is relevant to note that in the cross-
examination, this witness would glaringly state that the patient''s wife and his other relatives accompanied him and that he had not noted in the
relevant records as to who gave the information for marking the entries therein and that he cannot say the exact date of beginning of the disease of
diabetes and that he did not have personal knowledge of the health of Jaganathan before his examination. Therefore, it is quite evident from what
this witness deposed in his cross-examination is that the entries regarding the health of Jaganathan prior to his examination had not been effected in
Exs.C.1 to C.4, based on the contentions of the deceased, but somebody else which he did not note in the record at all and he could not also
assure the beginning of the disease diabetes for Jaganathan.
This witness would also in the re-examination depose that he had not recorded in the hospital records to the effect that Mr. Jaganathan gave
the information of the details entered in Ex.B.7, nor any one else particularly to have supplied such information. This witness is the key witness for
the defence and he could not give any valid evidence to the effect of the said Jaganathan suffering from the disease of diabetes, hyper-tention, etc.
even prior to his life coming to be insured on 13.5.1975 whereas this witness could only assess what he noted after april 1976. The other opinion
offered by this witness cannot be taken as the reliable evidence, since based on mere opinions, nothing could be decided unless corroborative
evidence is available.
The evidence of D.W.2 and the Ex.B.17, the medical certificate issued by one Dr. Sundaresan said to be residing adjacent to the deceased
Jaganathan at Tiruvarur could neither be marked through D.W.2, nor was the author of Ex.B. 17 alive at the time of trial so as to appear before the
court and affirm the contents of the said document. Ex.B.17 hence does not carry any weight, nor could it be appreciated in evidence, since it is
not a valid document, nor marked in the manner prescribed by law. Moreover, this document admittedly by D.W.2 has come into existence after
the death of Jaganathan and hence, based on Ex.B.17 nothing could be decided regarding the facts of the case, nor is there any importance
otherwise attached to the evidence of D.W.2 regarding the point that is to be determined. Ex.B.18, the manual containing the instructions as
guidance for agents is marked through D.W.3 and the said instructions have absolutely nothing to do with the proof of the case in hand and it is up
to the L.I.C. authorities to have taken all the precautions such as found in Ex.B.18 and having acted in a slip-shod manner and having failed to find
out the truth if at all there was one, regarding the ailment of the deceased Jaganathan at the time of assuring his life, it is quite unreasonable on the
part of the respondent/Corporation to have denied the sum assured.
The authorities cited by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would also reveal that either it is mis-representation or suppression of
facts or fraud said to have been exercised in the life of the deceased getting as sued by himself is the burden on the part of the person who alleges
i.e. the L.I.C. herein and in fact the case in hand is one without any evidence on the side of the defence and so far as the life of the deceased
Jaganathan as sued by the Corporation, P.W.1 is the wife and nominee of the deceased which is an admitted case and it is quite unreasonable on
the part of the respondent authorities to have declined to release the amount as sued in favour of the plaintiff when the demand was made on the
death of her husband, the assured.
The lower court without adhering to the legal dictum and relying on Ex.B.17 which should not have been allowed to be marked by the lower
court, since the author of the document is reported to have been dead, and even in the event of the said document coming to be marked by the
person who received it, unless the person who issued it comes forward to get into the box and testify himself on oath, the contents of the said
document cannot be appreciated by the lower court. The other documents relied upon by the lower Court, namely, Exs.B.11 to B.13 and Exs.C.1
to 5 would all only go to show the condition of the assured and the disease from April 1976 and based on such entries effected by the Doctor who
was treating the patient at that time, the lower court cannot cast its imagination too far and assume that he had the same disease even prior to
13.5.1975, the date of insurance of the deceased Jaganathan. Unless positive evidence is placed on the part of the defence to the effect that the
deceased Jaganathan was suffering from diseases, such as, diabetes, hyper-tension, asthma, etc, by mere assumptions and presumptions, no
conclusion could be arrived at and the one arrived at by the lower court is on presumptions and assumptions and not based on evidence as it is
required by law.
Since the case of the appellant/plaintiff is an admitted case on the part of the defence regarding insuring the life of the plaintiff''s husband,
Jaganathan, and based on that having assured the life of the deceased for a sum of Rs.50,000, as per Policy No.42818571 dated 13.5.1975 and
on 8.12.1976 since the policy holder died, as per the claim made on the part of the plaintiff being the nominee of the assured vide her letter dated
9.12.1976, the respondent/Corporation should have paid the said amount in realisation of their liability and the repudiation of the liability shown on
the part of the respondent/Corporation is without any basis and after such repudiation, the L.I.C. seems to have gone in search of evidence and
have accumulated some of the undependable evidence which all would go to reveal the subsequent condition of health of the assured and not to
serve as proof to the suppression of the disease alleged on their part at the time of assuring the life of the deceased Jaganathan. Hence, both the
above points are decided against the respondent/Corporation and in favour of the appellant/plaintiff.
The court below has committed patent errors and perversity in approach so as to arrive at the wrong conclusion to dismiss the suit filed by the
appellant. Even without analysing as to whose burden it is to prove the facts alleged in the whole of the case, bluntly the lower court has assessed
the evidence with a wrong approach and hence no proper decision was able to be arrived at as required by and in accordance with law. The
decision of the lower court is not only against the legal convictions, but also against the evidence rules of procedure. Hence, the interference of this
court in to the judgment and decree passed by the Judge of XVII City Civil Court, Madras, has become quite imminent and inevitable.
In result, the above Appeal Suit is allowed, setting aside the Judgment and decree dated 18.8.1983 made in O.S.No.1277 of 1980 by the XVII
Judge City Civil Court, Madras, further decreeing the suit filed by the appellant herein before the lower court as prayed for with interest at 18%
per annum and cost throughout.