High CourtsDivision Bench

Jai Parkash vs The Chandigarh Administration and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 9 September 1998 · Citation: (1999) 121 PLR 784 : (1999) 1 RCR(Civil) 138

HON’BLE JUDGES
Iqbal Singh, J · G.S. Singhvi, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 8877 of 1994
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Judgment

11 paragraphs · 1,019 words

G.S. Singhvi, J.—This petition has been filed for directing the respondents to allot to the petitioner built up booth in Sector 19 Market, Chandigarh.

2.

The averments made in the writ petition and the written statement show that one Niranjan Singh was granted hand-cart licence No. HCL-342. He was also allotted rehri parking site No. 121 in Rehri Market, Sector 19-C. By an order dated 23.4.1982, the Licensing Officer cancelled the licence granted to Niranjan Singh on the ground that he had violated Clause 21(1) of the Hand Cart Bye Laws. In the years 1982 and 1993, devastating fire broke out in the Rehri market of Sector 19-C resulting in huge loss of property to the persons who were running their business in the said market. With a view to rehabilitate such persons, a policy decision was taken by the administration to allot booth sites to them in Rehri Market. For this purpose, a survey was conducted on 11.4.1994. During the course of survey, the petitioner made claim by stating that he was doing business in the Rehri Market. The Screening Committee rejected his claim by making the following observations :

"(xiv) Jai Parkash s/o Hazari Lal - Site No. 121.

Shri Vidya Sagar had raised an objection that Shri Jai Parkash had not lodged any claim in the year 1985 as he did not suffer any loss in the fire. And now his name has wrongly been substituted with that of Pran Nath a handicapped who had lodged his complaint regarding loss. Shri Jai Parkash appeared before the Screening Committee and disclosed that he is still working on the site. Whereas a perusal of the record has shown that Shri Jai Prakash had not filed any claim for built up booth in the year 1985 and his name does not figure in the list of 392 persons who were declared fire, victims in the year 1982. However, both his as well as Pran Nath''s name figure in the FIR dated 6.5.1982. As per record of Estate Office site No. 121 is still lying vacant and has not been allotted to anyone. In view of the above noted circumstances it is clear that both Shri Jai Parkash and Pran Nath had got their names entered in the FIR falsely. Therefore, the Screening Committee does not recommend the names of either of them for allotment of a built up booth."

3.

Against the decision of the Screening Committee, the petitioner made representation. The same was rejected by the Estate Officer on 26.4.1993. This fact is borne out from the extract of the order passed by the Estate Officer, which is reproduced below :

"61. Shri Jai Parkash S/o Hazari Lal and Shri Pran Nath - Site No. 121.

Shri Jai Prakash appeared before me and stated that he is running a business of chappals. At the time of fire incident he used to do ready-made garments business. He states that his licence got burnt in the fire. However, from the verification it has been learnt that he has never been issued a licence. On being confronted with this, he says that he does not have a licence. In the list of fire victims his name is clubbed with one Shri Pran Nath. He filed a claim subsequently. Initially, he did not file any claim. Shri Pran Nath was summoned earlier for hearing but had failed to appear. However, he came on 23.3.1993. He stated that he had taken a site on rent from one Shri Bhagwan Dass. He used to pay Rs. 200/- per month against site No. 121. The list of fire victims indicates the names of both Shri Jai Prakash and Shri Pran Nath against site No. 121. The physical verification of 11.7.1992 reveals that Shri Jai Prakash was parking rehri on this site. According to the official record this site is still unallotted. Shri Pran Nath also stated that after the fire incident he was not allowed to park his rehri on this site. The record further reveals that Shri Bhagwan Dass was actually owning site No. 120 against which he has already been allotted a booth. From the above facts and physical verification report it is established that Shri Pran Nath is trying to get the benefit of booth by providing a false and incorrect information to the office. In view of the above details neither of them is eligible for allotment of booth under the Scheme of 1984 though they managed to get their names included in the list."

4.

The petitioner has relied on the order dated 1.3.1993 passed in CWP No. 937 of 1993 in support of his claim for allotment of built up booth site. His grievance is that other persons who were not named in the survey have been allotted booth sites ignoring the fact that he had been doing the business in the Rehri Market and in this manner his fundamental right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India has been infringed.

5.

The respondents have contested his assertion. They have pleaded that the petitioner was not doing business in place of Shri Niranjan Singh, and therefore, he is not entitled to be allotted booth site.

6.

We have heard Shri R.L Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Ashok Aggarwal, senior counsel appearing for the respondents and, in our opinion, no relief can be given to the petitioner in exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution because the issue whether or not the petitioner was doing business in the Rehri Market in place of Shri Niranjan Singh involves adjudication of a disputed question of fact which cannot be decided without recording evidence and there is no extra ordinary reason why we should undertake that exercise in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution instead of relegating the petitioner to the remedy of civil suit for adjudication of the disputed question of fact.

7.

For the reason mentioned above, the writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail remedy in a Civil Court.