Jagdish Singh vs Balwant Singh and Others

M.M. Kumar, J.—This petition filed under Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana Urban Rent (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,

1973, (for brevity the Act), is directed against the judgment dated 11.12.2001 passed by the Appellate Authority, Ambala by upholding the order

of ejectment dated 27.9.2000. The Rent Controller in his order dated 27.9.2000 had held that the tenant-petitioner was inducted as tenant in the

house in the year 1971. He used to pay rent to Amar Singh and Bachan Kaur. Thereafter, he defaulted in the payment of rent. It was further been

held that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the tenant-petitioner is in arrears of rent. The tenant-petitioner did

not even make payment of rent in the Court after his appearance. On the ground of non-payment of rent, the tenant-petitioner was ordered to be

evicted from the premises. The Rent Controller also concluded that he had jurisdiction to try the ejectment petition filed by the landlord-

respondent.

On appeal filed under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, the Appellate Authority upheld the findings of the Rent Controller holding that

the landlady-respondent Bachan Kaur (now represented by respondent No. 1) was the owner of the house in dispute which earlier was owned by

Amar Singh. The tenant-petitioner has raised a serious dispute with regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties by

claiming his own title. The Rent Controller had refused to determine the afore mentioned question by observing that the question of title was

required to be determined first by the Civil Court. The view of the Rent Controller in this regard has been reversed by the Appellate Authority

which proceeded to hold that the Rent Controller was entitled to determine the question of title in accordance with the judgment of this Court in

Dewan Chand Vs. Sh. Darshan Lal and Others, . The Appellate Authority further held that the landlord-respondent has been able to prove her

ownership and that the tenant-petitioner has been a tenant in the property since 1971 under her predecessor in interest. It also found that some

construction was raised by the tenant-petitioner with the permission of the landlord-respondents. The plea of the tenant-petitioner which did not

find favour with the learned Appellate Authority is that there is an agreement Ex.RW6/1 and in performance of that agreement possession of the

land with some construction has been given and the same is sufficient to protect the possession of the tenant-petitioner u/s 53A of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882 (for brevity ''the 1882, Act''). The view of the Appellate Authority reads as under:-

In the present case, a sale certificate has been produced which shows that the property had been purchased in an auction by Amar Singh.

There are some other letters on the record which show that the father of Amar Singh, namely, Lal Singh had written to the Municipal Committee

regarding sending the bills in the name of Amar Singh as he had become the owner. There is one more letter placed in the file which shows that this

property was mortgaged with Lal Singh and it was mortgaged with possession and thereafter, this property was purchased by Amar Singh. The

plea set up by the respondent is that Sajjan Singh had pooled in money for purchase of this property and Amar Singh in his own hand executed an

agreement Ex.RW6/1. Their stand is that Amar Singh had acknowledged the right of Sajjan Singh and this document was sufficient to show that

the respondent was the owner. Ex.RW6/1 is a 30 years old document and the Court can presume its execution if it comes from proper custody.

This document was produced by the respondent but at a very late stage. There are various other circumstances which only go to show that it

cannot be relied upon. There is no evidence to show that Amar Singh used to put his signatures in Urdu. The fact that this document did not find

mention in the reply sent to the notice, is another circumstance. This document is not a registered document and the trial Court had rightly

discarded this piece of evidence. There is one important circumstance which goes against the respondent and that is that the document does not

show that the property was purchased for the benefit of Sajjan Singh alone. It refers to 4/5 other names as well. The respondent had, on the other

hand, pleaded that it was purchased for his benefit alone. Then, there is the statement of the respondent which clearly states that Sajjan Singh was

a Government Servant; and had this property been purchased by him, it would have been reflected in his property statements. It has also come in

the statement of Jagdish Singh, who is son of Sajjan Singh that when the construction was raised, a loan had been obtained from the Government.

If it was so; those papers could have been produced to show that the loan was obtained for construction of his house.

Both the parties are related to each other and, it appears that Amar Singh allowed his cousin to come and occupy the property and a nominal

rent was charged being closely related but there was no exchange of receipts. Amar Singh even allowed Sajjan Singh to raise construction as the

rooms were not sufficient to accommodate his family. Sajjan Singh was in Government service and was posted at various stations. No material

was produced to show his period of posting at different stations. However, his family started living at Ambala from 1971 onwards. Some

construction was admittedly raised by Sajjan Singh. There is no evidence to show how much expenditure was made. Bare statement that a sum of

Rs. 80,000/- was spent on the construction, cannot be believed. However, Bachan Kaur had admitted that some constructions was raised. The

explanation given by her was that they had allowed Sajjan Singh to raise the construction and it was with their consent. A site plan was got

sanctioned by Sajjan Singh. It is not clear as to how the Municipal Committee had sanctioned the site plan. The Authorities must have obtained

some documents to satisfy themselves about the ownership or perhaps there was some letter from Amar Singh but that matter is not clear nor the

respondent has led any evidence. The dispute arose after the death of Amar Singh that too after a decade and when the respondent stopped

making payment of rent.

Agreement Ex.RW6/1 did not see the light of the day till 1986 and there was only a passing reference in the written statement. It was

introduced in evidence at a very late stage. It did not find mention in the response which was sent to the notice issued by the petitioner''s counsel.

This document is therefore a suspect document. This is more so as the sale certificate was issued in favour of Amar Singh in 1954. If the plea of

the respondent-appellant is accepted as correct for a moment, then the cause had accrued to the respondent after the execution of the sale

certificate, but he did not take any steps. For the first time, he asserted his ownership in the written statement filed by him. The respondent had

examined his brother, the respondent did not put the contents of that document to him probably under the fear that he would spill the beans.

The respondent had taken three contradictory pleas. The agreement setup by him can not be accepted for reasons given above. The plea of

adverse possession could only be raised when a party accepted the other as the owner. The plea of benami transaction is also not available in view

of the provisions contained in the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act.

Mr. S.K. Goyal, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has argued that in the present case, relationship of landlord and tenant has not been

established. According to the learned counsel, there is no evidence indicating the payment of rent or a rent note executed between the parties. The

learned counsel has pointed out that even for the sake of argument, if it is presumed that the landlord-respondents is owner of the house in dispute,

it would not necessarily results in raising a further inference that relationship of landlord and tenant exists for the purposes of the Act. The learned

counsel vehemently urged that no petition in the facts and circumstances of the instant case under the Act was maintainable. In support of his

submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Mohinder Singh v. Ram Nath 1984 H.R.R. 467

and in the case of Balbir Singh Vs. Balkiar Singh and Another, . The learned counsel has further argued that there is no evidence on record

indicating that the tenant-petitioner has ever paid rent to the landlord-respondents. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed

reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Amrit Lal C. Shah Vs. Ram Kumar, . The learned counsel has also argued that the municipal

record is no evidence for the proposition that the tenant-petitioner is tenant under the landlord-respondent. In support of his submission, the

learned counsel has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the cases of Smt. Ramjeevani v. Naroti Bai (1993) 1 Ren.C.R. 85 and

Jagan Nath v. Smt. Shanti Devi 1976 CLJ 312. He has further urged that the tenant-petitioner is a co-sharer in the property and the afore

mentioned document is per se admissible u/s 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as has been held in the cases of Kartar Singh v. Mt. Mehr

Nishan AIR 1934 Lah 885.

Mr. Vinod Sharma, learned counsel for the landlord-respondents has argued that Ex.AWS/1 dated 14.11.1953 is a certificate of sale issued by

competent officer under the Evacuee Trust Separation Act, 1951, when the afore mentioned house was purchased in the open auction by S. Amar

Singh s/o Shri Lal Singh, the predecessor in interest of the land lord-respondents, for a consideration of Rs. 1530/-. The property was purchased

exclusively in the name of Amar Singh. Learned counsel has further argued that if there was an agreement between the tenant petitioner Ex.RW6/1

dated 21.11.1953, then he should have filed a suit for specific performance which has never been done. According to the learned counsel cogent

reasons have been given by the Courts below for not reading this document in evidence because it has not come from proper custody and

therefore, it is suspicious. The learned counsel maintained that the tenant-petitioner made an effort to change the ownership in the municipal record

but his application Ex.A7 was dismissed. The learned counsel has further submitted that the statements of AW1 and AW5 amply show that there

was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the tenant-petitioner was a tenant under the landlord-respondents on payment of

rent. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Om Parkash v. Ram Swaroop (1984) 2 Rent L.R. 351, to argue that in

the absence of rent note, relationship of landlord and tenant can be established by adducing oral evidence. The learned counsel further maintained

that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court are extremely limited and unless it is concluded that there was no evidence, this Court can not interfere

in the findings of fact. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Dev Kumar

(Died) through LRs. Vs. Smt. Swaran Lata and others, , Ubaiba v. Damodaran 2000(1) Rent Law Reporter (S.C) 46, Ramdoss Vs. K.

Thangavelu, and Brij Mohan Vs. Meera Devi and Others, . He has also submitted that there was relationship of landlord and tenant and has placed

reliance on various judgment namely Harbans Lal v. Kishan Chand (2002) 2 Rent L.R. 571 (P&H), Kedar Bhatia v. Lingarkar Panduranga Rao

(1998) 2 RLR 126, Dewan Chand Vs. Sh. Darshan Lal and Others, .

I have thoughtfully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and am of the view that his petition deserves to be

allowed. In order to appreciate the controversy raised, it would be apposite to refer to the pedigree table which reads as under :-

Roda Singh

Hira Singh Lal Singh

Sajjan Singh Swaran Singh Girja Singh Narata Singh

Amar Singh Karam Singh Dharam Singh

Jagdish Singh Devinder Singh Lakhbir

(tenant petitioner)

Bachan Kaur Balwant Singh

(Land-lady-respondent)

It may be true that property on which the demised house has been constructed was purchased by Amar Singh on 14.11.1953 for a sale

consideration of Rs. 1530/-. But it is equally true that on 15.11.1953, Amar Singh himself purchased a stamp paper on which the agreement

RW6/1 was executed. According to the stipulation in the agreement, the afore mentioned property was purchased to the extent of half share for

the benefit of his real cousins i.e. sons of his father''s brother namely Sajjan Singh, Sarwan Singh, Girja Singh and Narata Singh and rest of the

50% was purchased for the benefit of Amar Singh, Karam Singh and Dharam Singh, The document Ex.RW6/1 further shows that the payment

was deposited by Amar Singh at that time in the office of the competent officer. Half share of that payment was contributed by Sajjan Singh and

his brothers. There is further stipulation that he was to transfer half share to Sajjan Singh. Sarwan Singh, Girja Singh and Narata Singh arid the

expenses to be incurred on transfer were to be borne by Sajjan Singh; Sarwan Singh, Girja Singh and Narata Singh. It is worth while to make a

reference to document Ex.RW6/1 in extenso and when translated the same reads as under-

I Amar Singh s/o Lal Singh, Jat by caste am a resident of Ambala City, Mohalla Chamar Naka, Ward No. 5, Ambala City, the owners of which

have migrated to Pakistan, has been auctioned by the competent officer, Ambala and I have purchased the said house for a sum of Rs. 1530/- in

my name by giving a bid in the said auction. But, I have not received the possession letter and the certification of auction as per procedure from the

competent officer till date. However, I have taken the possession as vendee on the basis of auction. As a matter of fact, I have purchased this

house for the benefit of Sajjan Singh. Sarwan Singh, Girja Singh and Narata Singh son of Hira Singh to the extent of half share and Amar Singh,

Karam Singh and Dharam Singh sons of Lal Singh to the extent of half share. Both the parties have given me the amount as per their share, which I

have got deposited in the Court of competent officer. Now, in may full senses. I undertake that when I would become absolute owner of the said

house through the Court. I would transfer half share of the same to Sajjan Singh, Girja Singh and Narata Singh sons of Hira Singh. who are my

cousins (sons of father''s elder brother) by executing a sale deed within one month and the share holders would bear the expenses of transfer as

per their share. Sajjan Singh etc. would bear half of the expenses (if any) on all the papers for obtaining certificate of auction and possession letter.

If after the issuance of receipt of possession letter and the certificate of auction, I do not transfer the shares as per agreement within one month, I

would be responsible for any type of loss suffered by the parties (sharers) and would be liable to repay their amount together with the interest 1%

per month. In case, I do not keep my words, J would pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 200/- to every share holder, besides their own amount.

Therefore, this argument has been got scribed in favour of Sajjan Singh etc., so that it may serve as an authority at the time of need. Contents of

the agreement have been read over, which are correct. Dated 14.11.1953.

Note:- The date 14.11.1953 in line No. 3 of page 2 has been striked off, which was incorrect. The date 21.11.52 is correct.

But the Courts below have discarded the aforementioned document by observing that the document has been produced on record after a

considerable delay. Some suspicious circumstances have also been pointed out which appears to have persuaded both the Courts below to

discard the document Ex.RW6/1. It has been pointed out that the document Ex.RW6/1 should have been mentioned in reply dated 10.2.1986

Ex.R-14 submitted to tenant-petitioner to the legal notice dated 8.1.1986 sent by the landlord-respondents. As the document has been pleaded for

the first time in the written statement filed on 2.8.1986, it has been discarded because of its late production. It has further been observed that after

making mention of the document in the written statement it was not made part of the record at the time of filing the written statement but was

exhibited only while rebutting additional evidence. The suspicious circumstances which have weighed with the Courts below to deny the exercise of

discretion u/s 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for brevity ''the Act''), which leads to a presumption that the document is genuine and correct

are that there is cutting on the date 14.11.1953 which has been substituted to 21.11.1953. The statement of Balwant Singh that Amar Singh, his

father used to sign the document in English has been treated as another suspicious circumstance because RW6/1 has been signed in Urdu. The

treasury challans Ex.A28 and Ex.A29 have been signed by Amar Singh in English. It has further been said that the document is not registered and

has been denied by the landlady-respondent. Both the Courts below have referred to the contents of the document to conclude that there is no

recital in the aforementioned document showing that half portion of House No. 9051/5 which was purchased by Amar Singh was alienated to the

tenant-petitioner. Holding that the provisions of Section 90 of the Act do not impose an obligation that the Court must presume that a 30 years old

document is genuine, both the Courts below have concluded that the discretion vested in the Court in view of the delay in production of the

document and the suspicious circumstances should not be exercised in favour of the tenant-petitioner by raising a presumption in his favour.

Before discussing the legal basis of the reasons given by the Courts for discarding the documents Ex.RS6/1, it is appropriate to make a

reference to Section 90 of the Act, which reads as under:-

Presumption as to documents thirty years old.- Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any

custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document,

which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that persons handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or

attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested.

Explanation:- Document are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the case of the persons with whom, they

would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such

as to render such an origin probable. This explanation applies also to Section 81.

ILLUSTRATIONS

(a) A has been in possession of landed property for a long time. He produces from his custody deeds relating to the land showing his titles to it.

The custody is proper.

(b) A produces deed relating to landed property of which he is the mortgagee. The mortgagor is in possession. The custody is proper.

(c) A connection of B, produces deeds relating to lands in B''s possession which were deposited with him by B for safe custody. The custody is

proper.

A perusal of the aforementioned provision makes it evident that the documents which are 30 years old and produced from proper custody

would prove themselves and no evidence of the handwriting, signature, sealing or delivery in general is required to be given. Even a presumption

has been raised in favour of the authority if it is recorded in the handwriting of any particular person. The provision goes to the extent that the

document executed or attested was duly executed and attested by those who purport to have executed and attested. The principle incorporated by

Section 90 is that an old document which is 30 years old, if produced from proper custody, the Court may presume that it has been signed and/or

written by those whose signatures it bears and that it has been duly attested and executed. The document should on the face of it be free of any

suspicion.

If the principles laid down in Section 90 of the Act are applied to the document Ex.RW6/1, it is evident that it has been produced from proper

custody. A document is supposed to be in possession of a beneficiary and accordingly Sajjan Singh who has been one of the beneficiaries under

the document RW6/1 had produced the same. Therefore, the primary requirement that the document should be produced from proper custody

stands satisfied in the instant case. The other requirement that the document should be free from any suspicious circumstances would also be

satisfied in the instant case because on the face of the document nothing is revealed which may raise a suspicion. On the contrary, it reveals that the

stamp paper on which the document is written has been purchased by Amar Singh S/o Lal Singh on 11.11.1951 as is evident from the

endorsement made by the stamp vendor at the back of the both the pages one worth Rs. 1 and the other worth eight annas. The cutting of the date

of 14.11.1953 has been crossed then corrected to 21.11.1953 as is explained by the notice given at the end of the document. Moreover, the

document has been signed in Urdu by Amar Singh. The delay pointed out by the Courts below in producing the document is not of such a

consequence which would go to the extent of discarding the same. It has been observed by the courts below that reference of the document should

have been made in the reply dated 10.2.1986, Ex.R14 which is said to have been disclosed for the first time on 2.8.1986 in the written statement.

However, both the Courts below have failed to appreciate that in Ex.A-9 which is copy of objections dated 24.7.1984 filed before the

Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ambala City, a detailed reference of this document dated 21.11.1953 has been made and a copy of this

document was enclosed. Para 4 of the aforementioned objections reads as under:-

That according to the agreement signed by late Shri Amar Singh S/o Lal Singh, husband of Smt. Bachan Kaur, the objector, on 21.11.52

(copy enclosed), this house was purchased for the benefit of Amar Singh and others sons Lal Singh, Sajjan Singh and others s/o Hira Singh on the

basis of 50% ownership of each party.

In view of the above, it is not possible to conclude that the document did not see the light of the day till the time it was exhibited before the

Court. The other factors that Amar Singh had to sign in English and there is cutting in date have also not impressed me to discard the

aforementioned document for the purposes of raising a presumption u/s 90 of the Act because it is nobody''s case that document RW6/1 is the

result of forgery. It is not unknown that in early fifties Urdu language was prevalent in this part of the country. The whole document has been

recorded in Urdu language and all the witnesses have signed in Urdu. Balwant Singh has not stated that his father Amar Singh never signed in

Urdu. Moreover, the stamp paper was purchased by Amar Singh himself on 11.11.1953. The writing is recorded by a stamp vendor. The cutting

of date is of no consequence because the note has explained the cutting and the same is put beyond any suspicion. Therefore, to my mind, the

document has to be regarded as a genuine document and presumption of truth would attach.

Once the document is presumed to be executed by Amar Singh then the next question is whether Sajjan Singh tenant-petitioner (now

represented by his son Jagdish Singh) would be entitled to any right in the afore mentioned property. The recital, in the document show that half of

the share has been purchased for the benefit of sons of Hira Singh namely Sajjan Singh, Sarwan Singh, Girja Singh and, Narata Singh. It has also

come in evidence that the site plan was submitted by Sajjan Singh on 25.7.1970 for proposed double story House No. 9051 which was later an

allocated AMC No. 316/B-VCl by the Municipal Committee, Ambala. The site plan has been sanctioned. The landlady has also admitted in her

statement that certain construction was raised by Sajjan Singh. Moreover, the dispute has arisen after about 10 years of the death of Amar Singh.

The cause of action is imputed to the non-payment of rent. In case, where a person in stranger to the property in his possession and he is allowed

to function as an owner or act as if he is the owner especially in the presence and in close proximity of those who claimed themselves to be the

owner then such fact would prove negation of ownership rights. Moreover, the tenancy is alleged to have commenced from 1971 whereas site plan

was submitted for sanction on 25.7.1970. The tenant-petitioner has claimed that he is in possession since 1953. The possession of Sajjan Singh to

the house in dispute has been apparently in the knowledge of the landlady and her deceased husband. He has built double storey house in the year

1970 which is an act akin to the act of an owner. In such a case, to my mind the benefit of Section 53A of the 1882 Act would be available and

the tenant-petitioner is entitled to defend his possession.

The doctrine of part performance incorporated in Section 53A of the 1882 Act postulates that when a person enters into a contract to transfer

the immovable property for valuable consideration by a writing signed by him and the transferee has taken possession in part performance of the

contract then such a transferee is entitled to defend his possession. He may not be able to use his possession as an instrument of attack but he can

certainly use the doctrine of part performance u/s 53A of the 1882 Act as a shield of protection to remain in possession who has agreed to sell.

Section 53A of the 1882 Act reads as under:

53-A. Pari performance.- Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his

behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty and the transferee has, in part

performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in

possession in part performance of the contract and has done act in furtherance of the contract and the transferee has performed or is willing to

perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered or, where there is

an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed for by the law for the time being in force, the transferor

or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the

property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:

Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has notice of the contract of the part performance

thereof.

A perusal of the aforementioned section shows that there are following sine-qua-non to avail these benefits which are:

(a) the contract should have in writing signed by the transferor.

(b) the transferee should have got possession of the immovable property covered by the contract; and

(c) the transferee should have done some acts in furtherance of the contract. In other words, the transferee has either performed his part of the

contract or willing to do so.

In the instant case, the document Ex.RW6/1 is in writing and is signed by the transferor Shri Amar Singh. It is also evident that the transferee

along with his three brothers have paid half of the amount for payment of the sale consideration in respect of the property purchased on

14.11.1953 in open auction. The so called tenant-petitioner has been in possession as is shown by him. He also submitted a site plan for building a

double storey on 25.5.1970 which was sanctioned by the Municipal Committee; Ambala. The theory of inducting transferee as a tenant in 1971

would be completely demolished and no reasonable person could expect that a person who had built a double storey house in 1970 would

become tenant in 1971 in the absence of any document in the intervening period showing transfer of title. It is also pertinent to notice that no

dispute had arisen during the lifetime of Amar Singh and it was only after 10 years of death of Amar Singh that such a dispute had arisen.

Therefore, in my considered opinion, the possession of so called tenant petitioner is that of a co-sharer and not that of a tenant. In such

circumstances the provisions of the 1882 Act cannot be invoked and no ejectment petition would be competent.

For the sake of argument, even if it is presumed that the tenant-petitioner are not the owner and the landlady-respondent is the owner then

there are only oral statement in favour and against the tenancy of Sayan Singh. It is true that oral statement with regard to tenancy itself may

constitute a basis but the oral statement alone which is rebutted by the oral statement of other side would not constitute sufficient basis for

presuming that there is relationship of landlord and tenant. On record, no receipt showing payment of rent has been produced. There is no rent

note which strengthen the belief that the tenant-petitioner is in possession in a capacity other than as a tenant. If that be so, then no ejectment

petition u/s 13 of the Act would be maintainable because there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. Therefore, on the basis of oral statement

which has survived on both sides one stating that the tenant-petitioner was never a tenant and the witness produced by landlady-respondent stating

that he was a tenant would not lead to the conclusion that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant. The relationship of landlord and tenant

has not been established. Therefore, the ejectment petition filed u/s 13 of the Act by the landlady-respondent is not maintainable and the same is to

be dismissed.

Under Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act this Court does not, ordinarily exercise revisional jurisdiction to reverse the findings of facts.

However, there is no absolute prohibition as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sundra Naicka Vadiyar (dead) by LRs. and

another Vs. Ramaswami Ayyar (dead) by his LRs., On this aspect, the views of their lordships read as under:-

Apart from the reasons given by the High Court, ignoring some of the documents which were vital for deciding the question of possession also

vitiated the finding on the question of possession recorded by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court. Apart from the documents

evidencing the compromise and containing the recital of surrender of possession by the appellant to the respondent, the other material documents

were the orders made in the eviction proceedings by the Revenue Court when the matters were taken up by the Revenue Court and dismissed on

the basis of the compromise accepted by the parties who are present. Ignoring these orders and overlooking the logical effect thereof and basing

the conclusion on the question of possession only on the oral evidence adduced by the appellant did cause an infirmity in the finding of fact which

justified interference in second appeal.

Similarly, it has been held that there is no rule of universal application prohibiting interference in the concurrent findings of facts. This Court has

been vested with the powers to ensure that the Rent Controller has exercised his jurisdiction according to law. These powers are essentially

supervisory in nature and intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law while passing the order under the Act. The power does not

extend to re-appreciating the evidence and then record its finding. However, in case where there is no evidence to sustain the finding then

interference under Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act is imperative. In Vaneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh (2000) 126 PLR 263 while referring to the

powers of this Court under Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, the Supreme Court has referred to its earlier views taken in the cases of Shiv

Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta 1996 (6) SCC 222 and Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 1988(2) SCC 119. The views

of their Lordships in this regard read as under:-

Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an

order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. The question that arises for consideration is whether the

High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can reassess or re-evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding that what has been recorded by

the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta held that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation

or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts. However, the High

Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an order is in accordance with law. For that limited

purpose the High Court would be justified in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., it was held that the High

Court while exercising the jurisdiction can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived

at by the fact finding Court is wholly unreasonable.

A perusal of Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act shows that the power of the High Court to revise an order is an appellate power, but it is

also true that it is not akin to power exercisable u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is no doubt, true that the High Court would be justified

in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands such interference.

When the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments are applied to the facts of the instant case, it becomes

clear that both the Courts below failed to take into consideration the vital document Ex.RW6/1. Once that document is read into evidence then the

right of the so called tenant-petitioner would flow in as a co-sharer and the fight of the landlady in the property would be eclipsed. Apart from that

the oral evidence produced by both the parties one claiming that the tenant-petitioner is a tenant and the other side claiming that he is not tenant

would not lead to record a finding that there was relationship of landlord and tenant. The possession is obviously with the tenant-petitioner even

before he is alleged to have been inducted as a tenant. The proceedings under the Act have been initiated after a period of ten years or death of

Amar Singh who is the real cousin of Sajjan Singh tenant-petitioner, (who is now represented by his son Jagdish Singh). Moreover, the

observations made in para 17 that Amar Singh allowed the tenant-petitioner to occupy the property at a nominal rent and for that reason there was

no exchange of receipt or permitting him to raise construction are clearly conjectural and cannot be supported by an evidence. It is the ipse dixit of

the Appellate Authority. Presumption, if any, on the basis of document Ex.RW6/1 would flow in favour of the tenant-petitioner because the onus to

prove the relationship of landlord and tenant was heavily on the landlady respondent, in the absence of any rent receipt or the rent note it is unsafe

to support the finding that there was relationship of landlord and tenant. Therefore, the interference of this Court under Sub-section (6) of Section

15 is in the interest of justice and to ensure that the law is complied with namely that in the absence of relationship of landlord and tenant, no

petition u/s 13 of the Act for ejectment of the tenant-petitioner would be competent and maintainable.

For the reasons recorded above, this petition succeeds and the impugned judgment is set aside.