Jagjit Singh vs Vaneet Jain

V.S. Aggarwal, J.—Jagjit Singh has filed the present revision petition directed against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, Jagadhari, dated 12.4.1996 and of the learned Appellate Authority, Jagadhari, dated 16.3.1998. The learned Rent Controller had passed an order of eviction against the petitioner which was upheld by the learned Appellate Authority.

The relevant facts are that the respondent contended that the shop was earlier owned by Tarlok Chand Jain. He had let the property to the petitioner. Tarlok Chand had died in the year 1981. He left behind his widow and two sons including the respondent. Besides that, he had two daughters. In the family partition, the shop in question fell to the share of the respondent. A decree of the Civil Court was also passed on 9.9.1988. The respondent contended that he requires the property for his own use and intends to start Karyana Food Grain business therein. Earlier, he was a minor and he has attained the age of 18 years on 9.2.1987. The petition was filed on 2.12.1988. The other ground of eviction that arrears of rent were due had not survived for the purpose of present revision petition.

The petitioner contested the petition for eviction. According to him, it was Parshotam Lal Jain who was collecting the rent from him. He was not aware if Tarlok Chand Jain was the landlord-owner of the property. The decree of the Civil Court dated 9.9.1998 was pleaded to be collusive and mala fide. The respondent was stated to be doing the business in Orissa where he is residing permanently. It was denied that the respondent bona fide requires the property in question.

The learned Rent Controller framed the issues and recorded the evidence. It was held that the respondent bona fide requires the property for himself, namely, for conducting business at Jagadhari. An order of eviction was passed. As mentioned above, it was upheld by the learned Appellate Authority.

On behalf of the petitioner, reliance was strongly placed on the fact that the judgment of the civil Court on the basis of which the respondent claims that he has become the owner of the property cannot be considered because the said decree or order of the Court had not been registered. In support of his argument, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and others, . But it becomes unnecessary to go into the said controversy. This is for the reason that it was not in dispute that Tarlok Chand Jain was the owner-landlord. After his death, respondent would be one of the co-owner/landlord. A co-owner landlord can file a petition for eviction and consequently the argument so much thought of by the learned counsel for the petitioner must fail.

The main dispute that arises for consideration is as to whether the respondent can take advantage of Section 13(3)(A) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short "the Act"). The relevant provision reads as under:-

"(3-A), In the case of a non-residential building, a landlord who stands retired or discharged from the armed forces of the Union of India or who was a minor son at the time of death of the deceased landlord and requires it for his personal use may within a period of three years from the date of retirement or discharge or attaining the age of eighteen years, as the case may be, apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession:

Provided that where the landlord has obtained possession of a non-residential building under this sub-section, he shall not be entitled to apply again for the possession of any other non-residential building of the same class."

In the present case, it is not in controversy that the property in question is a non-residential building and that at the time of death of his father, the respondent was a minor. He has filed the petition for eviction within three years of his attaining the age of majority. Necessarily, the Controller has to be satisfied that the claim of the respondent-landlord is bona fide or not. The expression "bona fide" by itself convey that it should be free from whims, caprice and motive. The same can only be determined on appreciation of totality of the circumstances. Mere wish of the landlord will not permit the Controller to pass an order of eviction.

It is true that under Sub-section (6) to Section 15 of the Act, the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere is limited. This Court will only interfere if there is illegality or impropriety in the impugned order. If the findings have been based on appreciation of facts then even if this Court comes to a conclusion to the contrary, it will not interfere. But if manifest injustice is caused because of misreading of evidence, then High Court would be competent to interfere and set aside such an order.

In the present case, father of the respondent had shifted to Orissa in the year 1952. He started business there. It is not in controversy that the respondent was born in Orissa. It transpired that the respondent was even enrolled with the Employment Exchange at Orissa. The respondent was helping his brothers in the business at Orissa.

Now it is being stated that the respondent intends to start business at Jagadhari and wants to shift to Jagadhari. But strange enough, no steps have been taken to do so. The respondent is still residing at Orissa. The totality of the facts, therefore, indicate that the respondent intend to join service at Orissa and had got himself enrolled with the Employment Exchange. Thus he is only floating the present ground to get the petitioner evicted from the suit property. It cannot be termed that the requirement is bona fide. In the peculiar facts, the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority had misdirected themselves in assuming that the moment the landlord asks for premises, it must be taken that the requirement is bona fide.

For these reasons, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order and judgment of the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority respectively are set aside. Instead, the eviction petition is dismissed.