Jalandhar Improvement Trust vs Daljinder Singh

Ashok Bhan, J.

The present appeal was failed beyond limitation. Notice of the application for condonation of delay was issued to the respondents. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and for the reasons given in the application for condonation of delay, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length on merits of the appeal as well. The appeal is being disposed of at the motion stage.

The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the claimantrespondents relying upon an earlier judgment of this Court. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant (Jalandhar Improvement Trust) relying upon the judgment of apex Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 981 : 1990(2) RRR 146, raised the contention that the claimantrespondent were not entitled to the additional compensation under Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.

As against this, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another etc. etc. v. Zora Singh etc. etc. 1991(2) RRR 162 : JT 1991(4) S.C. 538, wherein the apex Court has specifically overruled the judgment on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant. In view of the later judgment of the Supreme Court in Zora Singh''s case it is held that the claimant respondents are entitled to the benefits of Section 23(1A) of the amended Act.

The next point to be taken into consideration is as to whether the Amending Act of 1984 would be applicable to the acquisition made under the Punjab Town Improvement Act. It was conceded by the counsel appearing for the appellant that the Amending Act of 1984 would be applicable to the lands which have been acquired after the coming into force of the Amending Act, 1984 but the transitional provisions of Section 30 of the Amending Act would not be applicable to the lands acquired under the Punjab Town Improvement Act and the same would be applicable to the lands acquired under the Principal Act i.e. the Land Acquisition Act only. Section 30 of the Amending Act is reproduced below :

"30. Transitional Provisions (1) The provisions of subsection (1A) of Section 23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People, in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the commencement of this Act.

(2) The provisions of subsection (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Principal Act, as amended by Clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982, the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of People and before the commencement of this Act."

We do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The apex Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust and another v. Vithal Rao and others, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 689, held that it is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the existence of the two Acts would enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another equally situated the owner who is discriminated against would be hit by equality clause of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This view was followed by the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Harbans Kaur and others v. Ludhiana Improvement Trust and others, 1973 PLJ 250, in which it was held as under :

"The denial of the benefits of the Land Acquisition Act to the persons whose lands are acquired under the Punjab Town Improvement Act will amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, all benefits under the Land Acquisition Act shall be allowed to the persons whose lands and properties are required under the Punjab Town Improvement Act."

Following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Vithal Rao''s case (supra) and the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Harbans Kaur''s case (supra). We hold that the claimantrespondents would be entitled to all the beneficial provisions under the Amending Act, 1984 including the transitional provisions under Section 30 of the said Act as to hold otherwise, would be discriminatory in nature.

For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.