Jangir Singh vs State

Gurnam Singh, J.—Jangir Singh appellant was convicted for the murder of Ginder Singh, a boy of 8 years of age, and was sentenced to transportation for life by the trial Court, He has come up in appeal against his conviction. There is also a reference before us by the learned Sessions Judge for the confirmation of his sentence. The State has also filed a revision petition for enhancement of the sentence. There is also a revision petition by Mehar Singh, uncle of the deceased, for enhancement. This judgment will dispose of the appeal as well as the revision petitions along with the reference.

This case was remanded by me and Hon''ble the Chief Justice as the case was not properly conducted and the Magistrate, who had recorded the confession of the appellant, was not examined. It was sent back for retrial after quashing the sentence of the accused. It is during the retrial that the accused has been convicted and the case has come up before us. [After narrating the fact and discussing evidence, his Lordship proceeded:] At the time of ordering retrial during the course of our judgment we had remarked:

we do not consider it; desirable to express any opinion on these points, except this much that if a Court comes to the conclusion that a confessional statement made by an accused person before a Magistrate and duly recorded in accordance with the provisions of S. 164 is true, there is nothing wrong in law in its convicting him merely on the basis of that statement, though as a rule of caution corroboration of the statement should generally be insisted upon.

I still stick to this opinion expressed by us. If a Court can come to a conclusion that the confession made is true, there is nothing in the way of the Court to convict the confessor on the basis of that statement. But each case depends on its own circumstances. When the investigation is not honest and the Court finds that effort was made to create false evidence against the accused, in such circumstances the Court is justified in looking for same sort of corroboration. At this stage the remarks by Lord Cave in The Queen v. Thompson, (1893) 2 Q.B.D. 12 at p. 18 can be referred to with advantage:

I would add that for my part I always suspect these confessions, which are supposed to be the off spring of penitence and remorse and which nevertheless are repudiated by the prisoner at the trial. It is remarkable that it is an very rare occurrence for evidence of a confession to be given when the proof of the prisoner''s guilt is otherwise clear and satisfactory; but when it is not clear and satisfactory, the prisoner is not infrequently alleged to have been seized with the desire born of penitence and remorse to supplement it with a confession; a desire which vanishes as soon as he appears in a Court of Justice.

I am in respectful agreement with this opinion expressed by Lord Cave. This opinion aptly fits in with the facts of the present case.

Instead of finding any other corroborative evidence of the confession we find that there is lot of contradictory evidence present on this record. [After discussing evidence, his Lordship proceeded:]

The learned Advocate General has also conceded that the prosecution case entirely depends upon this confession. He has further argued that the conviction of the appellant can be based on a retracted confession provided the Court believes it to be true. In such a case, according to him, no evidence to corroborate the confession is required. In this case while retracting the confession the accused had stated that the confession was made by him under threat and pressure of the police. The learned Advocate-General has argued that the accused has led no evidence to substantiate these allegations. He further urges that if the allegations of the accused are found to be palpably false the confession should be accepted and the conviction of the appellant upheld. The facts disclose that the appellant remained in custody of the police from 28th July to 3lst July when he was produced before the Magistrate for recording the confession. From 30th July to 3lst July he was kept by the police in the police station. It is evident from the above discussion that he was not prepared to make a confession up to 30th July, upto the time when he was produced before the Magistrate. If any pressure was exerted on him it must have been after 6 P.M. on 30th July, when remand of his person was obtained. In these circumstances, I cannot conceive of any evidence which the accused could produce to support his allegations. He was kept in the police-station where no other evidence could be available except that of the police officials. In the nature of things there could only be evidence of circumstances through which undue pressure could be inferred. I have already discussed those circumstances which lead me to think that the confession made by the appellant was not voluntary.

The learned Advocate General argued that it was for the accused to prove his allegations of threat and undue pressure. Assuming the proposition to be true, as urged by the learned counsel, in my opinion, the burden of this proof on the accused is very light. This question of the onus is not free from difficulty. However, the words used in S. 24, Evidence Act, are "appears to the Court." It is really not the strict proof which is required from the side of the accused to show that the confession was the result of inducement, threat or promise. If it appears to the Court that it was so it is sufficient for the purposes of holding that such confession is irrelevant. The learned Advocate General argued that the reasons given by the accused for making the confession are palpably false. To support this contention, he has cited In re In Re: B.K. Rajagopal and Others, . I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the State that the reasons given by the appellant for making the confession are proved to be palpably false. In the Court of the Committing Magistrate the accused stated that the confession was the result of undue pressure and threat by the police. He repeated the same allegations in the previous trial before the learned Sessions Judge. He took up the same position in the present trial but added that he was also given beating by the police. The argument of the learned counsel is based on the fact that the Magistrate recording the confession did not find any injuries on his person. As far as undue pressure and the threat are concerned, they are not proved to be palpably false. On the other hand, there are circumstances in the case to show that the police was resorting to such methods otherwise there was no necessity for the police to delay the recording of the confession. No doubt injuries were not found on his person. It is not always necessary that beating should always create impression of injuries on the person beaten. If a man is continuously interrogated for several days and a few slaps are also given to him during interrogation along with the threats of future beating it can be called a beating by the police, although it may not cause visible injuries on such person. I, therefore, cannot hold in this case that the reasons given by the appellant have been proved to be palpably false. I am in respectful agreement with the authority cited by the learned counsel for the State. In that particular case, the facts were different from the present case before us. In that case before recording the confession of the accused they were sent up to the Judicial Lock-up and the confession was recorded on the following day. There was also evidence of the approver to corroborate the confession of the accused. Also the Court came to the positive conclusion that the reasons given by the appellant which induce him to make the confession were found to be palpably false. In my opinion, therefore, the authority cited by the learned counsel for the State has no application to the facts of the present case.

The learned counsel appearing for the State has frankly conceded that in case there was even a slight doubt about voluntary nature of the confession, it required corroboration. We have found circumstances from the evidence of the prosecution which go to show that there do exist such suspicions. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that in this case as a measure of caution, corroboration of the confessional statement is necessary. [It was held that there was no corroboration and the accused was acquitted.]

Chopra, J.

I agree.