Jagat Singh vs Tara Singh and another

Kapur, J.—This judgment will dispose of two appeals, Execution Second Appeal No. 573 of 1948, Jagat Singh v. Tara Singh, and Execution Second Appeal No. 572 of 1948, Jagat Singh v. Nathu, and a civil revision, civil Revision No. 221 of 1948, Jagat Singh v. Dhirt Ram. In Execution second Appeal No. 573 of 1948 and Civil Revn. No. 221 of 1948 the point involved is the same.

The decree-holders in these cases were called upon to file statements of debits under S. 13 (1), Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act. They only filed copies of decrees in their favour and the Debt Conciliation Board, holding, that there had not been compliance with the provisions of Ss. 13 and 14 of the Act in so far as "full statements of their accounts" had not been filed ordered that the debts should be deemed to be discharged.

The two decree-holders, however, started execution of their decrees and the executing Court held the decrees to be subsisting and proceeded with the executions Jagat Singh, the debtor, took two appeals to the Additional District Judge, Jullundur, who agreed with the executing Court and dismissed the appeals, and against this order an appeal and a revision have been filed in this Court.

The agreement (argument?) of the advocate for the appellant and petitioner is that a rule has been added under S. 23 (ee) and (h) prescribing the form for giving the particulars of debts, both under Ss. 13 and 14.

Section 13 (1) provides for a notice calling upon creditors to submit statements of debts. Sub section (2) of this section before and after the amendment in essence provides that every debt of which a statement has not been submitted in compliance with the provisions of sub s. (1) shall be deemed for all purposes and all occasions to have been duly discharged. At this stage we are not concerned with sub-ss. (3) and (4) of this section. Section 14 (1) of the Act gives the procedure of submission of statements of debts and requires the creditor to Submit along with such statement (referred to in S. 13 (1)) full particulars of all such debts to support his claims. The proviso to this sub. section is important and must be quoted in full. It runs as follows :

Provided that a decree or order of a civil Court shall be conclusive evidence as to the amount of the debt to which the decree relates, but the amount may be reduced as the result of an agreement arrived at in accordance with S. 17.

Interpreting Ss. 13 and 14, it was held by a Letters Patent Bench in AIR 1943 259 (Lahore) hat a decree of a civil Court has to be regarded as conclusive evidence under S. 14 (1) as to the amount of the debt to which the decree related, and the mere filing of the decree is a sufficient compliance by a creditor not only of the provisions contained in S. 14 (1) as to the particulars or the proof of the debt but also those of S. 13 (1) which relate to the statement of the debt owed to him. The decree-holder need not submit a separate statement of account, inasmuch as a decree must be viewed both as a statement of account under S. 13 (1) as well as a statement of its particulars under S. 13 (2) read with S. 14 (1) of the Act. It must be remembered that the provisions of S. 13 are of a highly penal nature and must be construed strictly against those in whose interest they were enacted.

Mr. Roop Chand submits that because of the addition of a rule under S. 28 prescribing a form under S. 14 (1) the ruling that I have quoted above does not apply. The argument is that under sub-cls. (ee) and (h) of S. 28 a form has been prescribed and unless a statement is made In that form there is no compliance. I am unable to agree. In the first place, there is no provision in S. 28 by which a form of the statement under S. 13 (1) can be prescribed. Section 28 (ee) refers to S. 14 (1) of the Act and, therefore, the form prescribed must relate to something under S. 14 (1) and not S. 13 (1). In any case, the judgment of Abdur Rahman J., with which Harries C. J., agreed, is so clear that I do not think prescribing a form under S. 28 of the Act can make any difference. The learned Judge in the case that I have quoted above said as follows :

The learned Single Judge of this Court considered that it was incumbent upon a creditor-irrespective of the fact whether he was a decree-holder or not - to submit a statement of account separately; but if a decree of a civil Court has to be regarded as conclusive evidence under S. 14 (1) of the Act as to the amount of the debt to which the decree related, the mere filing of the decree should be, in my view, held to be a sufficient compliance by a creditor not only of the provisions contained in S. 14 (1) as to the particulars or the proof of the debt but also those of S. 13 (1) which relate to the statement of the debt owed to him. In other words, I view a decree filed by a creditor decree-holder as performing two functions. It contains both a statement of the debt due to the decree-holder as well as its proof, the particulars of the debt, etc., having been dispensed with by the proviso to S. 14 (1) I refuse to believe that the legislature had any idea of empowering the Board to wipe off a decree without payment or adjustment even if it was filed by a decree-holder. But if it did have any such intention and wished to appoint the Board under this Act as a Super Court authorised to discharge the decree a of civil Courts produced before it, it has certainly failed to express it.

I most respectfully agree with these observations and apply them to the facts of this case. I am of the opinion that the filing of a decree of a civil Court was a sufficient compliance both with the provisions of S. 14 (1) as also of the provisions of S. 13 (1), and, therefore, the Board could not discharge the debts which they purported to do. Both the Courts below, in my opinion, were right in proceeding with the execution and disregarding the order of the Board discharging the debts of the two decree-holders.

Execution second Appeal No. 572 of 1948 deals with the case of the decree-holder Nathu whose debt was discharged because of his not being present before the Board on 10th January 1945. The facts of this case are that on 10th January 1945 Nathu''s son appeared before the Board and informed them that Nathu was ill and would appear at the next hearing. The Board ordered Nathu to show cause why his debt should not be discharged. On the next hearing, that is, 20th February 1945 all the decree-holders including Nathu were present. A power-of-attorney in favour of the son of Nathu was attested by the Board at the instance of Nathu. The order of the Board was that the decree-holders should appear at Shahpur for scrutiny of accounts on 20th March 1945, when again all the creditors were present and the order was :

The petitioner wished to pay off Buta Singh and he should bring Rs. 160 at the next hearing. The creditors should produce copies of bonds etc., at the next hearing i.e., 20th April 1945, and Harnam Singh should be awaited.

It was at the next hearing on 20th April 1945 that the order of discharge was passed. The Board said:

Nathu was not present on 10th January 1945 and he had appointed his son as his attorney, and he (Nathu) is unable to give any reason why he was absent on 10th January 1945. His debt should, therefore, be deemed to be discharged because of his absence on 10th January 1945.

Mr. Roop Chand submits relying on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Sat Paul v. Abdul Hai, 50 P. L. R. 194 : (A. I. R. (36) 1949 E. P. 1 F. B.) that if finding has been given on the question of sufficiency of cause by the Board in an enquiry under sub-s. (4) of S. 13 the finding is conclusive and the civil Court cannot go behind it. But the facts of this case seem to be different. The order shows that the son was present on the first hearing as an attorney, but even if he was not, the order of the Board passed on 20th February and 20th March whereby they ordered all the creditors including Nathu to appear with documents in favour of their debts should by implication be held to be an order holding in favour of Nathu in regard to his absence on the first day. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Courts below were right in allowing the execution to proceed in this case also.

In the result, both the appeals and the revision are dismissed, but in the circumstances parties will bear their own costs throughout.