Jabbar Mandal vs Tarak Chandra Ghosh

The judgment of the Court was as follows:

The Petitioners were the second party in proceedings u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which were drawn up on June 12, 1948, by the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Barasat. The lands in dispute were also, under his order, directed to be kept under attachment u/s 145(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, after receipt of a report of the officer-in-charge of Police Station Habra that a breach of the peace was apprehended in connection (sic) the dispute over the possession of certain lands. On July 23, (sic) after a written statement had been filed by the second (sic) the Subdivisional Magistrate transferred the case to the (sic) Officer for disposal. The second Officer, on a consideration (sic) the evidence, came to the conclusion that the first party was (sic) possession of the land and declared them entitled to possession (sic) released the land from attachment. As against this order, (sic) present application by the second party has been directed.

Three points have been urged by Mr. Chakravarti on behalf (sic) the Petitioners. His first contention is that the Subdivisional (sic) had no right in law to transfer these proceedings to any (sic) magistrate and was bound to dispose of them himself, that (sic) transfer of the case to the second Officer was without jurisdiction and that the second Officer had no jurisdiction to dispose of (sic) proceedings. The second contention of Mr. Chakravarti is (sic) it as the learned magistrate did not, in his order drawing up (sic) proceedings, state the grounds of his satisfaction that a dispute (sic) to cause breach of the peace existed, the proceedings were (sic) in law. The third contention of Mr. Chakravarti is that the (sic) magistrate has not clearly found the possession of the (sic) it party on the relevant date, namely, June 12, 1948.

Taking the last point first, we find, on reading the judgment, (sic) it there can be no possible doubt that the finding of the learned (sic) as regards possession is as regards the date--June 12, (sic). It is true that in the last portion of the order the magistrate said "I find that the first party is now in possession". In (sic) earlier portion he has, however, made a statement which (sic) shows that he was considering the question of possession (sic) June 12, 1948. The contention of the learned advocate that (sic) finding of the learned magistrate does not amount to (sic) at the proper time must, therefore, fail.

On the question whether the order of transfer passed by the (sic) Subdivisional Magistrate gave the second Officer jurisdiction to enquire into these proceedings and dispose of them, the (sic) advocate relied on the words in Section 192 of the Code of (sic) Procedure. He argued that the power of transfer given (sic) this section is only with regard to cases of which the magistrate has taken cognisance. His contention is that, as the taking (sic) cognisance of offences only is dealt with in the preceding (sic) (Section 190) of this Chapter, the reasonable view is that the (sic) of transfer u/s 192, Code of Criminal Procedure, is only (sic) respect to offences of which cognisance has been taken under (sic) Code of Criminal Procedure. We find, however, that this (sic) whether Section 192, Code of Criminal Procedure, authorises the (sic) of proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, (sic) the magistrate who drew tip the proceedings, is well settled by the authority of the decision in the case (sic) Satish Chandra Panday v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi I.L.R.(1895) 22 Cal. 898. All (sic) arguments now mentioned before us were considered by the Lordships in that case who also pointed out that the (sic) ''criminal'' which appeared before ''cases'' in the section (sic) had been deleted by a later amendment. On a full considerate of the matter Macpherson and Gordon JJ. came to the (sic) conclusion that Section 192 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (sic) authorise transfer of proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. This case has been consistently followed in this Court a number of cases, of which mention may be made of the following namely, Ram Kissore Roy v. Dwarka Nath Sen (1906) 10 C.W.N. 1095, Lolit (sic) Moitra v. Surja Kanta Acharjee I.L.R.(1901) 28 Cal. 709, Chintamon Singh v. (sic) (1907) ILR 35 Cal. 243 and Hafizar Rahaman v. Aminal Hague ILR (1941) 1 Cal. 67.

Our attention was drawn to a judgment of our learned (sic) Sen J. in the case of Pran Krishna Das Mahanta v. Shyam (sic) Sarkar (1949) 54 C.W.N. 228. In this case, Sen J. was not considering the (sic) of transfer of proceedings tinder Section 145, Criminal Procedure (sic) but the question of transfer of cases u/s 133, Code of Criminal Procedure. In coming to the conclusion that the (sic) u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have to be d posed of by the magistrate who drew up the proceedings and (sic) these proceedings cannot be transferred, the learned Judge (sic) consider Section 192, Code of Criminal Procedure and held that Section (sic) Code of Criminal Procedure, deals with the transfer only of (sic) His attention, however, was not drawn to the several (sic) Bench decisions following the decision in the case in (sic) Chandra Panday v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi (supra) referred above.

We are bound to follow, the decision in the case reported Satish Chandra Panday v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi (supra) (sic) as already stated, has been followed in a number of cases (sic) has settled the law in a particular way. We may state also (sic) nothing has been shown to us to induce us to dissent from (sic) view expressed therein.

There remains for consideration the last contention (sic) Mr. Chakravarti that the proceedings are bad inasmuch as (sic) grounds have not been mentioned. There is an authority in (sic) case of Nittyanand Roy v. Paresh Nath Sen ILR (1905) 32 Cal. 771, which (sic) appear to support his contention, but the Full Bench decision (sic) the case of Khosh Mahomed Sirkar v. Nazir Mahomed ILR (1905) 33 Cal. 352 (sic) the case of Nittyanand Roy v. Paresh Nath (sic) (supra) is a clear and direct authority against him (sic) the point now in issue. In the present case, though (sic) grounds have not been mentioned in so many (sic) the order drawing up the proceedings clearly (sic) the basis of the satisfaction. As the information was (sic) from the report of the officer-in-charge of P.S. Habra, (sic) have looked into this report and we find that it does contain statement of the apprehension of the breach of the peace. On (sic) authority of the Full Bench decision in Khosh Mahomed (sic) v. Nazir Mahomed (Supra), referred to above, in which an (sic) similar position, was considered, we are bound to hold (sic) the requirement of Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (sic) stating the ground must be held to have been satisfied.

All the contentions raised by Mr. Chakravarti, therefore, fail. (sic) Rule is accordingly discharged.