High CourtsDivision Bench

J. Viswanatha Chettiar vs The Official Assignee and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 9 January 1975 · Citation: (1975) ILR (Mad) 273

HON’BLE JUDGES
K. Veeraswami, C.J · Natarajan, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 — Section 2(8)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Original Side Appeal No. 90 of 1974

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Judgment

30 paragraphs · 740 words

K. Veeraswami, C.J.—The third Respondent, who was brought on record in the appeal at his instance, was a tenant of the premises Nos.

557 and 558 in Pycrofts Road, Madras. The lease was granted to him by the Appellant''s mother with effect from June 1, 1961, for a period of 12

years. The third Respondent, by an order, dated July 3, 1973, with reference to an act of insolvency on September 16, 1972, was adjudicated as

an insolvent. Earlier, on November 14, 1972, the Official Assignee was appointed as an interim Receiver and was directed to seal the premises

while the insolvency Petition was pending. On an application by the Appellant for the purpose. Sethu Raman J., directed the keys of the premises

to be handed over to the third Respondent. This order is the subject-matter of the appeal. Originally, the third Respondent had not been impleaded

in the appeal. While it was pending, at the instance of the Appellant, the Official Assignee was asked to hand over the keys to him, the Court not

being aware at that time that the third Respondent had an order in his favour and he was not a party to the appeal.

2.

The third Respondent contends that since, on the expiry of the term of the lease, he became a statutory tenant within the meaning of Section 2(8)

of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act and as this right was merely personal to him and, there fore, did not vest in the Official

Assignee, it is he who is entitled to have the keys of the premises. On the other hand, according to the Appellant, since the adjudication was with

effect from September 16, 1972, the date of the act of insolvency, and since the lease period came to an end only on June 1, 1973, the

outstanding portion of the lease vested in the Official Assignee on the adjudication of the third Respondent and that, therefore, the third

Respondent would not be entitled to possession of the premises. But the Official Assignee at no time took possession of the premises. All that he

did was to obey the directions of the Court that the premises should be sealed in order that later on he may take possession of the movables inside

the premises. For the purpose of removing the movables, the premises were opened and that was how the Official Assignee came into possession

of the keys. As a matter of fact, it appears that the third Respondent had continued to be in possession all the time though along with his lock on

the premises was superimposed another lock of the Official Assignee to obey the orders for sealing the premises. But this could not detract from

the fact that the third Respondent as a matter of fact was not deprived of his possession at any time, until or the orders of this Court the keys were

directed to be handed over by the Official Assignee to the Appellant.

3.

It has beer held in M. Mohanarangiah Chetty Vs. Official Assignee, Madras, by a single Judge of this Court, and this we think is the correct

decision, that statutory protection of a tenant who continues to be in possession of the leased premises after the expiry of the term of the lease is

not such property as would vest in the Official Assignee on adjudication of the person. In Second Appeal No. 83 of 1965--Hajee Abdulla

Sait�Appellant v. K.S. Moorjani and 9 others--Respondents--a Division Bench of this Court held that on death, the statutory protection of a

tenant holding over would come to an end as the protection was only personal to him, which could not be regarded as property. It follows,

therefore, in our opinion, that since the third Respondent had not been deprived of his physical possession of the premises at any time and such

possession he continued to have been after the termination of the period of the lease, he should be regarded as a tenant within the extended

meaning of the definition of the term under the Act and that being a personal protection to him as a statutory tenant, it did not vet in the Official

Assignee. He is therefore, entitled to the keys. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.

4.

We direct the handing over of the keys to the third Respondent by the Appellant by 5 p.m., to-morrow (September 1 1975).