High CourtsDivision Bench

Janaki Devi vs R. Vasanthi and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 9 December 2004 · Citation: (2005) 1 CTC 11 : (2005) 1 LW 455 : (2005) 1 MLJ 357 : (2005) 3 RCR(Civil) 694

HON’BLE JUDGES
M. Thanikachalam, J · K. Govindarajan, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 68, 69, 71 · Madras High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1956 — Order 25 Rule 9 · Registration Act, 1908 — Section 52, 58, 59, 60 · Succession Act, 1925 — Section 63, 68
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
O.S.A. No. 224 of 1999

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Judgment

324 paragraphs · 7,207 words

M. Thanikachalam, J.—The unsuccessful first respondent in T.O.S. No. 10/91, unable to resist the claim of the petitioner/plaintiff/the first

respondent herein, who sought for, grant of letters of administration, in respect of the Will dated 4.7. 1974, executed by one Lakshmi Bai, is the

appellant.

2.

Brief facts leading to the grant of letters of administration are as follows:

(a) Tmt. Lakshmi Bai, who died on 22.6.1981 had executed a Will on 4.7.1974, at Madras, in favour of the plaintiff/first respondent herein, which

was her last Will, attested by one Kanmani and A.T. Venkatesan. The plaintiff/first respondent is the step sister of the executant, Tmt. Late

Lakshmi Bai. Out of love and affection, she executed the Will in favour of the plaintiff/first respondent, cancelling the previous Will executed by

her, in favour of Vasudevan, and another previous Will in favour of Kannan Lal Prasad.

(b)The plaintiff/first respondent herein filed a suit in O.S. No. 886/1993, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Villupuram, against the tenant of

the property, by name Kannan, on the basis of the Will, which was exhibited there as Ex.A.1. But, the said suit was dismissed on the ground that

the Will was not probated.

(c)The plaintiff/first respondent''s husband was not well and the first respondent was also under bed rest, from September 1984 to June 1989,

which prevented her, from filing the petition or to take steps, to probate the Will, and the delay was not wanton.

(d) Lakshmi Bai had executed the Will, while she was in a sound disposing state of mind, under which the plaintiff/first respondent was given, the

right of management over the properties, covered under the Will, as well as the properties described in the petition. As per the Will, the

plaintiff/first respondent alone has to continue the Dharmam, charges and others are not entitled to be in management of the properties. The

appellant herein also filed a suit against the plaintiff/first respondent and other respondents, questioning the validity of the Will. Under the above

circumstances, it is prayed, that letter of administration, should be granted for the administration of the estate, according to the Will.

(e) The appellant in her written statement, branding the Will dated 4.7.1974, as a rank forgery had stated that the plaintiff/first respondent is not the

sister of the deceased Lakshmi Bai, that according to the Trust deed, the plaintiff/first respondent cannot be one of ""the persons, who can manage

the Trust, since she is a stranger to the family, that the execution, attestation, registration of the Will are all surrounded by suspicious circumstances,

which should be cleared by the petitioner, before she obtains any order, that the explanations for not taking steps to get the Will probated are all

imaginary, that the plaintiff/first respondent could not have born to Rajaram Prasad and that under the terms of the Will dated 26.3.1941 executed

by Rajaram Prasad, a life estate was given to his daughter, Lakshmi Bai and after her life time to her heirs, which could not be curtailed by the

fabricated Will.

(f) The respondents 2 to 6 herein, disputing the Will projected by the plaintiff/first respondent, reiterating the history of the Trust, its obligations,

and duties would contend, that except these respondents, nobody is having any right, title or interest what so ever, for carrying on the

administration of the properties of Lakshmi Bai, including the plaintiff/first respondent herein and that since the Will itself is a forged one, the

plaintiff/first respondent is not entitled to claim any relief, under the guise of Will, preventing the lawful successors, to inherit the estate.

3.

The learned Single Judge, on the basis of the pleadings, had framed the following issues, for consideration and they are:

1.

Whether the Will dated 4.7. 1974 is genuine, true and invalid?

2.

Whether the petitioner is entitled to Letters of Administration?

3.

To what relief the petitioner is entitled to?

4.

The learned Judge, evaluating the materials placed before him, came to the conclusion, that the plaintiff/first respondent had proved the

execution of the Will, despite the fact the attestors have died, as contemplated under law and that the plaintiff/first respondent is entitled to the grant

of letters of administration, as claimed, since the question of title cannot be gone into, under this proceedings. In this view, the suit was decreed,

ordering the issue of letters of administration, in favour of the plaintiff/first respondent, which is under challenge in this appeal.

5.

Heard the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. G. Rajagopalan for the appellant, the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, for the first

respondent and the learned counsel, Mr. A. Tamizharasan for respondents 3 to 7.

6.

The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, while assailing the judgment submitted,

(i) that there is no explanation for the delay in taking steps for obtaining probate, as contemplated under Order 25, Rule 9 of the Madras High

Court Original Side Rules,

(ii) that the Will is not proved, as contemplated under law, since none of the attesting witnesses has been examined, to prove the execution of the

Will, as well as the valid attestation,

(iii) that since it is said that the attestors are dead, the execution of the Will is also not proved, by identifying the signatures of the attestors as well

as the executant, as that of the persons attested and executed, and

(iv) that since the Will has not been properly proved, as mandated by law, letters of administration granted in favour of the plaintiff/the first

respondent, is liable to be set aside, which are supported by other respondents, who are supporting the appellant, in a way.

7.

The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent, countering the above arguments submitted, that in view of the admissions made

by the appellant and other contesting respondents, regarding the execution of the Will by Lakshmi Bai, in other proceedings, the oral evidence of

P.W.1 alone is sufficient to prove the execution of the Will, since she has identified the executant''s signature and the attesting witnesses'' signatures,

being the person present at the time of the execution of the Will, as well as at the time of the registration of the same and, that she had explained the

delay in not taking immediate steps, to get the Will probated, that the delay may not have any significance in this case, because of the fact the

execution of the Will is proved, as contemplated under law and that the learned Judge, considering all these points, has correctly appreciated the

evidence, granted a decree as prayed for, which requires affirmation, not interference by this Court.

8.

From the above submissions and considering the plea and counter plea of the parties, the point that arises for consideration in this appeal is,

Whether the Will dated 4.7.1914 marked as Ex.A 1 is proved, as required under law, entitling the plaintiff/first respondent, for the grant of letters

of administration ?.

Point:

9.

One Lakshmi Bai, the daughter of Rajaram @ Rajaram Prasad, who was managing the Kemabai Trust had executed a registered Will in favour

of the plaintiff/first respondent herein on 4.7.1974. The said Lakshmi Bai died on 22.6.1981 i.e. more or less 7 years from the date of the alleged

execution of the Will. The plaintiff/first respondent claiming that she is the step sister of Lakshmi Bai, further contending, that out of love and

affection, Lakshmi Bai had executed the Will in her favour, cancelling the previous Wills, thereby making the Will dated 4.7.1974 as her last Will,

has filed the petition for grant of letters of administration, since certain immovable properties were bequeathed to her and the same has to be

administered as per the wishes of the legatee.

10.

The contesting respondents including the appellant, opposed the petition, generally denying the execution of the Will, labeling the same as

forged one, not questioning, on the ground of fraud specifically or on the ground that Lakshmi Bai was not in a sound disposing state of mind, to

execute a valid Will, understanding its effect, etc.

11.The learned Single Judge considering the rival contentions of the parties, as herein before mentioned, uphold the execution of the Will, thereby

ordering the grant of letters of administration, which is under challenge.

12.

It would be better, to remember the pleadings in the petition, as well as in the written statement to appreciate the rival contentions of the

parties, while assessing the evidence adduced in support of their rival contentions. The plaintiff/first respondent has specifically pleaded that

Lakshmi Bai executed the Will, on 4.7.1974, which was registered on the same day, before the Sub-Registrar''s Office, T. Nagar, which was

attested by one D. Kanmani S/o. Dinakar Raj and A.T. Venkatesan, S/o. Thanigachala Mudaliar. It is also further pleaded, that the said two

attestors are now dead. Though the executant of the Will by name Lakshmi Bai died on 22.6.1981, admittedly, the petition was not filed, to

probate the Will within the reasonable time, whereas the same was filed, elsewhere in the year 1990, thereby showing some considerable delay

also. To explain this delay, certain allegations are made in paragraph-7 of the petition, wherein it is stated that the petitioner was under bed rest

from September 1984 till June 1989 and that apart, her husband was also busy in his business, which prevented the plaintiff/first respondent, to

move the Court, for appropriate relief.

13.

The appellant has stated in her written statement, that the Will does not bear the signature of Lakshmi Bai and it is a rank forgery. It is not the

case of the appellant that at the time of the execution of the alleged Will in favour of the plaintiff, Lakshmi Bai was not doing well or bed ridden or

she was not in a sound disposing state of mind, being mentally upset. Thus, it is seen, only a plea of forgery alone has been projected, to invalidate

the Will. The other contesting respondents, questioned the validity of the Will on the ground that Lakshmi Bai has no right over the properties

mentioned in her Will dated 4.7.1974 and in this view, she cannot execute the Will in favour of a stranger validly, with respect to the properties,

not specifically belonged to her.

14.

In the year 1986, the appellant herein as plaintiff, on behalf of Kemabai Trust had filed the suit in O.S. No. 142 of 1986 on the file of the

Subordinate Judge of Villupuram, for framing a scheme, for proper administration and maintenance of Kemabai Chattram and for other reliefs,

wherein the plaintiff herein by name Vasanthi, was shown as 19th defendant. While tracing out the history of Kemabai Trust, how Rajaram Prasad

vested the interest in favour of his daughter, Lakshmi bai to manage the properties and maintain the Trust, it is stated that Lakshmi Bai had

executed a Will in favour of Vasanthi wife of Fernandes and the relevant portion reads:

That will also did not take effect, as another Will was executed by her on 4.7.1974 in favour of R. Vasanthi, wife of Fernandez (18th defendant).

True, it is further pleaded, that the execution, valid attestation and acceptance of the Will is not admitted, though, the execution of the Will dated

4.7.1974 by Lakshmi Bai in favour of Vasanthi was admitted by the appellant herein.

15.

The respondents 2 to 6 herein have filed another suit on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Villupuram in O.S. No. 58/1989, impleading the

plaintiff as 4th respondent and the suit was aimed, for declaration that the plaintiffs therein are fit and proper person, as trustees, for the

management and administration of Kemabai Trust, with powers of control, collect and receive the income of its properties, etc. with other ancillary

reliefs. The respondents 2 to 6 herein, while tracing out the history of Kema Bai Trust, had specifically pleaded in paragraph-8 of the plaint,

regarding the execution of the Wills by Lakshmi Bai. While narrating the previous Wills dated 26.3.1941 and 19.10.1955, it is said ""afterwards

that was also being cancelled by a third Will dated 4.7.1974.......... However, the said Lakshmi Bai''s third Will was executed on 4.7.1974 in

favour of one alleged sister, Vasanthi under suspicious circumstances"". It is further pleaded that the Will dated 4.7.1974 was created with false

recitals, regarding relationship with her and how Lakshmi Bai had no right to execute a Will, in favour of Vasanthi, a girl whose parentage is not

known, so as to come under this orbit of hierarchy. Thus it is seen, not only the appellant, but also the other respondents in the suit viz.,

respondents 2 to 6, have specifically admitted the execution of the Will, in favour of the plaintiff/first respondent. In this backdrop, remembering the

above pleadings, which are binding upon the parties, not explained otherwise, it should be seen whether the execution of the Will is proved, since

law mandates that if a person wants to rely upon a Will, it should be proved as contemplated under the Evidence Act, where mode of proof also

specified, such as by calling at least one attesting witness or in the absence of availability of the attesting witness, how the same has to be proved,

by adopting other methods.

16.

The Indian Succession Act, 1925, regulates how a Will should be executed, in order to have its enforciablity. A Will is said to be duly

executed when the following conditions are satisfied, viz.,

(i) The testator shall sign and affix his mark to the Will,

(ii) Signature and mark of the testator shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will,

(iii) the Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, and

(iv) each of the said witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will and each of them should have signed the Will in the

presence of the testator.

17.

The law is so settled, unquestionably that it is the duty of the propounder of a Will, to prove the due execution of the same, removing all the

suspicious features if any, or removing the cloud of suspicion, if any, created by other side showing that the testator was so conscious, at the time

of the execution of the Will, was aware of the fact that he or she had executed the Will, only in order to give effect of the same, it was attested by

not less than two attesting witnesses, seeing the testator signing or having the personal knowledge of the signature of the testator. It is also said, if

the beneficiary under the Will takes predominant role, while preparing the Will or getting the Will prepared, executed and registered, there may be

some suspicion regarding the Will, which should be removed by the propounder or the beneficiary, as the case may be, showing that irrespective

of the fact that the beneficiary was present, she or he had not influenced the testator, to execute the Will against the wish, depriving the legitimate

right of any person, in case of non testamentary succession.

18.

The amount of proof or request proof regarding the execution of the Will, to satisfy the conscience of the Court would depend upon the

capacity of the testator such as mental fitness, physical fitness, the nature of the Will itself, such as registered or unregistered, the language of the

Will, such as the said language is known to the testator, the nature of the signature and attestation, creating doubt or affirmation, provisions made

under the Will such as excluding the legitimate heirs or preventing the line of successor, or favouring a third party against naturality and the

existence of any other suspicious circumstances, depending upon the health condition, other improbabilities if any. Thus, the plaintiff has to satisfy

the Court by letting in sufficient acceptable evidence, to prove the due execution of the Will.

19.

The Will, Ex.P.1 has to be proved as required under law with regard to Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act read with Section 68 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In certain circumstances, where it is not possible to prove the Will u/s 68 of the Evidence Act, it can be proved as

contemplated under Sections 69 and 71 of the Evidence Act. A combined reading of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of

the Indian Evidence Act, makes it clear that a person propounding the Will has to prove that the Will was duly and validly executed. It cannot be

done by simply proving the signatures on the Will were that of the attestors, but it must be proved that the attestations were made properly as

required by clause (c) of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. u/s 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, a concession has been made to prove and

establish a Will, only by examining one attesting witness, even though the Will has to be attested by two witnesses, mandatorily. But, in his

evidence, he has to satisfy the attestation of the Will by him and the other attesting witness, in order to prove that there was due execution of the

Will. Sections 69 and 71 of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. u/s 69

of the Indian Evidence Act, if no attesting witness is found, it can be proved by other evidence that the attestation of one attesting witness at least is

in his handwriting and that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. Section 71 of the Indian

Evidence Act is to meet the situation, where it is not possible to prove the execution of a Will by calling the attesting witness, though alive, or when

the attesting witnesses have been called, they deny or fail to recollect the execution of the document. In that way, Section 71 of the Indian

Evidence Act is incorporated to safeguard the mandatory provisions of Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 71 of the Indian Evidence

Act is only to give assistance and come to rescue of a party who has taken steps to get attesting witness to give evidence, but he failed or such

witness denied or failed to recollect the execution of the Will. This is only with a view to prove the due execution by ""other evidence"". In support of

the above legal position, Some useful reference may be made to the following decisions to have the guideline, in testing a Will.

20.

In Smt. Indu Bala Bose and Others Vs. Manindra Chandra Bose and Another, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has laid down what is the mode

of proof in order to dispel the suspicious circumstances, and how the onus lies on the propounder to explain certain circumstances. It is observed

in paragraph-7 of the judgment as follows, affirming the previous decisions:

If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance

to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in

removing the suspicious circumstances the Court would grant probate, even if the Will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near

relations.

It is also made clear in Paragraph-8, what is the suspicious circumstances which reads:

A circumstance would be ''suspicious'' when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or not expected of a normal person.

21.

In Kalyan Singh Vs. Smt. Chhoti and Others, it is held, failure on the part of the plaintiff to remove suspicious circumstances, by placing

satisfactory materials on record should lead to the conclusion that the Will is not genuine. At paragraph-20, it is stated as follows:

It has been said almost too frequently to require repetition that a Will is one of the most solemn documents known to law. The executant of the

Will cannot be called to deny the execution or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed. It is, therefore, essential that trustworthy and

unimpeachable evidence should be produced before the Court to establish genuineness and authenticity of the Will. It must be stated that the

factum of execution and validity of the Will cannot be determined merely by considering the evidence produced by the propounder. In order to

judge the credibility of witnesses and disengage the truth from falsehood the Court is not confined only to their testimony and demeanour. It would

be open to the Court to consider circumstances brought out in the evidence or which appear from the nature and contents of the documents itself.

It would be also open to the Court to look into surrounding circumstances as well as inherent improbabilities of the case to reach a proper

conclusion on the nature of the evidence adduced by the party.

22.

In Kashibai and Another Vs. Parwatibai and Others, it is held, when no witnesses had deposed that the Will was signed by the deceased, in

his presence or he had attested the document, it should be held, the execution of the Will was not proved, as contemplated u/s 68 of the Evidence

Act. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has also considered Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, as well as Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act,

including the definition for attestation as well as execution, wherein it is observed:

A reading of Section 68 will show that ''attestation'' and ''execution'' are two different acts one following the other. There can be no valid

execution of a document which under the law is required to be attested without the proof of its due attestation and if due attestation is also not

proved, the fact of execution is of no avail. Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 also lays down certain rules with regard to the execution

of unprivileged Wills. Clause (c) of Section 63 provides that the Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each one of whom has seen the

testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has

received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark or the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses

should sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no

particular form of attestation shall be necessary.

23.

A Division Bench of this Court in Ammu Balachandran Vs. Mrs. O.T. Joseph (died) and others, , while considering the suspicious

circumstances, viz., that some pages of the Will were not signed by the testator, has taken the view that one signature on the last sheet, made with

the intention of executing the Will is sufficient. The Division Bench has observed, that Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act only says that the

signature or mark of the testator or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to

give effect to the writing as Will. The signature or mark of the testator can be either at the commencement or at the end, but it must be so placed

that it shall appear that it was intended to give effect to the instrument as a Will. It is further observed, where the other side alleges undue influence,

fraud or coercion, it is for them to prove the ingredients and satisfy the Court that the document produced in Court is defective for those reasons.

Further, it is said, delay in propounding the Will also, may be considered as one of the suspicious circumstances and considering this point, it is

held, that even if there is any delay, if the same is properly explained, that cannot be treated as a suspicious circumstance for denying a probate.

24.

In Kannian v. Sethurama, AIR 2000 SC 3522 it is held, by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the scribe of a Will could not be regarded as an

attesting witness and the examination of the scribe will not satisfy the requirement of Section 68 of the Evidence Act.

25.

In an unreported decision of this Court in Maria Stella, Karunai Nesam and David Mohan Babuji Vs. T. Joseph Catherine, T.X. Francis, A.

Rosalin Stephen, N. Bernard, S. Christina, S. Philomina, S. Lidwin, S. Josephina, rep. By mother and guardian and A. Rosalin Stephen, in

C.M.A. No. 1020 of 1990 dated 11.7.2002, one of us (K. Govindarajan, J.) has held, considering the previous decisions, as well as the effect of

Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and the factum of registration of the Will, that it is clear that it is not necessary to give positive evidence to

prove that the testatrix did see the attesting witnesses put their signatures or that attesting witnesses saw the testatrix sign the document. Where

there is proof of signature, everything else is implied till the contrary is proved. In the absence of witnesses who are either dead or cannot be

brought to Court or cannot recollect the facts, the second evidence is permitted. It is also further observed, relying on a Division Bench of this

Court in Irudayammal and Others Vs. Salayath Mary, , that it is true that registration, by itself, in all cases, is not proof of execution, but if no other

evidence is available, the certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of its execution and the certificate of the registration officer u/s 60 of the

Registration Act is relevant for proving execution.

26.

Keeping the above principles of law, as well as the pleadings, as pointed out supra, the execution of the Will in this case viz., Ex.P.1 has to be

considered.

27.

The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Order 25, Rule 9 of Madras High Court Original Side Rules, is not complied with in this

case, and the non-explanation of the delay, with materials should be construed as one of the unavoidable circumstances, to cast shadow upon the

Will, to eclipse the same. Order 25, Rule 9 of the Madras High Court Original Side Rules says:

In any case where probate or letters of administration is for first time applied for after the lapse of three years from the death of the deceased, the

reason for the delay shall be explained in the petition.

In the case on hand, it cannot be said, that this requirement is not complied with, since paragraph-7 of the petition gives some explanation, for the

delay. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, that during the relevant period viz., from September 1984 to June 1989, the

plaintiff/first respondent could not have been in bed rest, since she was attending the Court in the connected proceedings, fails to inspire us, to

reject the explanation offered, considering the fact that the petitioner had proclaimed and propounded the Will, as and when occasion had arisen

for her to do so. Admittedly, this petition or plaint has been filed, after three years from the date of death of the testator, since she died on

22.6.1981. If the plaintiff had been silent, not even whispering about the Will, when occasion had arisen, then the inaction on the part of the plaintiff

for more than three years in not taking the steps, to probate the Will, could be viewed with suspicion. In this case, admittedly, on the basis of the

Will, probably thinking that the Will need not be probated, a suit has been filed by the petitioner, before the District Munsif Court, Villupruam

against one Kannan, who was the tenant of the property, for certain reliefs and in those proceedings, this Will was exhibited as Ex.A 1, thereby

showing, the plaintiff had taken action, immediately, to preserve the property, over which right has been given, indicating that the plaintiff had no

intention, to suppress the Will or conceal the same, from the eyes of others. True, ultimately the suit has been dismissed on the ground, that the Will

could not be acted upon, as it was not probated and that is why the present case is filed, though not immediately, but within the reasonable time,

explaining the delay. As held by the Division bench of this Court, in Ammu Balachandran''s case, if the execution of the Will is proved, the delay in

taking steps to probate the Will, will not loom large, since Order 25, Rule 9 of Madras High Court Original Side Rules has not prescribed any

period of limitation and probably, it aims to give explanation alone.

28.

In Corra Vedachalam Chetty v. G. Janakiraman, 2001 (3) CTC 283, a Division Bench of this Court had considered the aspect of failure to

produce Will for probate immediately after the demise of testator and its effect, wherein it is held as follows, which is squarely applicable to the

present case also:

The fact that the Will was not produced immediately after the demise of the testator for the purpose of probate, does not by itself render the Will

fraudulent or untrue. So also the fact that the Will came from the custody of the daughter, beneficiary does not render the Will untrue when the

evidence exists to show that the Will was in fact, the last Will of the testator.

29.

For the reasons which we are going to assign hereunder, the execution of the Will is duly proved and therefore, on the ground of the delay in

filing the petition for probate alone or letters of administration, entertaining indelible suspicion, a doubt could not be entertained, as if the Will was

fabricated by the plaintiff. Hence, this defence deserves rejection.

30.

Ex.P.1 is a registered Will and it should have its solemnity, u/s 60 of the Registration Act, though it will not relieve the propounder from proving

the execution of the Will, by examining the attestor as contemplated u/s 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. When the plaintiff/first respondent has

pleaded regarding the attestation of the Will, naming the two attestors, it was not challenged either by the appellant or by other contesting

respondents in the written statements specifically. Further, when the plaintiff has pleaded that the attestors are dead, not challenged. Therefore, it

should be taken as an admitted fact that none of the attesting witnesses is alive, to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 68 of the

Indian Evidence Act.

31.

The legislators in their wisdom, with forethought expecting this kind of circumstance, enacted Section 69 of the Evidence Act, giving guidelines,

how a document, which requires attestation should be proved, where no attesting witness is found. u/s 69 of the Indian Evidence Act, if no

attesting witness is available, and all the attesting witnesses are dead, law contemplates proof, that the attestation of one attesting witness at least, in

his hand writing and that the signature of the person executing the Will is in the hand writing of that person. It does not say specifically what kind of

proof should be made available, such as by examining certain category of person. In the absence of any such specific direction, this fact could be

proved, as any other fact, which is required to be proved under the Evidence Act. Therefore, if a person had seen the testator signing in the Will,

as well as attesting witnesses signing in the Will, he could speak the execution and the attestation of attesting witnesses, are in their hand writings

and the signature of the person, who executed the document is in the hand writing of that person. Preciously, this is the procedure adopted by the

propounder in this case, speaking the execution of the Will, attestation, etc., not challenged.

32.

The petitioner as P.W.1 has categorically deposed, that the draft Will was written in her house, after it was typed, in the presence of attesting

witnesses by name Kanmani and another, the executant signed in the Will, while so the witnesses had seen Lakshmi Bai signing the Will and

Lakshmi Bai had seen the two attesting witnesses signing the Will, as attestors. It is the specific further assertion of P.W.1 that she had seen

Lakshmi Bai signing the Will and also affixing her left thumb impression in the presence of the Sub Registrar at the time of registering the Will. The

above evidence given by P.W.1 has not been challenged, as seen from the cross examination. The submission of the learned counsel for the

appellant, that since the appellant had taken the stand of forgery, she cannot deny the execution, attestation, spoken by P.W.1, is unacceptable to

us. At least by way of suggestion, to cast cloud upon the evidence given by P.W.1, they should have challenged the evidence of P.W.1, regarding

the execution of the Will by Lakshmi Bai, attestation by two witnesses and the registration also. In the absence of any such denial, regarding the

execution of the Will by Lakshmi Bai and its attestation, it should be held, that the oral evidence of P.W. 1 is more than sufficient, to prove the

validity of the due execution of the Will, as contemplated u/s 69 of the Indian Evidence Act. The oral evidence of P. W. 1 coupled with the

admission of the appellant as well as the other contesting respondents, regarding the execution of the Will by Lakshmi Bai, in the other connected

proceedings as hereinbefore mentioned, are proof sufficient, to conclude unhesitatingly, that Ex.P1 is the last Will executed by Lakshmi Bai, in

favour of the plaintiff/first respondent.

33.

The evidence given by P.W.1, in this case, makes out a case, as if the propounder of the Will had taken dominant role in the execution of the

Will, as well as its registration, which could be termed as one of the suspicious circumstances. This suspicion automatically vanished and cleared by

the inaction on the part of the testator. During the life time, the testator, would have taken action, if she thought, that the Will was brought out by

P.W.1, without her knowledge. No action has been taken. The testator viz., Lakshmi Bai died on 21.6.1981, whereas she had executed the Will

on 4.7.1974, thereby indicating her life came to end after 6 years. It is not the case of the contesting respondents or the appellant that from 1974,

Lakshmi Bai was not in a sound disposing state of mind, bed ridden or unable to understand the day-to-day activities or failed to attend the

administration of the trust, etc. This being the position, considering the date of execution, as well as the date of death of the testator, the reasonable

inference that could be drawn is that though the beneficiary had participated in the execution of Will, she had not brought out the Will against the

wishes of the testator and if at, all only at the instance of the testator, P.W. 1 should have taken part at the time of the execution of the Will, which

in our considered opinion, failed to create any shadow of doubt about the genuineness of the Will.

34.

The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that Lakshmi Bai used to sign in Tamil, whereas Ex.A1 does contain the signature in

English and this circumstance should be taken as one of the suspicious circumstances, to doubt about the genuineness of the Will, has no base for

its acceptance, considering the plea in the written statement itself. In paragraph-2 of the written statement, the appellant has stated, while referring

the Wills dated 26.3.1941 and 19.10.1955, that in the first Will, Lakshmi Bai is said to have signed in Tamil, while in the second Will in English,

thereby showing that Lakshmi Bai was in the habit of signing her name not only in Tamil, but also in English. Therefore, the fact that Ex.A1 does

contain the signature of Lakshmi Bai in English or in many documents, she had signed in Tamil, cannot be a ground to doubt about the genuineness

of Ex.Al, considering the fact, its execution is well proved, as indicated by us, as well as correctly by the learned Judge also.

35.

The plaintiff/first respondent claims, that she is the step sister of Lakshmi Bai, which is very much challenged. In this proceedings, the

relationship of the parties was not in issue, warranting any findings. Lakshmi Bai could very well execute a Will, even in favour of a stranger, if she

had the right and in this view, the claim of the plaintiff/first respondent, that she is the step sister of Lakshmi Bai alone assuming incorrect, cannot be

taken into account, to doubt about the genuineness of the Will, since it is otherwise proved. Therefore, the attempt made by the learned counsel for

the appellant, taking us to the evidence, age of Lakshmi Bai and Rajaram @ Rajaram Prasad, failed to persuade us to create any doubt over the

genuineness of the Will, regarding the executant and in this view, this point is also liable to be rejected.

36.

Ex.P.1 original Will was registered on the same day of the execution and the attestors alone have identified the testator before the Sub

Registrar, for registration. Since forgery was alleged, to prove the execution of the Will as well as its acceptance before the Sub Registrar by

Lakshmi Bai, the plaintiff had taken the steps, to examine the thumb impression of Lakshmi Bai in Ex.P.1, comparing the same with the thumb

impression available in the Registrar''s office. The finger print expert, who has been examined as P.W.2, has given evidence about the similarity,

and we do not find any reason to discard his evidence, only on the ground, that the compared thumb impressions are not having similar appearance

by size. The size of thumb impression would depend upon the manner of taking and affixing. When the finger was rolled on both sides, the space

covered by the impression may be larger, when the thumb was just pressed and taken away, the space covered may be less and only in this way, it

appears to our mind, there is some difference in size and it will not change the characteristic of the thumb impressions, which was found by the

hand writing expert, similar. The oral evidence given by the finger print expert would make it clear further, that Lakshmi Bai had been to

Registrar''s Office, registered the document, thereby accepting the execution of the document viz., Ex.P.1 and that is why, the thumb impression

found in Ex.P.1 and the thumb impression found in the book maintained by the Sub Registrar''s Office tallied. True, the signature of Lakshmi Bai in

Ex.P.1 was not compared with the admitted signature of Lakshmi Bai and the reason is not known. However, by proving the thumb impression,

the registration of the document by Lakshmi Bai is proved, which would prove that Lakshmi Bai had admitted her signature in the Will, thereby

admitting its execution also.

37.

Sections 52 & 58 of the Registration Act, imposes certain duties upon the registering authority, followed by endorsement by registering officer

u/s 59 and certificate of registration u/s 60 of the Act, recognising these acts as solemn one. In this case, in Ex.P.1 endorsements were made, not

challenged, which could be taken as evidence, to prove the due execution also, in the absence of evidence available, through the mouth of the

attesting witnesses, since they are dead, on identification of their signatures, though registration by itself could not prove the due execution of the

document.

38.

The above view is further strengthened by a Division Bench of the Privy Council in AIR 1943 43 (Privy Council) , wherein Their Lordships

have held that the endorsement showing presentation and execution, admitted by the testator before the Registrar are sufficient to certain extent to

prove the execution of the Will itself, provided it is not shown that the testator, who had admitted the execution of the document, is not an

impostor.

39.

In Irudayammal and Others Vs. Salayath Mary, , a Division Bench of this Court has held that certificate of registration u/s 60 of the

Registration Act is relevant for proving the execution, wherein it is observed as follows:

It is true that registration, by itself, in all cases, is not proof of execution, but if no other evidence is available, the certificate of registration is prima

facie evidence of its execution and the certificate of the registration officer u/s 60 of the Registration Act is relevant for proving execution.

40.

In Hutchegowda v. Chennigegowda, AIR 1953 Mys. 49, the following view was taken by a Division Bench:

Evidence that a document was duly registered is some evidence of its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed.

41.

We have already given a finding regarding the genuineness of the execution and its registration on the basis of the unchallenged evidence given

by P.W.1 and considering these proved facts supported by the above rulings, it should be further held, in view of Sections 52(1)(a), 58 & 60 of

the Registration Act, the certificate issued by the Registrar would certainly, constitute sufficient evidence to prove the document, its execution also

to some extent. For the foregoing reasons, we are fully satisfied, that the requirements of conditions in proving a Will, as mentioned supra are well

established, and the burden of proof also discharged by the plaintiff, deserving her, to receive the order, for letters of administration.

42.

The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, as well as other contesting respondents, that Lakshmi Bai has no right to execute the

Will, or she has no interest in the properties covered under the Will are all not within the scope of this suit and if these defences are available, it is

for the appellant and the other contesting respondents, to agitate the same before the appropriate forum, since they have already filed the suit,

questioning this Will and in this view, it may not be proper for us to give any finding, regarding the validity of the Will, except saying its execution is

proved, entitling the plaintiff to get an order, for letters of administration.

43.The learned single Judge, considering all these points in detail, in the light of the above settled legal position, came to an unerring conclusion, that

the execution of the Will is proved, in which finding, we are unable to see any perverse in nature or any error either on law or on facts, warranting

our interference, to upset the findings. In this view, we find no reason, to conclude the appeal is meritorious, whereas it should be held, that the

appeal is not meritorious, entitling its dismissal.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in T.O.S. No. 10/1991, but under the facts and

circumstances of the case, directing the parties to bear their respective costs.