Jagananthan vs Kannagi

P.K. Misra, J.—Heard Mr. P. Mathivanan, learned Counsel for the petitioner. In spite of notice, there is no appearance on behalf of the

respondent.

The present revision petition has been filed by the defendant challenging the order passed by the trial court allowing the petition filed by the

plaintiff for amending the plaint.

The suit was filed for the realisation of Rs. 35,100/- on the basis of a promissory note allegedly executed by the defendant.

Even though such promissory note was dated, in the original plaint, the date of execution, the place of execution of the promissory note and the

place where the demand for repayment was made have not been indicated.

The defendant, in the written statement, stated that the place where the promissory note was executed and the place where the demand was

made for repayment have not been indicated in the plaint and therefore it cannot be said that the suit was filed within the territorial jurisdiction of the

trial court.

Thereafter, a petition was filed by the plaintiff to amend the original plaint to include the details regarding the place where the promissory note

was executed, the place where the demand was made for repayment, etc. Such petition for amendment was allowed by the trial court subject to

payment of costs of Rs. 200/- by the plaintiff to the defendant.

The order passed by the trial court allowing the amendment petition is being challenged in this revision petition by the defendant mainly on the

ground that such amendment which was sought after the period of limitation should not have been allowed. In support of such contention, learned

Counsel for the petitioner relied on Natarajswamy Vs. Gnenambal Abraham, ; S. Kuppusamy Vs. P.K. Subramani, P.K. Kandasamy, P.K.

Kumaravel and P.K. Loganathan, as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in T.N. Alloy Foundry Co. Ltd. Vs. T.N. Electricity Board and

Others, .

In my considered opinion, the ratio of these decisions is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In T.N. Alloy

Foundry case, cited supra, the plaintiff sought to amend the plaint by enhancing the claim for damages and such amendment had been filed after the

period of limitation. Even though, the single Judge had allowed such amendment, subsequently the Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside

the order of the single Judge on the ground that the enhanced damages was claimed after the expiry of the period of limitation. The matter was

taken in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while referring to its earlier decision in L.J. Leach and Company Ltd. Vs. Jardine

Skinner and Co., to the effect that ordinarily the court may decline an amendment which is sought for introducing a new cause of action which has

become time-barred, the Supreme Court observed that if such a discretion has been used by the Division Bench, there was nothing to interfere

with the order passed by the Division Bench.

It is to be noted in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, the amendment was for enhancing the damages and such an enhanced claim was

obviously time-barred and in such circumstances, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the Division

Bench. In the present case, the plaintiff is neither attempting to introduce any new cause of action, which is time-barred, nor the amendment sought

for alters the nature and character of the suit. The suit filed was to recover a sum of Rs. 35,100/- and the suit was laid within the period of

limitation. The amendment sought for by the plaintiff relates to the inclusion of the details relating to the place where the promissory note was

executed and the place where the demand for repayment was made. The amendment became necessary inasmuch as the defendant in her written

statement raised the defence of territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Therefore, the ratio laid down in L.J. Leach and Company case, which was

followed in T.N. Alloy Foundry case, cited supra, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

In Natarajswamy case, cited supra, the suit was based on a promissory note, but subsequently the plaintiff sought to amend the plaint to sue on

the original cause of action, which was time-barred. In such circumstances, the learned single Judge of this Court held that such an amendment

cannot be permitted. In my considered opinion, the ratio of the said decision is also not applicable to the present case.

In Kuppusamy case, cited supra, the amendment of the plaint, which was allowed by the trial court, was set aside by this Court in exercise of

revisional powers by referring to the decision in K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. v. Alliance Ministries 1995 TNLJ 77 , wherein it had been observed

as follows:

...Having allowed the period of seven years elapsed from the date of filing of the suit, and the period of limitation being three years under Article 54

of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, any amendment on the ground set out, would defeat the valuable right of limitation accrued to the

respondent.

In the above said decision, the amendment was resisted on the ground it would annul the valuable defence of limitation accrued to the revision

petitioner. The learned Judge was of the view that the power under Order VI Rule 17 cannot be indiscriminately exercised to extend the period of

limitation. In my considered opinion, this decision is also not applicable to the present case.

In my considered opinion, the aforesaid decisions, which were relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his

contentions are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the present case, the amendment sought for by the plaintiff

neither introduces a new cause of action nor enhances the claim made in the plaint nor alters the nature and character of the suit. The suit was for

recovery of a sum of Rs. 35,100/- allegedly due and payable on a promissory note executed by the defendant and the same was filed within the

period of limitation. By the amendment all that the plaintiff wanted to supply is the place where the promissory note was executed and the place

where the demand for repayment was made as these details became necessary since the defendant has questioned the territorial jurisdiction of the

trial court. For determination of the said issue the details relating to the place of execution of promissory note and the place where the demand for

repayment was made are relevant materials to be pleaded in the plaint. In my considered opinion, the trial court was right in allowing the

amendment sought for by the plaintiff. In such view of the matter, the discretionary order passed by the trial court is not required to be interfered

with in exercise of the discretionary power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The revision petition is devoid of merits. Accordingly, it is dismissed. Connected CMP is closed.