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Judgment
Radhe Shyam Sharma, J.—These appeals are directed against judgment dated 4-11-2006 passed by Sessions Judge, Korba, District Korba in Sessions Trial No. 78/2005. By the impugned judgment, accused persons/appellants Janpad Ram and Ramprasad have been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run the sentences concurrently:-
Case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under:
Paikuram (deceased) had cultivated brinjal and tomato in his field (fence). He was residing in a hut raised by him in the said field and was watching his vegetable crops therefrom. On 6-11-2005, at about 7-8 P.M., the appellants came to the fence of the deceased and took Mahua liquor from him. At about 10 P.M., the appellants demanded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from him. The deceased refused to give the sum. Premsingh (PW-1) had gone to attend call of nature. He, having heard noise of the deceased, came immediately to the hut of the deceased. He saw that appellant Janpad gave Tangiya blow on the head of the deceased. He tried to intervene. Appellant Ramprasad caught him and appellant Janpad assaulted him. Thereafter, appellant Janpad again assaulted the deceased. The appellants threw Premsingh (PW-1) towards the fire, due to which, he received burn injuries on his hands. Thereafter, the appellants fled. Premsingh (PW-1) remained lay down near the hut for the whole night. On the next day, he narrated the incident to Goverdhan (PW-4). The deceased died. Premsingh (PW-1) lodged Merg Intimation (Ex. P-1) in Police Station Kartala. He also lodged First Information Report (Ex. P-2).
The Investigating Officer reached the place of occurrence, gave notices (Ex. P-7 and P-18) to Panchas and prepared inquest (Ex. P-8) on the dead body of the deceased. The dead body of the deceased was sent to Community Health Centre, Kartala for post mortem examination vide Ex. P-19. Dr. B.S. Narvariya (PW-10) conducted post mortem on the dead body of the deceased and gave his report (Ex. P-26), in which, he found (i) lacerated wound, 1% inches x 1/2 inch x 3/4 inch, 9 inches above the tip of nose over parieto-occipital bone mid region, on dissection bone was found fractured in 11 pieces, (ii) lacerated wound, 14 inch lateral to left parietal bone, , on dissection, blood was found filled in there and underneath skull bone was also found fractured. It was found that this was an ante mortem injury caused by hard and blunt object, (iii) abrasion on left shoulder, 1% inches, ante mortem in nature, caused by hard and rough object, (iv) abrasion on back portion of left shoulder, caused upto neck, IViinchesxViinch, ante mortem in nature and caused by blunt and rough object (v) abrasion on frontal region of abdomen, 14 inch above umbilicus, 2%inchesx%inch, ante mortem in nature and caused by hard and rough object, (vi) abrasion on back portion of right shoulder, 21/4 inchesx1/4inch, ante mortem in nature and caused by blunt and rough object, (vii) lacerated wound over right cheek, 1inchx%inchx14inch, ante mortem in nature, blood was found filled in on dissection, caused by hard and blunt object. He opined that the cause of death was coma due to fractured skull bone (internal bleeding). Premsingh (PW-1) was also sent to Community Health Centre, Kartala for medical examination vide Ex. P-14A. Dr. Vivek Pratap Singh Tanwar (PW-6) examined Premsingh (PW-1) and gave his report (Ex. P-14), in which, he found (i) lacerated wound, 2 cms x 1 cm, right side of skull on parietal aspect, just 5" above from ear (ii) blister (burn wound), 3 inches x 11/2 inches on right hand on palmer aspect just at the base of thumb and distal to wrist joint and on dorsal aspect of hand and all four fingers dorsal aspect.
In further investigation, memorandum statement (Ex. P-3) of appellant Ramprasad Yadav was recorded u/s 27 of the Evidence Act and at his instance, a bamboo (Lathi) was seized vide Ex. P-5. Memorandum statement (Ex. P-4) of appellant Janpad Ram was also recorded u/s 27 of the Evidence Act and at his instance, a Tangiya was seized vide Ex. P-6. Plain soil, blood stained soil and white Gamchha were seized from the place of occurrence vide Ex. P-10. A full shirt was seized from appellant Janpad Ram Yadav vide Ex. P-11. Patwari Premlal (PW-8) prepared panchnama (Ex. P-12) and site-map (Ex. P-12A). Another site-map (Ex. P-9) was prepared by Sub-Inspector Yadumani Sidar (PW-9). The seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur for chemical examination vide Ex. P-20. Report (Ex. P-22) was received therefrom. In Ex. P-22, it was found that articles A-blood stained soil, C - bori, D1 - Gamchha, D2 - shirt, H - baniyan and I - godariwere stained with blood.
After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korba, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, Korba, who conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned above.
Shri Sudhir Verma, learned counsel for appellant Janpad Ram argued that Premsingh (PW-1) is an interested witness. His evidence is not reliable. The date and time of incident was 6-11-2005 at about 10 P.M. and Premsingh (PW-1) disclosed the incident on the next morning at about 6 A.M. His conduct was unnatural. He further argued that Premsingh (PW-1) improved his version in the Court. There are material contradictions in his evidence. Therefore, his evidence is not reliable and conviction cannot be based on his solitary evidence. He placed reliance on Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri, and Jai Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2012 LS (MP) 261.
Miss Nirupama Bajpai, learned counsel for appellant Ramprasad argued that no over act of appellant Ramprasad is stated by Premsingh (PW-1). The prosecution has not been able to prove that appellant Ramprasad shared common intention to commit murder of the deceased. There is no clinching and reliable evidence against appellant Ramprasad. Therefore, conviction of appellant Ramprasad u/s 302 with the aid of Section 34 IPC is not sustainable.
Shri Rajendra Tripathi, learned Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants do not warrant any interference by this Court.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the record of Sessions Trial No. 78/2005. The conviction of the appellants is based on the evidence of Premsingh (PW-1).
Premsingh (PW-1) deposed that the deceased was his maternal uncle (Mama) and he was residing with him. The deceased had cultivated brinjal and tomato in his field (fence). The deceased was residing in a hut raised by him in the said field and was watching his vegetable crops therefrom. The appellants demanded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the deceased. The deceased refused to give the sum. He further deposed that he had gone to attend call of nature. He, having heard noise of the deceased, came immediately to the hut of the deceased. He saw that appellant Janpad was assaulting the deceased. Appellant Ramprasad was standing there. He snatched the Tangiya from appellant Janpad and threw away the same. He further deposed that appellant Ramprasad caught his waist from behind and appellant Janpad assaulted him. He fell down towards the fire and his hands burnt in the fire. Thereafter, he became semi-unconscious. He further deposed that he reached his house in the next morning at about 6 A.M.
Dr. Vivek Pratap Singh Tanwar (PW-6) deposed that on 7-11-2005, at about 7:30 P.M., he examined Premsingh (PW-1) and gave his report (Ex. P-14), in which, he found (i) lacerated wound, 2 cms x 1 cm, right side of skull on parietal aspect, just 5" above from ear (ii) blister (burn wound), 3 inches x 1 inches on right hand on palmer aspect just at the base of thumb and distal to wrist joint and on dorsal aspect of hand and all four fingers dorsal aspect.
Goverdhan (PW-4) deposed that Premsingh (PW-1) had come to his house on Monday at about 7 A.M. At that time, Premsingh (PW-1) had sustained injury on his head and his hands had burnt.
Looking to the evidence of Premsingh (PW-1), Goverdhan (PW-4) and Dr. Vivek Pratap Singh Tanwar (PW-6), it appears that Premsingh (PW-1) is an injured witness, therefore, his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be doubted.
Injured, Interested/Related and Solitary Witness
In Mano Dutt and Another Vs. State of U.P., the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
30 Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain protect the real culprit. We need not discuss more elaborately the weightage that should be attached by the Court to the testimony of an injured witness. In fact, this aspect of criminal jurisprudence is no more res integra, as has been consistently stated by this Court in uniform language.
We may merely refer to Abdul Sayeed Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, , where this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 271-72, paras 28-30)
The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. ''Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.'' [Vide Ramlagan Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar, , Malkhan Singh and Another Vs. State of U.P., , Machhi Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, Mehmood Alam Tariq and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , Bonkya Alias Bharat Shivaji Mane and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, , Bhag Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, , Mohar and Another Vs. State of U.P., , Dinesh Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan, , Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 477, Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, and Balraje @ Trimbak Vs. State of Maharashtra,
While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29)
Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident.
In State of U.P. Vs. Kishan Chand and Others, a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 459). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below.
The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.
In Brahm Swaroop and Another Vs. State of U.P., the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as follows:
Merely because the witnesses were closely related to the deceased persons, their testimonies cannot be discarded. Their relationship to one of the parties is not a factor that effects the credibility of a witness, moreso, a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. A party has to lay down a factual foundation and prove by leading impeccable evidence in respect of its false implication. However, in such cases, the court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse the evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible evidence.
Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. "Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness
In Waman and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as follows:
In Balraje @ Trimbak Vs. State of Maharashtra, this Court held that the mere fact that the witnesses were related to the deceased cannot be a ground to discard their evidence. It was further held that when the eyewitnesses are stated to be interested and inimically disposed towards the accused, it has to be noted that it would not be proper to conclude that they would shield the real culprit and rope in innocent persons. The truth or otherwise of the evidence has to be weighed pragmatically and the court would be required to analyse the evidence of related witnesses and those witnesses who are inimically disposed towards the accused....
19......."29........The evidence of a witness cannot be discarded solely on the ground of his relationship with the victim of the offence. The plea relating to relatives'' evidence remains without any substance in case the evidence has credence and it can be relied upon. In such a case the defence has to lay foundation if plea of false implication is made and the court has to analyse the evidence of related witnesses carefully to find out whether it is cogent and credible. (Vide Jarnail Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 477 and Balraje @ Trimbak Vs. State of Maharashtra,
In Alagupandi @ Alagupandian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as follows:
16 In the case of Govindaraju alias Govinda v. State of Sriramapuram P.S. & Anr [Crl. Appeal No. 984 of 2007 decided on March 15, 2012]: (Reported in Govindaraju @ Govinda Vs. State by Sriramapuram P.S. and Another, this Court held as under:
Now, we come to the second submission raised on behalf of the appellant that the material witness has not been examined and the reliance cannot be placed upon the sole testimony of the police witness (eye-witness). It is a settled proposition of law of evidence that it is not the number of witnesses that matters but it is the substance. It is also not necessary to examine a large number of witnesses if the prosecution can bring home the guilt of the accused even with a limited number of witnesses. In the case of Lallu Manjhi and Another Vs. State of Jharkhand, this Court had classified the oral testimony of the witnesses into three categories:-
a. Wholly reliable;
b. Wholly unreliable; and
c. Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
In the third category of witnesses, the Court has to be cautious and see if the statement of such witness is corroborated, either by the other witnesses or by other documentary or expert evidence. Equally well settled is the proposition of law that where there is a sole witness to the incident, his evidence has to be accepted with caution and after testing it on the touchstone of evidence tendered by other witnesses or evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a sole witness should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit into the chain of events that have been stated by the prosecution. When the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a sole eye-witness, then such evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Presence of such witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other witnesses, it may not be safe to make such a statement as a foundation of the conviction of the accused. These are the few principles which the Court has stated consistently and with certainty. Reference in this regard can be made to the cases of Joseph Vs. State of Kerala, and Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007) 15 SCC 760. Even in the case of Jhapsa Kabari and Others etc. Vs. State of Bihar, , this Court took the view that if the presence of a witness is doubtful, it becomes a case of conviction based on the testimony of a solitary witness. There is, however, no bar in basing the conviction on the testimony of a solitary witness so long as the said witness is reliable and trustworthy.
xxx xxx xxx
In Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
10 The submissions advanced in this respect had been that Shri. Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW-1) being a partner in the Firm would be beneficiary in the transaction of land involved herein in case one partner had been eliminated and other partner landed in jail. Such an argument is not acceptable for two reasons:
(i) While appreciating the evidence of witness considering him as the interested witness, the court must bear in mind that the term ''interested'' postulates that the witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some other reason
(ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence
Premsingh (PW-1) deposed that the deceased was his maternal uncle (Mama) and he was residing with him. The deceased had cultivated brinjal and tomato in his field (fence). The deceased was residing in a hut raised in that field and was watching his vegetable crops. On the date of incident, at about 6 P.M., he and the deceased were sitting in the fence. The appellants came to the fence of the deceased in drunken state. The appellants demanded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the deceased. The deceased refused to give the sum. He further deposed that he had gone to attend call of nature. He, having heard noise of the deceased, came immediately to the hut of the deceased. He saw that appellant Janpad was assaulting the deceased. Appellant Ramprasad was standing there. He snatched the Tangiya from appellant Janpad and threw away the same. Blood was oozing out of the head of the deceased. He further deposed that appellant Ramprasad caught his waist from behind and appellant Janpad assaulted him. He fell down towards the fire and his hands burnt in the fire. Thereafter, he became semi-unconscious. Thereafter, when he became able to see, he saw that the deceased had sustained multiple injuries on his person and he was unable to speak. He further deposed that he reached his house in the next morning at about 6 A.M.
Goverdhan (PW-4) deposed that Premsingh (PW-1) had come to his house on Monday at about 7 A.M. At that time, Premsingh (PW-1) had sustained injury on his head, blood was oozing out of the head and his hands had burnt. He asked Premsingh (PW-1) about the deceased. Premsingh (PW-1) did not say anything and indicated towards the hut. He went to the hut and saw that the deceased was lying down out of the hut having deep injuries on his head. He, shouting, ran towards the village. He narrated the villagers that the deceased was lying down out of his hut. They were preparing to take the deceased to hospital, but he died. He further deposed that Premsingh (PW-1) was admitted in hospital for 4-5 days. When Premsingh (PW-1) became able to speak, be narrated the incident.
Premsingh (PW-1) deposed that when he reached his house, his wife asked about the deceased. He indicated towards the fence of the deceased. Fence of the deceased was visible from their courtyard. He further deposed that he was taken to Kartala in an autorickshaw. The deceased was also being taken in an autorickshaw to hospital, but he died. He further deposed that he lodged UK (bx. H-Z) in police station Kartala, since nis nanas naa burnt, therefore, he had put thumb impression of his left hand.
Sub-Inspector Yadumani Sidar (PW-9) deposed that on 7-11-2005, at about 3 P.M., Premsingh (PW-1) lodged Merg Intimation (Ex. P-1) regarding death of deceased Paikuram. He also recorded FIR (Ex. P-2). He further deposed that Premsingh (PW-1) was sent to. CHC, Kartala for medical examination and dead body of the deceased was also sent to CHC, Kartala for post mortem examination. Dr. Vivek Pratap Singh Tanwar (PW-6) deposed that he examined Premsingh (PW-1) and gave his report (Ex. P-14).
Dr. B.S. Narvariya (PW-10) deposed that he conducted post mortem on the dead body of deceased Paikuram and gave his report (Ex. P-26). He found that the injuries sustained by the deceased were ante mortem in nature and cause of the death was coma due to fractured skull bone (internal bleeding). Looking to the evidence of Premsingh (PW-1) and Dr. B.S. Narvariya (PW-10), it is established that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature.
Premsingh (PW-1) specifically deposed that the deceased had sustained near about 10 injuries and the time of incident was 9-10 P.M. He specifically deposed that he was semi-unconscious and when he became able to move, he, dragging himself, went to his house and reached there on the next morning at about 6 A.M.
Chinilal (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, at about 7 P.M., he had reached to the fence of deceased Paikuram. Premsingh (PW-1) and the appellants were already present there. He further deposed that Premsingh (PW-1) was also known as Mundu. This witness was declared hostile by the prosecution, but, in cross-examination by public prosecutor, he deposed in paragraph 11 that it is true that Premsingh (PW-1) was sleeping on a cot in the courtyard of Goverdhan (PW-4). He further deposed that Premsingh (PW-1) told him that the appellants assaulted him and the deceased.
We have perused the evidence of Premsingh (PW-1). He specifically deposed that appellant Janpad assaulted the deceased. He snatched the Tangiya from appellant Janpad and threw away the same. Thereafter, appellant Ramprasad caught his waist from behind and appellant Janpad assaulted him also. He became semi-unconscious. When he became able to see, he saw that the deceased had sustained multiple injuries on his person. The evidence of Premsingh (PW-1) is duly corroborated by medical evidence and also by oral evidence of Goverdhan (PW-4) and Chinilal (PW-2). In the above facts and circumstances, not informing police and family members immediately cannot be said to be unnatural conduct of witness Premsingh (PW-1). Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned trial Court.
Now, we shall examine the conviction of appellant Ramprasad with the aid of Section 34 IPC.
It is well known that to establish the common intention of several persons so as to attract provisions of Section 34 IPC, the following two fundamental facts have to be established: (i) common intention to commit an offence and (ii) participation of the accused in commission of the offence. To attract Section 34 IPC, it is not necessary that each one of the accused persons must assault the deceased. It is enough if it is shown that they shared common intention to commit the offence in furtherance thereof and each one played his assigned role by doing separate acts, similar or diverse. Section 34 IPC is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 IPC, it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.
In Rangnath Sharma Vs. Satendra Sharma and Others, the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direction or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it prearranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true concept of the section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. The existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention pervading amongst all accused in order to attract the provision. Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34, it is not necessary to show some specific overt act on the part of the accused, when it is shown that there was common intention and meeting of mind.
In Ram Tahal and Others Vs. The State of U.P., it has been laid down as under: (SCC p. 140, para 5)
5... There is no doubt that a common intention should be anterior in time to the commission of the crime showing a prearranged plan and prior concert, and though, it is difficult in most cases to prove the intention of an individual it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. This inference can be gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries, caused by one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries the concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence for instance that all of them had left the scene of the incident together and other acts which all or some may have done as would help in determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted. This Court had in Krishna Govind Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra, already referred to earlier, held that the prearranged plan may develop on the spot during the course of the commission of the offence but the crucial circumstance is that the said plan must precede the act constituting the offence. If that be so before a court convicts a person u/s 302 or 304, read with Section 34 IPC, it should come to a definite conclusion that the said person had a prior concert with one or more persons named or unnamed for committing the offence.
In Gopi Nath @ Jhallar Vs. State of U.P., the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel on either side. As for the challenge made to the conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 IPC, it is necessary to advert to the salient principles to be kept in consideration and often reiterated by this Court, in the matter of invoking the aid of Section 34 IPC, before dealing with the factual aspect of the claim made on behalf of the appellant. Section 34 IPC has been held to lay down the rule of joint responsibility for criminal acts performed by plurality of persons who joined together in doing the criminal act, provided that such commission is in furtherance of the common intention of all of them. Even the doing of separate, similar or diverse acts by several persons, so long as they are done in furtherance of a common intention, render each of such persons liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for the whole of the criminal action - be it that it was not overt or was only a covert act or merely an omission constituting an illegal omission. The section, therefore, has been held to be attracted even where the acts committed by the different confederates are different when it is established in one way or the other that all of them participated and engaged themselves in furtherance of the common intention which might be of a pre-concerted or pre-arranged plan or one manifested or developed at the spur of the moment in the course of the commission of the offence. The common intention or the intention of the individual concerned in furtherance of the common intention could be proved either from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or attending circumstances of the case and conduct of the parties. The ultimate decision, at any rate, would invariably depend upon the inferences deducible from the circumstances of each case.
In the instant case, the appellants came to the fence of the deceased, took liquor from the deceased and demanded money from him. On refusal by the deceased, appellant Janpad assaulted the deceased. When Premsingh (PW-1) intervened and snatched the Tangiya from appellant Janpad, appellant Ramprasad caught him and appellant Janpad assaulted him. He became unconscious. When he became able to see, he saw that the deceased had sustained multiple injuries on his person. The role played by the appellants was with a view to achieve the ultimate objective of killing the deceased. Appellant Janpad assaulted the deceased and appellant Ramprasad caught Premsingh (PW-1). Therefore, the application of the principles enshrined in Section 34 IPC was fully justified and no exception could be legitimately taken to the same on the peculiar facts of this case to which due reference extensively had been made by the court below. The conviction u/s 302 with the aid of Section 34 IPC is, therefore, well merited.
From the above, it is apparent that the appellants shared common intention to commit murder of the deceased and to assault Premsingh (PW-1).
Therefore, the evidence of Premsingh (PW-1) is cogent, trustworthy and reliable and is duly corroborated by medical evidence. The same can be based for conviction.
Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge does not call for any interference by this Court. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in both the appeals; they deserve to be and are hereby dismissed.