Jagat Mittar Saigal vs Kailash Chander Saigal and another

S.S. Chadha, J.—Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932 lays down the effect of non-registration of a firm on suits to enforce a right arising from a contract by a partner against other partners or by or on behalf of a firm against any third party and provides that such a suit shall not be entertained unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner. The question of law raised in this petition under S. 8 (b) read with S. 20 (4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short called the Act) is as to whether such a petition is barred at the instance of a partner of an unregistered partnership firm.

The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner and respondents are brothers and sister. On April 1, 1968 they entered into a partnership agreement to carry on the business of Ship Chartering, Ship Brokerage and other allied lines on the terms and conditions which were later reduced into writing in the form of a partnership deed dated May 1. 1968 duly executed between the parties. Some of the terras and conditions of the partnership were varied later and a fresh partnership deed was drawn and executed on April 12, 1971. The partnership deed contains the arbitration agreement between the parties according to which if any dispute Shall arise between the parties in respect of the conduct of the business of the partnership, in respect of the interpretation, operation or enforcement of any of the terms and conditions of the deed or in respect of any other matter, cause or things whatsoever not therein otherwise provided for, the same shall be referred to for adjudication to an arbitrator to be appointed as per provisions of the Arbitration Act for the time being in force. Certain disputes arose between the parties in carrying on the business of the firm and its accounting. The petitioner challenged the actions of respondent No. 1 and demanded maintenance of true and proper accounts of the partnership. The partnership being at Will, respondent No. 1 dissolved the partnership firm with effect from Sept. 15, 1976. Respondent No. 1 sent a balance-sheet prepared by him for the period from April 1, 1976 to Sept. 15, 1976 to the petitioner which was not accepted as correct and was questioned. The petitioner demanded the rendition of true and proper accounts of the partnership dealings and transactions up to Sept. 15, 1976 and called upon the respondents to do so. On the failure of the respondents, a dispute arose between the parties which, according to the petitioner, was to be referred to arbitration in terms of the arbitration agreement between the parties. The petitioner then invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by a petition u/s 20 of the Act with a prayer for directing the arbitration agreement contained in the partnership deed dated April 12, 1971 being filed in this Court; for appointment of an arbitrator in terms thereof and to refer the entire disputes between the parties with regard to the affairs, accounts, dealings, termination of the partnership and rendition of true and proper accounts in relation thereto between the parties.

The petition which was registered as a suit, being Suit No. 426-A of 1977 came up for hearing before this Court and was allowed on Aug. 12, 1977. The arbitration agreement contained in the deed of partnership dated April 12, 1971 was directed to be filed. Shri P. N. Khanna, a former Judge of this Court, was appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes covered by that petition. Shri P. N. Khanna entered upon the reference on August 29, 1977 and took upon himself the burden of answering the reference. The arbitration proceedings were continued till March 22. 1981 when the respondents asked the arbitrator not to proceed with the reference as the respondents declined to agree to any further extension of time. In those circumstances, the arbitrator expressed bis wish not to proceed further in the case and accordingly he resigned as an arbitrator in the matter.

The petitioner now prays in this petition, which is registered as a suit, that this Court may be pleased to appoint another arbitrator in terms of the order passed on Aug. 12, 1977 in Suit No. 426-A of 1977 and refer the matter in dispute to the appointed arbitrator for arbitration.

A preliminary objection is taken by the respondents in the written reply that in view of the fact that the partnership firm in pursuance of the deed dated April 12, 1971 is not registered with the Registrar of Firms, the petition of the petitioner is not maintainable because of the bar of S. 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Some other objections have been raised in the reply but they are not pressed at the hearing.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions, Sec. 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter called the Partnership Act) is reproduced below:

(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.

(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm; and

(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect -

(a) the enforcement of any. right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or

(b) the powers of an official assignee, Receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909, or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, to realise the property of an insolvent partner.

Section 69 of the Partnership Act forbids the institution of certain suits in respect of partnerships which have not been registered under the Partnership Act, The section is mandatory as it provides that "no suit shall be instituted" The Court has not been left with any discretion in the matter. The Court has no power to grant any relief against the disability imposed by Section 69. Sub section (l) bars the right of any person suing as a partner in a firm to enforce a right arising from a contract against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner of the firm. Sub-section (2) deals with enforcement of claims arising from a contract by a firm against third party and prohibits the enforcing in any suit of any such right on behalf of the firm against the third party, unless the firm is registered. Sub-section (3), however, introduces certain exceptions to the disability imposed by subjections (1) and (2). It also extends those disabilities to a claim of set-off or other proceedings to enforce a right arising from any contract. The language used in sub-sec. (3) ''other proceeding'' is not clear. This resulted in the divergence of Judicial opinion being expressed by various High Courts. The conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., , wherein it was held that the expression "claim of set off" in S. 69 (3) does not disclose a category or a genus. The words ''other proceeding'' in sub-section (3) must receive their full meaning untrammelled by the words ''a claim of set off. The latter words neither intend nor can be construed to cut down the generality of the words ''other proceeding''. The sub-section provides for the application of the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) to claim; of set off and also to other proceedings of any kind which can properly be said to be ''for enforcement of any right arising from contract except those expressly mentioned as exceptions in sub-sections (3) and (4)."

In the case before the Supreme Court on appeal from the Bombay High Court a partner of an unregistered partnership applied u/s 8 (2) of the Act to enforce a right arising from a contract between the parties and it was held that the proceedings were barred by Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Relying on this the submission of Mr. V. N..Kaura, the learned counsel for the respondents is that the present petition u/s 8 (b) read with Section 20 (4) of the Act is liable to be dismissed as it has been made to enforce a right under the contract by a partner of a firm which is not registered under the Partnership Act Reliance is placed on a recent decision of the Allahabad High Court in Iqbal Singh and Others Vs. Ram Narain and Others, , wherein it was held, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., that an application under S. 20 of the Act by a partner in an unregistered firm is equally hit by Section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act and is, therefore, not maintainable. In that case an argument was advanced that the firm had already been dissolved and the proceedings had been instituted for accounts and consequently, the application u/s 20 could not be thrown out as not maintainable. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court did not accept that argument.

Reliance is also placed on Smt. Rampa Devi and Others Vs. Bishambhar Nath Puri and Others, , wherein also it was held that a petition u/s 20 of the Act was barred by the provisions of the Partnership Act. but the arbitration agreement does not become void. The parties could still refer the disputes arising out of the contract for settlement by arbitration without the intervention of the Court. The counsel urges that the parties are not without any remedy and they can still go in for arbitration without the intervention of the Court. Reliance is further placed on kamji Dags v. Durga Das", (1979) 81 Pun LR 673, wherein ft was expressed that "It is impossible to think that the right to proceed to arbitration is not one of the rights which are founded on the agreement of the parties and, therefore, the words of Section 69 (3) "right arising from a contract" are in every seem sufficient to cover the present matter, meaning thereby that an arbitration clause which arises out of arbitration agreement was covered by Section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act". Reference is also made to the decision in Paras Ram Darshan Lal Vs. Union of India and Another, wherein a petition under Sections 8 and 20 of the Act was held as not maintainable in view of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act in case of unregistered partnership firm.

Partnership is defined as the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any one of them acting for all. Partnership is a contract of two or more persons to share the profits of the business. One of the first essential elements of partnership is that there must be an agreement between the persons constituting the partnership. An agreement is sine qua non of every partnership which may be oral or in writing or may be express or implied. The law also allows the agreement between the partners being varied between them from time to time on all matters affecting their rights and obligations to one another. There is a contractual relationship and this is clear from Section 5 of the Partnership Act which says that the relation of partnership arises from contract and not from status. The partnership is a species of contract and consequently a suit to enforce a right arising from such a contract would be within the purview of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. The operation of Sec. 69 would extend to a suit in which a partner sues his co-partner or sues the firm to enforce any right arising from the contract between the partners. The contract between them would obviously be the contract of the partnership specifying their rights and obligations inter se. The rights and obligations of the parties arising from their relation are regulated by the contract between them. This would include the right to seek a dissolution of the firm or to call for its accounts or the right to realise the property of a dissolved firm. All these would be right arising from the contract as envisaged by that expression used in Section 69 of the Partnership Act.

As I said earlier, sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act bays a right of a person suing as a partner in a firm to enforce certain rights against the firm or against any partner alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm. Sub-section (2) bars the enforcing of claims by a firm against a third party. This is the effect of non-registration of a firm on suits to enforce a right arising from a contract. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act, however, carve out an exception to the prohibition contained in the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) and clearly enables the enforcement of any right to sue the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. It appears that the Legislature intended that no disability should attach to any partner in regard to winding up of the affairs of the firm including the realisation of the property of the dissolved firm and its accounting between the partners on its dissolution. A partner can enforce any right to sue for the dissolution of the firm or for accounts of a dissolved; firm or for realising the property of the dissolved firm. In other words, a suit for accounts of a dissolved firm or for realising the assets of a dissolved'' firm is not barred under the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) by reason of the exception contained in sub-section (3) of Sec. 69.

The words "other proceeding" in sub-section (3) of Section 69 are proceedings of any kind which can be squarely said to be for She enforcement of any right arising out of the contract and the prohibition contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) is equally attracted to those proceedings. In the case of arbitration proceedings in the Court, it necessarily follows that if it is to enforce a right arising from a contract between the parties, then the prohibition would apply. But it shall not affect the arbitration proceedings to enforce a right arising from the contract if it is the enforcement of a right for accounts of a dissolved firm, or for the realisation of the property of a disserved firm. A partner of an unregistered firm can enforce any right arising from the contract for rendition of accounts of a dissolved firm. In other words, although a partner of unregistered firm has no right to bring a suit for enforcement of a right arising out of the contract, yet after the dissolution of such a firm, a suit or arbitration proceedings for the relief of the rendition of accounts is maintainable as it is expressly saved by Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 69. The words "to sue for account of a dissolved firm" are used in the widest sense and would inevitably include the proceedings u/s 20of the Act for the enforcement of the right of accounting of a dissolved firm.

For a petition to be maintained u/s 20 of the Act, there are three essential conditions necessary. Firstly, there must be an arbitration agreement i. e. the parties must be ad idem. The arbitration agreement is required to be in writing and must be to submit, present or future difference to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not. The arbitration agreement may be in the form of a clause put in another contract. This is the usual practice in commercial contracts such as deeds of partnerships. A contract with an arbitration clause, rolls, as it were, two contract into one. All the same it is a contract enforceable in law. The second condition is that the agreement to refer must have been entered into before a suit relating to the subject matter of the dispute is filed by either party. The reason for this is that the law prohibits proceeding u/s 20 in cases where a suit is pending with regard to the same subject matter. This need not detain me. The third condition is that a deference must have arisen to which the agreement applies. The difference must be one which is contemplated in the agreement itself, otherwise it would be beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. If these conditions are satisfied then the parties instead of availing, of the procedure prescribed in Chapter II can have the arbitration agreement filed in Court. When a petition is filed in the Court, the Court has to find out whether there is an arbitration agreement between the parties and whether the disputes disclosed by the parties are covered by such arbitration agreement. Here the Court is determining the existence of a contract between the parties and after its existence is determined, then there is the enforcement of a right arising out of that contract. The enforcement of the right is for the determination of the disputes in accordance with arbitration agreement between the parties. The Court directs by an order that the arbitration agreement be filed and makes an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties, whether in the agreement or otherwise.

In the case before me, one of the partners is asking for the rendition of accounts in accordance with the arbitration agreement between the parties by arbitration with the intervention of the Court. The arbitration agreement was directed to be filed earlier in Suit No. 426-A of 1977 when a reference was made to Shri P. N. Khanna as sole arbitrator appointed by this Court. No objection to the non-registration of the firm was raised then. The proceedings here are for the enforcement of right arising out of a contract but restricted for the accounts of a dissolved firm. Such a proceeding is saved by the exception, contained in Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. The Court in a petition u/s 20 of the Act is called upon to order the agreement to be filed and the Court has to make an order of reference to the arbitrator. When the application is allowed, the Court can only refer the dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator is required to decide the question which is covered by the reference. If the dispute is restricted to the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or any right to realise the property of a dissolved firm, then the no registration of the firm will not stand in the way of the arbitration agreement being filed in Court for enforcement of those rights arising out of the contract. The relief in a petition u/s 20 of the Act should not be narrowly construed as restricted to the filing of the arbitration agreement. It embraces all steps necessary for the enforcement of the right of getting the disputes settled by arbitration. With the intervention of the Court, a partner of unregistered firm can enforce his right for accounts of a dissolved firm through arbitration.

I have already noticed Jagdish Chander Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., which is heavily relied upon by Shri Kaura. It was held that where a partner of an unregistered partnership applies u/s 8 (2) of the Act to enforce a right arising from a contract between the partners, the proceedings are barred by Section 69 of the Partnership Act. The case before the Supreme Court was on an appeal from the judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. Vs. Foreign Import and Export Association, . The objection raised in that case was whether in view of the provisions contained in Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act that petition was maintainable. The brief facts giving rise to the aforesaid question were these.

In or about July, 1955, Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. (for short K. T.), the petitioners in that case agreed to sell to M/s. Phillip Brothers India Limited, an American Company, 10,000 tons of manganese ore of 16/48 grade for shipment abroad during the period January to June 1956. The terms of shipment provided that 5,000 tons of manganese ore was to be shipped between Jan. to Mar., 1956 and the balance of 5,000 tons of manganese ore was to be shipped before 30th June, 1956. In connection with the supply of these goods a contract was entered into between K. T. and one Jagdish Chandra Gupta, who carried on business in the firm name and style of Messrs Foreign Import and Export Association (for short F. I. E.), the respondents in that case. The terms of the agreement between them had been reduced to writing. K. T. and F. I. E. became equal partners in the joint venture, with profits and losses therein being shared equally. In connection with the shipment of 5,000 tons of manganese ore which was required to be made between Jan. to Mar., 1956, K. T. called upon F. I. E. to supply 2,500 tons of manganese ore. F. I. E. did not comply with that request. K. T. themselves had to supply the full quantity of 5,000 tons of manganese ore to the American purchasers. K. T. served a notice on F. I. E. alleging that F. I. E. had committed a breach of the contract between K. T. and F. I. E. and that K. T. were entitled to claim damages from F. I. E. for their failure to supply 2,500 tons of manganese ore for shipment between Jan. to Mar., 1956. K. T. claimed a sum of Rupees 1,50,000/- from F. I. E. as and by way of damages. K. T. further stated that the contract between K. T. and F. I. E. provided that in case of dispute the matter would be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration Act. K. T. appointed Mr. Kolah as an arbitrator on their behalf and trusted that F. I. E. would agree that he should be the sole arbitrator in the matter. F. I. E. were requested to appoint another arbitrator on their own behalf if F. I. E. did not agree to the appointment of Mr. Kolah as the sole arbitrator. It was finally stated that if F. I. E. failed to appoint an arbitrator on their behalf within 15 clear days after the service of that notice upon them, K. T. would appoint Mr. Kolah as the sole arbitrator in the reference and proceed accordingly. F. I. E. declined to comply with the demands made in the aforesaid notice.

K. T. thereupon filed the petition u/s 8 of the Act praying that Mr. Kolah or some other fit and proper person be appointed as the sole arbitrator for the purpose of the arbitration between K. T. and F. I. E. with like power to act in the reference and to make an award as if he had been appointed by consent of all the parties. The partnership between K. T. and F. I. E. had not been registered under the provisions contained in the Partnership Act. There was a difference of opinion between Mr. Justice Madholkar and Mr. Justice Naik as regards the maintainability of the petition. The matter came up before Mr. Justice K. T. Desai who held the petition as maintainable. The Bombay High Court took the view that the right to make the application u/s 8 of the Act is not a right arising from a contract within the meaning of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. It was further held by reading the provisions of Section 69 as a whole that the words ''other proceeding'' used in Section 69 (3) cannot be construed so as to embrace an application u/s 8 of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Bombay High Court. On the first question, it was held fat p. 1885):

The first question to decide is whether the present proceedings is one to enforce a right arising from the contract of the parties. The proceeding under the eighth section of the Arbitration Act has its genesis in the arbitration clause, because without an agreement to refer the matter to arbitration that section cannot possibly be invoked. Since the arbitration clause is a part of the agreement constituting the partnership it is obvious that the proceeding which is before the Court is to enforce a right, which arises from a contract. Whether we view the contract between the parties as a whole or view only the clause about arbitration, it is impossible to think that the right to proceed to arbitration is not one of the rights which are founded on the agreement of the parties. The words of Section 69 (3), "a right arising from a contract" are either sense sufficient to cover the present matter.

On the second question it was held that the words ''other proceeding'' in sub-section (3) must receive their full meaning. After holding that the right to proceed to arbitration is a right founded on the agreement of the parties and the claim made in that petition was to enforce a right arising from a contract, it was held that it was within the purview of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. The provisions of Clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) of Section 69 was not before the Supreme Court for its construction. In that case K. T. claimed a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- from F. I. E. as and by way of damages for the breach of the contract between the parties on the failure of F. I. E. to supply 2,500 tons of manganese ore for shipment between Jan. to Mar., 1956. The contract between them would be the contract of partnership regulating their rights and obligations inter se. The enforcement of the claim would be ''rights arising from a contract'' as envisaged by their expression in sub-section (1) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. The case before the Supreme Court was not a suit or other proceeding by a partner of an unregistered firm to enforce any right to sue for the dissolution of the firm or for accounts of a dissolved partnership or for realising the property of a dissolved firm. The ratio could not be extended or applied to the case of the exceptions provided by Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act.

I do not have the benefit of the reasoning in reaching the conclusion in FAFO 19 of 1961 relied upon and followed in Iqbal Singh and Others Vs. Ram Narain and Others, by another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The judgment in that case is not available but the report mentions that in reaching its conclusion the reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Jagdish Chander Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., and the later Division Bench did not reconsider the question. With great respect to the learned Judges they have probably missed the true facts before the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chandra''s case (supra). It appears that in the earlier case before the Allahabad High Court, it was argued that the application for arbitration was substantially an application seeking to enforce a right to obtain accounts of a dissolved firm. It was observed that it is difficult to accept the contention that an application for arbitration in which a question of accounting might arise for decision by the arbitrator is tantamount to an application seeking to have accounts of a dissolved firm. 1 am unable to persuade myself to agree to such a narrow construction. The application u/s 20 of the Act may not be basically for the dissolution of a firm or for the accounts of a dissolved firm, nonetheless it is for the enforcement of the right arising out of the contract of getting those disputes settled by arbitration. It would be a case for the enforcement of a right for the dissolution of the firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, based on the rights and obligations arising out of the contract between the parties. In proceedings u/s 20 of the Act. the Court first orders the agreement being filed in Court, then makes the appointment of the arbitrator, if necessary, and consequently refers tile differences to him in terms of the arbitration agreement. The arbitration proceedings are in the nutshell proceedings with the intervention of the Court in accordance with the rights arising out of the contract between the parties. In the case before me it is the admitted case of the parties that the partnership was dissolved on Sept. 15, 1976 and the claim made is for the enforcement of the right to sue for accounts of a dissolved firm through the intervention of the Court. As observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the proceedings u/s 8 of the Act has its genesis in the arbitration clause, because without an agreement to refer to arbitration that section cannot possibly be invoked. I have endeavoured to show, that the same would be the position in a petition u/s 20 which is clearly to enforce a right arising from a contract.

In Ramji Das (1979-81 Pun LR 673) (supra) the case before the Punjab and Haryana High Court there was a finding in the suit that the partnership stood dissolved with effect from Nov. 19, 1967. The accounts were not settled between the two partners of an unregistered firm. One of the partners wanted, the disputes to be settled with the intervention of the Court by moving an application u/s 20 of the Act. The learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, with great respect to the learned Judge, again fell into an error by holding that the matter is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander Gupta Vs. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., to the applicability of Section 69 (3). The judgment in Paras Ram Darshan Lal (AIR 1979 Del 135) (supra) by Sultan Singh, J. of this Court proceeds on its own facts. The petitioners, an unregistered firm, in that case alleged that various contracts were entered into by them with the Union of India for the construction of the bridges; that the disputes arose out of the contract and that the Union of India was requested to appoint an arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration agreement but the Union of India did not appoint an arbitrator. The petition u/s 20 of the Act in that case was to enforce a right arising from a contract on behalf of a firm against Union of India, a third party. It would not be enforced unless the firm is registered. It was rightly held that the petition under the Act is a proceeding to enforce a right arising out of the contract within the meaning of sub-sec. (3) of Section 69 and Section 69 (2) is applicable. It was also observed that "by any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that such a claim is to enforce any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm". Meaning thereby that if it was a proceeding to enforce any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, then it would be exempted from the operation of S. 69(2) of the Partnership Act.

The legislature in its wisdom has provided in Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (3) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act that the rights of the partners of an unregistered firm in regard to the dissolution of the partnership, its accounting and the realisation of the property of a dissolved firm are to remain unaffected by the provisions of sub-sees. (1) and (2) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 69 engraft an exception upon the provisions contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69. It is equally applicable to me enforcement of a right arising from a contract by way of a suit or in other proceedings including a petition u/s 20 read with S. 8 of the Act. The right to proceed to arbitration is a right arising out of the contract between the parties. If the right to claim the relief is restricted to the accounts of a dissolved firm or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, then the non-registration of the firm is no bar to the petition for referring the mattes in dispute to arbitration. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed. Shri M. S. Joshi, retired Judge of this Court is appointed at an arbitrator in place of Shri P. N. Khanna who has since resigned. There will be no order as to costs in these proceedings.