Tribunals and Commissions(1999) 04 NCDRC CK 0099

JAGTIAL CONSUMER WELFARE COUNCIL vs S.D.M., LIC, NAKKALAGUTTA, HANAMKONDA, WARANGAL

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 15 April 1999 · Citation: 1999 2 CPJ 677

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.Parvatha Rao , T.Ranga Rao , Mamata Lakshmanna J.
RESULT
Complaint dismissed

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

5 paragraphs · 1,668 words
1.

THIS is a complaint filed before this Commission on 24.3.1992 under Section 17(a)(i) read with Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 with the following averments. The first complainant is M/s. Jagtial Consumer Welfare Council represented by its Secretary and the second complainant is one Smt. Mahesh Rangamma, w/o. Jalpat Rao of Gopulapur Village, Dharmapuri Mandal, Karimnagar District. One Mahesh Umapathi Rao son of the second complainant sent proposals for Money Back Insurance Policy with double accident benefits under Table No. 75/20 for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- on 31.8.1990 by paying sum of Rs. 304/- on 17.8.1990 and another sum of Rs. 1,000/ on 31.8.1990. Subsequently he was murdered by Naxalites on 27.9.1990. The second complainant being his mother and being a nominee under the policy submitted her claim forms to the Branch Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Jagtial (opposite party No. 2) requesting for payment of Rs. 1 lakh payable under the said policy. But on 31.5.1991 the Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Hanamkonda sent a cheque for Rs. 50,000/- only as ex-gratia payment, though the second complainant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1 lakh as per the terms of the policy. The second complainant got issued a legal notice dated 23.9.1991 calling upon the opposite parties to pay the balance of Rs. 50,000/-. But the second opposite party sent a letter stating that the contract was not concluded between the son of the second complainant and the Corporation and the Corporation is therefore not liable to pay any more amount. The complainants therefore filed the present complaint praying for a direction to the opposite parties to pay Rs. 50,000/- towards balance of policy amount, to pay interest at 21% on Rs. 1 lakh from 27.9.1990 till 31.5,1991, to pay interest at 21% from 1.6.1991 till the date of realisation, to pay eligible bonus, to pay compensation of Rs. 25,000/- and costs.

2.

THE authorised signatory of the Life Insurance Corporation of India filed a counter denying the allegations made in the complaint and contending that late Mahesh Umapathi Rao made a proposal on 17.8.1990 for taking a policy with double accident benefit, that he paid Rs. 304/- on 17.8.1990 and Rs. 1,000/- on 1.9.1990 to cover the first half-yearly instalment of premium, that however the proposal was not accepted by the Corporation for want of certain documents namely proof of age, that the proof of age was not received till 6.10.1990, that because the proposer Mahesh Umapathi Rao died even before the proof of age was received by the Corporation, the proposal was not accepted and no policy was issued and that the complainant is not entitled to the policy amount. It was further stated in the counter that after taking into consideration the cause of death of the deceased as he was murdered by unknown persons, the Corporation decided to pay Rs. 50,000/- by way of ex-gratia and accordingly paid the said amount. Finally the opposite parties prayed for dismissal of the complaint. At the time of enquiry the complainant examined 3 witnesses PWs 1 to 3 and got marked Exs. A-1 to A-4. The opposite parties have not adduced any oral evidence but got Exs. B-1 to B-3 documents marked in defence.

The point for consideration is whether there is deficiency in service on the part of the opposite parties.

3.

THE case of the complainant is that her late son Mahesh Umapathi Rao sent a proposal for Money Back Insurance Policy with double accident benefit under Table No. 75/20 by paying a sum of Rs. 304/- on 17.8.1990 and also another sum of Rs. 1,000/- on 31.8.1990, that her late son was killed by Naxalites on 27.9.1990, that being the nominee of her late son under the said proposal she made a claim for payment of the policy amount of Rs. 1 lakh and that the opposite parties unreasonably and arbitrarily repudiated her claim. THE contention of the opposite parties is that though Mahesh Umapathi Rao sent a proposal for taking Money Back Insurance Policy with double accident benefit by paying a premium of Rs. 304/- on 17.8.1990 and another sum of Rs. 1,000/- on 31.8.1990 the said proposal was not accepted for want of proof of age of Mahesh Umapathi Rao and that even before this proposal was accepted the said Mahesh Umapathi Rao died and therefore the policy amount is not paid to the complainant. THE further contention of the opposite parties is that after considering the fact that the said Mahesh Umapathi Rao was killed by Naxalites they decided to make ex-gratia payment and accordingly they paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and obtained Ex. B-1 full and final settlement voucher on 5.5.1991 and that no amount is payable to the complainant. One Mr. R. Satyanarayana, the agent of the opposite parties deposed as P. W. 1 that the date of birth certificate of Mahesh Umapathi Rao was given to the Development Officer on 31.8.1990 on which date a further sum of Rs. 1,000/-was paid as premium. It is urged for the complainant that the failure of the opposite parties to issue the policy even after receiving the date of birth certificate of the deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao amounts to deficiency in service and therefore the complainant is entitled to the policy amount. It is true that P.W.I, the agent of the opposite parties deposed as P. W. 1 that the date of birth certificate was given by deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao on 31.8.1990 when he paid the premium of Rs. 1,000/-. But the plea of the opposite parties is that a true copy of the date of birth certificate of deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao was received on 6.10.1990, after the death of Mahesh Umapathi Rao and therefore the proposal was not accepted and there was no concluded contract. THE learned Counsel for the complainant points out that Ex. B-3 xerox copy of the date of birth certificate of the deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao said to have been received by the opposite party on 6.10.1990 does not show that it was received by the opposite party on 6.10.1990 and that in the circumstances the case of the complainant that it was received by the opposite parties even before the death of the deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao has to be accepted. It is seen that one Mr. S.V. Ramana Rao, the Branch Manager of the opposite party Insurance Company at the relevant time deposed as witness for the complainant as PW 3 that his branch office received Ex. B-3 date of birth certificate on 6.10.1990. Therefore it is difficult to accept the case of the complainant that the date of birth certificate Ex. B-3 was received by the opposite parties even before the date of death of the deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties contends that even if the date of birth certificate was received by the opposite parties before the date of death of the deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao for argument sake there cannot be a concluded contract as long as the proposal was not accepted and that mere receipt of premium amount and preparation of policy documents is not acceptance and the acceptance must be signified by some act or acts agreed on by the parties or from which the law raises a presumption of acceptance. He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raja Vasireddy Komalavalli Kamba, AIR 1984 SC 1014, wherein it was held as follows : "The mere receipt and retention of premium until after the death of the applicant or the mere preparation of the policy documents is not acceptance. Acceptance must be signified by some act or acts agreed on by the parties or from which the law raises a presumption of acceptance."

It was also held therein that the general rule is that the contract of insurance will be concluded only when the party to whom an offer has been made accepts it unconditionally and communicates his acceptance to the person making the offer. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties also relied on a decision of this Commission reported in Yattam Seshakumari v. Life Insurance Corporation, Kakinada, 1998 ALD (Consumer) 237, wherein this Commission held that when the Insurance Company refused to accept the proposal and therefore repudiated, it by returning the first premium amount even before the death of the deceased, there was no policy of insurance and the complainant as nominee of the deceased cannot claim any relief against the Insurance Company under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In view of the above decisions the learned Counsel for the opposite parties contends that irrespective of the fact that the date of birth certificate of the deceased Mahesh Umapathi Rao was received by the opposite parties either before or after the death of the deceased the complainant is not entitled to the policy amount since the proposal was not accepted by the opposite parties. It may be seen that it is not the case of the complainant that the proposal made by the deceased was accepted by the opposite parties and a policy was issued. As mere receipt of premium amount does not amount to acceptance of the proposal and as there is no material to show that the proposal was accepted we hold that the complainant is not entitled to the policy amount. Even otherwise also the complainant is not entitled to claim further amount inasmuch as Ex. B-1 full and final settlement voucher mentions that the complainant received a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as full and final settlement of her claim and as it is not the case of the complainant that the said voucher was obtained from her by force or under compulsion. In the result the complaint is dismissed but without costs in the circumstances of the case. This will not preclude the complainant from approaching a competent Civil Court for appropriate reliefs. Complaint dismissed.