High CourtsDivision Bench

Jagdish Parshad vs State of Haryana and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 25 July 2007 · Citation: (2008) 149 PLR 50 : (2007) 4 RCR(Civil) 397

HON’BLE JUDGES
Vijender Jain, C.J · Mahesh Grover, J
RESULT
Dismissed

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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 626 words

Vijendra Jain, C.J.—The petitioner has assailed the orders dated 27.4.1993 (Annexure P-2) and dated 27.12.2001 (Annexure P-5) by way of present wit petition.

2.

The petitioner, who was allotted Booth Site No. 30, Sector 7, Panchkula, was required to make deposit of the price as per the stipulations incorporated in allotment letter dated 3.10.1987 (Annexure P-1). However; he failed to do so despite the last date for deposit of installments had expired on 5.10.1992. Accordingly, proceedings u/s 17(1) to (4) of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 (for short ''the Act'') were initiated against the petitioner and vide order dated 27.4.1993 (Annexure P-2), the site in question was resumed alongwith forfeiture of 10% of the money deposited by him. He filed an appeal against the said order on 28.9.2001. The reasons for this inordinate delay is that the petitioner had taken recourse to the filing of the ''suit which culminated in the filing of the Regular Second Appeal wherein it dawned on him that the proper course would have been to file an appeal against the order of resumption upon which he withdrew the Regular Second Appeal and challenged the said order.

Thereafter in appeal before the competent authority also, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared and consequently, the same was dismissed on both counts, i.e. of delay as well as on merits.

3.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner had been making payment of installments up to the year 2000 when he came to know that the order of resumption had been passed in the year 1993 and, therefore, took recourse to the filing of the civil suit. In para 6 of the writ petition, he has given the details of the payments which reflected that after 1988, he deposited installments on 10.4.1995 and onwards, i.e. much after the site had been resumed in 1993. He further contended that since the petitioner had been making payment of the installments at least up to the year 2000, the order of resumption was bad and also that the authorities concerned were, demanding interest at the rate of 18% which dissuaded him from making, the deposit and the matter regarding the payment of interest has been settled in Roochira Ceramics v. Haryana Urban Development Authority 2001 (1) P.L.J. 109 and a number of other judgments, wherein it has been held that the Haryana Urban Development Authority, at best, can impost (impose?) 10% interest on the payment of delayed installments.

4.

Learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 opposed the prayer of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and sought dismissal of the writ petition.

5.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the law Lald down by the Apex Court does not, in any way, help the petitioner as the facts of this case reveal that even though, the booth site was allotted to him in the year 1987, he failed to make payment towards its price from 1988 to 1995. Even thereafter, as per the petitioner''s own showing he made payment of the installments in the year 1995, 1996 and 2000. The site stood resumed in the year 1993 and it was in the year 2000 that the petitioner assailed the order of resumption by way of a civil suit. In view of these peculiar facts, as also the fact that the site already stood resumed in the year 1993 on valid ground of non-payment of dues, there is no reason for us to exercise our equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, especially when the order of resumption assumed finality in 1993 itself with the first challenge being made in 2000, much belatedly.

6.

Hence, the writ petition is dismissed.