Jang Bahadur vs State of Punjab

S.S. Dewan, J.

In this revision petition, Jang Bahadur petitioner assails his conviction under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short `the Act''). The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar vide his order dated April 6, 1981 sentenced him to one year''s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge, Amritsar upheld his conviction, but reduced his sentence of imprisonment to six months while maintaining the sentence of fine with its default clause.

It is unnecessary to delineate the facts in any great detail. The petitioner was found in possession of 5 quintals of Haldi powder for sale, wherefrom a sample was duly taken by Dr. Satish Kumar, Government Food Inspector, which on subsequent analysis was found to contain 0.80 per cent of grit and 2.64 per cent of ash insoluble in dilute HCL against the maximum prescribed standard of 1.5 per cent.

The revisionist denied the said charge and gave out that he was an employee of the factory which used to do the grinding work only; that the trucks used to ply on that route and the dust and ash used to fall on the articles lying in the vicinity and that the sample of Haldi was taken by the Food Inspector without making it homogeneous. The learned trial Court believed the prosecution version and convicted and sentenced the petitioner as aforesaid.

The first point urged before me is that the conviction was bad in as much as it rested on the evidence of the Food Inspector Dr. Satish Kumar and his associate Dr. S.C. Saini. I find no merit in this submission. There is no rule of law that the conviction cannot be based on the testimony of a Food Inspector and other official witnesses. It is only out of a sense of caution that the Courts insist that the testimony of the Food Inspector should be corroborated by some independent witnesses. This is a necessary caution which has to be borne in mind because the Food Inspector may in a sense be regarded as an interested witness but this caution is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law. If it were otherwise it would be possible for any guilty person to escape punishment by resorting to the device of bribing the independent witnesses. Both the doctors had no illwill or animus against the petitioner so as to involve him in this case. Even otherwise Dr. S.C. Saini has categorically stated that an effort was made to join some independent persons from the locality but none came forward. In the premises, the Food Inspector had no alternative hut to take the sample in the presence of Dr. S.C. Saini. The conviction of the petitioner cannot, therefore, be assailed an infirm on the ground that it rested merely on the evidence of the Food Inspector and the other official witness.

It is then urged on behalf of the petitioner that Haldi is a primary food and the prosecution has not shown that the petitioner has deliberately added an extraneous matter to the Haldi, and to buttress this argument, reliance is placed on a decision in State v. Vijay Kumar, Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 1963 decided by a Division Bench of this Court on July 29, 1963. The submission by the petitioner''s counsel seems to be misconceived. The proviso to S. 1 (ia)(m) of the Act reads thus :

"Provided that, where the quality of purity of the article, being primary food, has fallen below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability, in either case, solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency, then such article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this subclause."

It is the duty of the prosecution to show that the article is adulterated as defined in any of the subclauses of S. 2(ia) of the Act. If the prosecution succeeds in showing that an article is adulterated as contemplated in subclause (m) of S. 2(ia) of the Act, never the less the article cannot be deemed to be adulterated if the circumstances contemplated in the proviso are established. The prosecution cannot be expected to prove that the fall in the standard is not due to natural causes or beyond the control of human agency. It is for the accused, who has been dealing with the article in question, to adduce proof or rely on the material to show that the fall in standard is solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency. In this regard no part of the burden of proof rests on the prosecution and the entire burden rests on the petitioner. In this view I am fortified by a Division bench decision of this Court in Amrik Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1983(1) F.A.C. 3. The proviso is in the nature of an exception to the clause (m) of S. 2(ia) of the Act. It is for the defence to establish the exception. Since the petitioner has not discharged the burden resting on him, he has been rightly convicted by the Courts below. It is needless to refer to the decisions in State v. Vijay Kumar, (supra), as the ratio thereof is not applicable to the facts and Circumstances of this case.

The learned counsel had then raised the identical contentions which stand ably repelled in the judgment of the Appellate Court. In the revisional jurisdiction, it suffices to say that I am in agreement thereof and the same are hereby affirmed. The criminal revision is without merit and is hereby dismissed.