Jagmohan Singh and Others vs Prayag Narayan Singh and Others

Dawson Miller, C.J.—The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted on the 11th March, 1920, by the plaintiffs who are the appellants in this appeal claiming certain lands in mauza Indarpur Kochaisa against the defendant No. 1 who is the superior landlord of the interest in suit.

The land in suit originally belonged to one Deochand Singh who died in or about the year 1882. Deochand Singh had two sons Prabhu and Bigan, the former being married to Mt. Deomurat Kuer and the latter to Mt. Marno Kuer. Both these sons, it is now found, predeceased their father and upon the death of Deochand in 1882 some question appears to have arisen as to the possession of this property. The two widows of Prabhu and Bigan, who had survived their husbands, ware also alive at the death of Deochand. Upon that event the property would in the ordinary course go to Deochand''s heirs and the widows would not be entitled to any interest therein because their husbands had predeceased Deochand. The only right which they would have in the property, if any, would be the ordinary Hindu widows right to maintenance. One thing is quite clear in this case and that is that the widows were put in possession of the property and remained in possession for a number of years and one of the questions, which was in issue at the trial of this case, was whether the property which was acquired by the two widows in 1882 was acquired by them as their Stridhan or, as the plaintiffs alleged, whether they were merely allowed, to remain in possession of the property during their joint lives by way of maintenance. I may add that the property is a very small one being valued in the plaint at something under Rs. 1,000. The heirs of Deochand were somewhat distant collateral relations and presumably had other property of their own. They were no longer joint with him. There is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that these two ladies should have been allowed to remain in possession of the whole of the property left by their father-in-law, by way of maintenance after his death. That was the case of the plaintiffs. If that case is made out then there can be no doubt that the plaintiffs ought to succeed in this suit. It is necessary to add what happened subsequently. Mt. Marno Kuer the widow of Bigan predeceased her sister-in-law Mt Deomurat Kuer. Deomurat Kuer sometime before the year 1907 after the death of Marno Kuer appears to have parted with her interest whatever it may have been in this property to the landlord the present defendant. Subsequently about the year 1907 there was some further question as between the heirs of Deochand and a sister-in-law of Deomurat on the one hand and the landlord, the present defendant on the other and an arrangement was entered into whereby the landlord was allowed to remain in possession. He appears to have acquired the property from Deomurat because she was not able to pay her rent. It does not appear that an actual suit was brought nor was any rent decree passed. However that may be he got possession of the property. Now the question which arises in this appeal depends upon the determination of the question whether Deomurat Kuer was in possession of the property merely by way of maintenance or whether she was in possession of the property by adverse possession as against the heirs of her father-in-law. If she acquired adverse possession after her father-in-law''s death then no doubt the property would become her Stridhan. The authority for that proposition is to be found in the decision of Kashi Ram v. Mt. Amri (1910) 32 All. 189. The facts of that case were very similar to the present and it was held there relying upon a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Ranee Janki Koer [1877] 5 I.A. 1 that property acquired by a Hindu lady by adverse possession becomes her separate Stridhan property. As a general proposition that however required some limitation for if the property is acquired by a Hindu widow claiming as the widow of her deceased husband then no doubt, according to the ruling of their Lordships in the case of Mt. Lajwanti v. Safa Chand AIR 1924 P.C. 121 the property becomes an accretion to her late husband''s estate and on her death would pass not to her hairs but to the heirs of her deceased husband. Although in the present case there was no specific finding that these two widows had come into possession of the property in lieu of maintenance with the consent of the heirs of Deochand nevertheless that was the case put forward by the plaintiffs in their plaint. As against that the case put forward by the defendant was that this property had been acquired by them as Stridhan and of course it would follow that if the property were in fact their Stridhan any alienation of that property to the landlord would be binding not only against the heirs of Deochand who would have no right to it but against the whole world. On the other hand if the land in suit were merely the property of the widows given to them for their life-time by way of maintenance then the only interest they had in it and certainly the only interest which they could alienate would be their interest for life. The result would therefore be in the event of this being their life interest only that the alienation made to the landlord, the present defendant, would enure to his benefit only during the life time of the widows or the survivor of them.

Although as I have just stated there was no specific finding that the property was granted to the widows by way of maintenance still there was an issue raised whether the property was Stridhan or not, and it was found by the trial Court and the finding was upheld by the first Appellate Court that this property was not the Stridhan of the widows. It seems to me therefore to follow upon that finding that the only interest which the widows could have was the interest asserted by the plaintiffs, namely, that of maintenance only. Although this interest was alienated still that alienation would not be binding upon the heirs of Deochand who would acquire a vested right in the property after the death of the widows and the question, therefore, which becomes important is whether the widows or the survivor of them died within 12 years of the present suit. If Deomurat who was the surviving widow died more than 12 years before the suit then there can be no doubt that the defendant would have acquired adverse possession against the plaintiffs. It is found as a fact however in the case that she died within 12 years of the suit, and therefore, in my opinion, the suit is not time-barred.

It is argued by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents that there was nothing really to show on the evidence in this case whether the widows had acquired this property by virtue of their right to maintenance or whether they had acquired it by adverse possession that is to say, by some title asserted by them which had not been interfered with by the person entitled to inherit the property. But it is clear that if they were asserting an adverse title other than a title as widows of their deceased husbands they would be asserting a title which after 12 years would give them a right to hold the property as part of their Stridhan, but in the face of the finding of the lower Appellate Court that this was not their Stridhan, it seems to me that we are bound to come to the conclusion that the only manner in which they would have acquired the property was as maintenance. In this state of affairs it seems to me that the appeal must succeed, the decree of the lower Appellate Court will be set aside and a decree will be entered in favour of the appellants declaring their title to the property and their right to recover possession. The plaintiffs are entitled to their coats throughout.

Foster, J.

I agree.