Jagat Chandra Roy and 11 others vs Rakhal Chandra Roy

Wilkins, J.—The Petitioners have been convicted of two offences, viz., (1) of being members of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to steal paddy, and (2) of theft of that paddy; and they have been sentenced under sec. 143, I. P. C., to various terms of imprisonment as well as to fine; the convictions and sentences were confirmed on appeal. They now ask us sitting in revision, to set aside these convictions and sentences, on the ground that the occurrence was due to a dispute entirely of a civil nature, and that the paddy was taken by them under a bond fide claim of right.

As I understand that plea, the claim of the Petitioners is that they have a certain right to the land on which the paddy was grown; but I cannot find anywhere on the record that they or any of them have ever actually claimed any direct interest in the crop itself beyond such interest as a landlord may have in the crop grown by his tenant.

The fact of the cutting and carrying away of the paddy by a large body of men, including the Petitioners is clearly found both by the Magistrate and by the Sessions Judge. Into the exact details of the dispute in regard to the property in the land, it is unnecessary to enter. For'' the purposes of this case it is sufficient to determine--admitting the existence of such a dispute--whether the Petitioners have rendered themselves criminally liable by their acts.

Now taken at its best their claim is that they (or some of them) have an interest in the land itself; they have never asserted that it was they who cultivated the land, and grew the crop upon it, or that they have a perfect right to the whole of that crop so as to justify them in cutting it and carrying it off. The dispute is said to be a "civil dispute," i.e., one outside the cognizance of the Criminal Courts, because (as I apprehend the matter) their claim to an interest in the land itself can be determined only by a Civil Court; and it is strongly urged for them, as evidence of the existence of such a dispute, that the landlord of the complainant in this case has now pending a suit in which he prays for a declaration of his title to, and for confirmation of his possession of, this property. In these circumstances we are asked to say that the Petitioners honestly believed that they had a right to go upon this land in large numbers, and to out and carry away the whole of the crop of paddy, not one stalk of which any of them took any part in cultivating.

Speaking for myself, I am unable to go so far as this I am willing to concede that possibly the Petitioners may have thought that they had a valid interest in the land and were entitled to get some return from it in the shape of rent. But even if that belief was well founded, still it seems to me impossible to hold that they could, in consequence, have had, or that they really had, an honest belief that they were entitled to assemble in large numbers and to cut and carry off the whole of a crop which none of them grew. By these acts they have, in my opinion, intentionally caused wrongful loss to the cultivator of that crop, and have consequently been rightly convicted; for I know of no authority for holding that, because A has a bond fide belief in his right to some interest in land, he is thereby justified in appropriating to himself the whole of the crop, which was sown and cultivated by B, even if it may eventually happen from the result of litigation that B is liable to pay something to A for occupation of the land.

The case of Abdool Biswas, Petitioner v. Khater Mondal (3 C. W. N. 332 (1899)) which has been referred to in support of the Petitioner''s plea, is quite distinguishable. In that case the plea - of the accused was that the paddy had been sown by his uncle; and the conviction was set aside because there was nothing in the judgment to show that the accused did not bond fide believe that the paddy which he carried off belonged, as he stated, to his uncle. In the present case the position is very different; the defence was that the crop was cultivated not by the complainant, but by a tenant holding under some of the accused as well as under the opposing shareholder; and that this tenant peacefully cut and removed his own crop. Both the lower Courts have found that it was the Petitioners themselves who appropriated the crop, which was grown by a third, person, the complainant.

I would, therefore, discharge this rule. But in consideration of the circumstances of the case, 1 would reduce the substantive sentences of imprisonment to sentences of rigorous imprisonment for one month in the case of each of the first two Petitioners. The sentences of fine should stand.

I desire to add that, in my opinion, the trial of this case (as indeed of many cases of a like nature) would have been materially simplified had the Magistrate framed a charge under sec. 143, I. P. C., stating as the common aim of the accused, the object of enforcing their right or supposed right to the property in dispute. It is always advisable for a Magistrate in these cases especially, to refrain from trenching upon questions which it is the special province of the Civil Court to decide; and he should content himself-- I do not say in every case, but in most cases of this description--with dealing with that aspect of the complaint which relates more especially to the maintenance of his jurisdiction of the public peace where it is broken by persons who forcibly take the law into their own hands.

Prinsep, J.

I am of the same opinion. Mr. Jackson who appears for the Rule has contended that the Petitioners have committed no offence because they acted bond fide in assertion of their right to the land and he mainly relies on the fact that the landlord of the complainant has found it necessary to bring a suit for a declaration of his title to these lands and for confirmation of his possession. That would not necessarily throw any doubt on this case in which it has been found that the complainant, the tenant of the Plaintiff in that suit, has cultivated the land and raised the crop which the accused have forcibly cut and carried off. None of the cases cited by Mr. Jackson go to that extent. They are nearly all cases regarding orders passed under sec. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which considerations of a very different character arise. The law is clearly expressed in the last illustration to sec. 378 of the Penal Code thus :--

A in good faith believing property belonging to B to be A''s own property takes that property out of B''s possession''. Then as A does not take dishonestly, he does not commit theft.

The fact that this suit has been brought does not, in my opinion, exonerate the accused. Whatever the legal claims of the accused may be, they are clearly breaking the law in forcibly carrying off a crop found to have been raised by the complainant. Nor can it properly be held that in so doing they have acted in good faith believing the crop to be their own property. The crop certainly was never their property, and here I would point out that this plea is opposed to the line of defence taken at the trial, witnesses having been examined to prove that this crop was raised not by the complainant but by a tenant of the principal accused. The defence has been unable to establish this : How then can the accused fairly plead in the alternative that they out this crop under an honest belief that it was theirs?

For these reasons I have no doubt that the convictions are correct.

I agree also in thinking that in a case of this description a Magistrate would exercise a wiser discretion if he charged the accused as stated by my learned colleague. Many cases which have recently been before me have shown that persons are too inclined to use force in, what may be termed, taking the law into their own hands instead of resorting to the regular tribunals for a determination of their claims, and they thus often become responsible for bloodshed and serious riots. Such acts must be strenuously repressed and punished. In the present case the withdrawal of the complainant after protest against the aggression of the accused has probably averted such lamentable consequences. I agree in modifying the sentences of imprisonment.