Jagdish Attri vs Additional District Judge/IIIrd F.T.C., Haridwar and another

Hon''ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard Mr. Siddhartha Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sudhir Kumar, Brief Holder for the State/respondent No. 1 and Mr. Pankaj Miglani, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2.

The present writ petition has been filed against the rejection of an amendment application moved at the instance of the petitioners/tenant in appeal. The brief facts leadings to the filing of the writ petition is that the landlady had applied for release of the shop on the ground of personal need for her two sons. The petitioner, who is the tenant, resisted the release application. The prescribed authority allowed the release application holding that the need of the landlady is bonafide and that the shop was required to settle her two sons. This order was passed in the year 2009, against which the petitioner preferred an appeal. After sixteen months, when the appeal was ripe for hearing, the petitioner moved an amendment application contending that the landlady had a shop in the premises in question which was being used by his younger son which has now been let out to one Mr. Jagjeet Singh. Another amendment sought was that the landlady had become very old and, therefore, she does not have any need to do any business herself. This application was resisted by the opposite party. The lower appellate court after considering the matter, rejected the amendment application.

Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and after perusing the amendment sought and the objection raised, the Court is of the opinion that frivolous objection was raised, prima facie to scuttle the hearing and prolong the matter. No doubt, a liberal approach should be adopted and full opportunity should be given to the tenant to defend himself and raise such plea, which could negate the factor of the bonafide need of the landlady. But an amendment application should not be allowed where it amounts to a misuse of the process of law. This is precisely what has happened in the present case. The landlady has died. Her sons have been substituted in the appeal. The amendment that the landlady is an old lady and she has no need in the shop in question is neither here nor there. The original application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act was filed for the need of her two sons and was not for her own need. Consequently, the amendment application on this aspect was patently erroneous.

The second amendment sought, namely, that the younger son of the landlady was running a shop, which he has let it out to one Mr. Jagjeet Singh. No prima facie evidence has been brought on record to show that this factual averment is correct. On the other hand, a perusal of the objection raised by the opposite party indicates that the stand taken by the petitioner is contrary to the earlier stand taken by the petitioner. Before the prescribed authority, the petitioner had taken a stand that the younger son was running a business in some other place and now, by the impugned amendment, the petitioner has taken a summersault contending that the younger son is doing business of a travel agency at another place and has now let it out. Two contrary stands against the younger son of the landlady itself indicate that the amendment sought was frivolous incorrect and was not supported by any substantial evidence. A clear indication appears to be given that the amendment was sought to delay the hearing of the appeal.

In the light of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petition and is, accordingly, dismissed. The lower court is directed to decide the appeal within six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.