Jagannath Misra vs Ram Chandra Deo

The petitioner Sri Jagannath Misra was convicted for an offence u/s 500, Penal Code, and sentenced by the trial Court to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. But in appeal the learned Sessions Judge, while confirming the conviction, reduced the sentence of imprisonment to one month, but maintained the sentence of fine. Hence the revision to this Court. Mr. R. K. Das in presenting an able argument, vehemently protested against the illegality of the conviction and raised a number of points of law which will be dealt with shortly. It is necessary to state the facts which have been found concurrently by the Courts below and regarding which there can now be no possible scope for any dispute.

The complainant, Sri Ramchandra, the present holder of the Badakhemidi estate resigned his membership of the District Board of Ganjam in November 1942, whereupon the seat fell vacant and was to be filled up by election. The complainant set up one Sri Gouranga Chandra Deb Goswami, his Guru, and the Congress party set up another candidate Satyanarayan Patnaik. The accused belongs to the Congress party, and at that time was the president delegate of the board. In the course of the election campaign a meeting was organised on behalf of the complainant or his adherents in village Nuapada which appertains to his estate. On 12th July 1943, the complainant was scheduled to address a meeting of the villagers at about 3 P. M. For that purpose a pandal was arranged in front of the Mutt and some chairs and a table were placed there. The complainant reached Nuapada at 3 P. M. and was taken in procession to the place of the meeting. But he found that the accused and Satyanarayan Patnaik had already occupied the two chairs, although they were not invited to attend the meeting. When the complainant came near, the accused and his adherents shouted "Go back. Down with zamindari" and tried to create a disturbance. The complainant thereupon wanted to leave the place as he thought that his presence would further annoy the accused, who was bent upon creating a disturbance, but the raiyats requested the complainant not to go away The zamin-dar then stood on the table to address the villagers numbering about two thousand. The accused then stood on a chair and said that the zamindar had resigned from the District Board because of the construction of Naupada High School and a road from Bonkai to Chandipur. This imputation was denied by the zamindar. He stated that the reasons for his resignation were otherwise and were to be found in his letter of resignation. Upon this the accused shouted "you are a liar" and pro-duced the District Board file which he had in his hand--it is surprising to me how the file of the District Borad of Ganjam was allowed to be taken out from the office and was in the hands of the accused. There was some altercation as to the correct reading of the contents of the letter of resignation, and the complainant requested the accused to hand over the letter to him so that he may read it. But the accused handed over the file with the letter to Satyanarayan Patnaik, coupled with the remark that "Satyanarayan Patnaik was more gentlemanly than the zamindar" (apan tharu se adhika bhadra). The zamindar appealed to the crowd to judge the behaviour of the accused who therefore got more annoyed or angry and shouted in a loud voice ''abhadra, asabhya and atyachari'' pointing his hand to the complainant. Thereupon, the raiyats protested but the complainant pacified them and fearing that there may be a breach of the peace he left the meeting.

This version of the occurrence has been proved to the satisfaction of the Courts below, not only upon the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses, but. from some statements which have been made by the witnesses examined on behalf of the accused himself. It should be stated here that the accused admitted that he called the complainant ''abhadra'' but he denied that he used any of the other words. The complaint was lodged on 6th August 1943, but the delay has been satisfactorily accounted for as found by the Courts below. Upon the facts it is argued that the conviction u/s 500, Penal Code, is not justified particularly upon the ground that the accused is protected by Exceptions 1, 3 and 9. The difficulty in the way of the petitioner is that ho such plea has ever been taken in the Courts below. It will be found that each of the exceptions now relied upon before this Court requires it to be proved as a fact that the imputation was true and for the public good (Exception 1) and was expressed in good faith regarding the public conduct of the complainant and respecting his character (Exception 3) and that the imputation was made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person who made it, or for the public good (Exception 9). Here, on the contrary, the accused does not admit that he made any imputation regarding the complainant beyond calling him abhadra. Therefore I can quite understand why these exceptions were not pleaded in the Courts below. The first contention must, therefore, be overruled.

It was then argued that the complainant, although he is a respectable zamindar, ought to be prepared to bear the criticisms which may be advanced regarding his conduct in public life, and that when he was a member of the District Board and resigned and wanted to set up another candidate in his vacant place, he is not expected to be so thin-skinned as to take offence at the words which may be used in the heat of the moment by a rival candidate, or by the adherents of a rival candidate. I agree with this contention to a large extent. It was then argued that there is no evidence that the words which have been found to have been used by the accused lowered the complainant in the estimation of others. Reliance was placed upon two cases of the Bombay High Court in support of this contention. I have perused the evidence, and it is correct to say, as was ''urged by the learned advocate for the petitioner, that none of the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant states in their evidence that in their estimation the complainant was lowered. On the other hand, the evidence discloses that the raiyats protested against the imputations made by the accused. The first case is Anandrao Balkrishna v. Emperor AIR 1915 Bom. 28. Davar J., who delivered the main judgment of the Full Bench took the view that it is incumbent upon the prosecution before a conviction u/s 500, Penal Code, can be sustained to prove that the words used by the accused directly or indirectly lowered the moral or intellectual character of the complainant, or has lowered his character in respect of his calling or has lowered his credit in the estimation of others. The learned Judge observed at p. 31 that there was no evidence whatsoever in the ease, in which even an allegation was made that the complainant was lowered in the estimation of anybody, and that there was absolutely no proof whatever of all the requisites necessary before a conviction for defamation could be obtained. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge disagreed with the decision of the Calcutta High Court, given as far back as 1901 by Princep J., in Gobinda Pershad v. G.L. Garth 28 Cal. 63. Heaton J., differed from Davar J., and adopted the Calcutta view. Shah J., however, agreed with Davar J. In this Court we have adopted the practice that the Calcutta view should not be departed from unless it is found to be absolutely wrong. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the Calcutta view should be followed by me. Moreover, the observations of Davar J., appear to be obiter, because at page 33 the learned Judge was able to decide the case upon the assumption that the requirements of Section 499 and Expln. 4 were satisfied. But still he came to the conclusion that the petition presented by the accused contained imputations which were made in good faith for the protection of the accused''s own interest and were made to a person in lawful authority over the complainant. After examining the evidence he stated thus at p. 33:

Having regard to all these facts I have no hesitation in holding that the accused had the gravest reason for believing that the mamlatdar was actuated by malice and personal ill will towards him in the present instance.

and held that the accused was protected under Exceptions 8 and 9. Philip Rangel v. Emperor A. I. R. 1932 Bom. 193, was a case not u/s 500, but u/s 504, Penal Code, and lays down that mere breach of good manners does not constitute an offence u/s 504. In that case in a meeting of a certain limited company consisting of about 40 members the accused muttered in a low voice "You damn bloody bastards and cads." It was held that the words used by the accused were not intended to be taken literally but intended as mere abuse, that the accused did not adopt a loud and insolent tone, and indeed he did not intend his remarks to be heard, so that the elements of Section 504, Penal Code, were not satisfied.

Reference was also made to a case of the Patna High Court, Jainarain Singh Vs. Emperor, , but the decision is of no assistance in this case because the learned Chief Justice after giving a quotation from Section 499, merely observed that it was clear that a person is not guilty of defamation unless he intends that the words spoken should harm a person, pr knows or has reason to believe that his words would harm such persons, and then proceeded to point out that in the case before him much depended on the actual question which Jai-narayan was asked by the police, but the form of that question was not in evidence. The case, therefore, was decided upon its own facts.

Having given the case my most anxious consideration I am unable to hold that the words which have been found to have been used by the accused were intended to be defamatory, but the words undoubtedly amounted to insult within the meaning of Section 504, Penal Code. The accused from the very beginning was bent upon preventing the holding of the meeting which had been convened by the villagers to which he was not invited. He behaved in a deliberately rude and insulting manner to the complainant. He called him a liar, and in a very loud voice he called him ''ungentlemanly, barbarous and atyachari.'' This was in the presence of the raiyats of the zamindar. The accused in any opinion deliberately abused the complainant apd intentionally insulted him and thereby gave provocation to the complainant intending, or knowing it to be likely that the provocation will cause the complainant to break the public peace. It is very much to be commended that the complainant did not lose his temper and behaved in a remarkably gentlemanly and peaceful manner, and far from urging his raiyats to chastise the accused or to take any action against him, the complainant pacified the raiyats. There is evidence that the adherents of the accused actually threw stones at the complainant. It is regrettable that the accused behaved in such a manner and intentionally insulted the complainant. The facts found clearly bring home to the, accused the charge u/s 504, Penal Code. I would, therefore, alter the conviction from Section 500, Penal Code, to Section 504 Penal Code.

But the sentence imposed upon the accused appears to me to be unduly severe. Although the conduct of the accused cannot be justified in view of what I have stated above, it must be remembered that he was supporting a rival candidate who had been set up by the Congress party and in order to impress upon the raiyats the desirability of supporting the Congress party the accused resorted to abusive epithets simply for the purpose of belittling the zamindar in the estimation of the villagers, so that they may not vote for the zamindar''s candidate. There is some evidence that the father of the accused is indebted to the estate of the complainant and some decrees are being executed against him and that it was for this purpose that the accused was actuated by malice. But I am not relying upon that evidence.

In Philip Rangel v. Emperor A. I. R. 1932 Bom. 193, Beaumont C. J. pointed out that in the case before him there was nothing insulting apart from the language used as the accused there did not adopt a loud and insolent tone and indeed did not intend his remarks to be heard. In the pre-sent case the conduct of the accused was insulting. Apart from the language he used, he did not have the courtesy to make room for the zamindar to sit on a chair in a meeting which was convened by the zamindar and to which the accused was not invited. He adopted a loud and insolent tone and was anxious that his remarks should be heard, and cried out loudly that the complainant was not only a liar, but was ungentlemanly, barbarous and tyrannical. The only conclusion which I can reasonably come to is that there was clear intention to insult the zamindar. The accused ought to have known that the insult would be likely to lead to a breach of the public peace, and the breach in this case . was avoided owing to the most commendable behaviour of the zamindar.

I am informed that the accused has been in jail for eleven days. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances I would sentence him to the period of simple imprisonmnent which he has already undergone and would reduce the sentence of fine to a sum of Rs. 100 (one hundred) in default, simple imprisonment for one month. The fine, if realised will be given to the zamindar (P.W. 1) as compensation u/s 545, Criminal P. C. The excess fine, if paid, will be refunded.