Jarnail Singh And Others vs State Of Punjab And Another

Sureshwar Thakur, J

CRM-516-2022

The present application has been filed for preponing the date of hearing of main case.

For the reasons recorded in the application, the application is allowed. Main case is taken up today.

Main case

Through the instant petition, filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the petitioners seek quashing of DDR No.20, dated 25.07.2019, constituting

therein offences, under Sections 323, 325, 447, 148, 149 of the IPC 1860, as arise from FIR No.101, dated 30.06.2019, under Sections 341, 323, 324,

505, 447, 511, 148, 149 IPC, lodged at Police Station Barnala, District Barnala, and, also of all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, hence on

the basis of compromise (Annexure P-3) arrived at between the parties. FIR (supra), and, also consequential proceedings arising therefrom, stand

quashed through an order made on 13.12.2021, upon CRM-M-12480-2021.

When the instant petition came up before this Court on 23.03.2021, an order was made upon the learned Magistrate concerned, to make a report to

this Court, with respect to the genuineness of the compromise, as also whether any person(s) has/have been nominated as accused, and, as also

whether any person has been declared a proclaimed offender, and, that whether challan has been filed. The afore order, makes it apparent that the

petitioners had depended, upon, a compromise/settlement, arrived at, in respect of the FIR (supra) with the complainant-respondent No.2.

The afore made order by this Court on 23.03.2021, has been complied with by the learned Magistrate concerned, and, the elicited report has been

placed on record. A perusal of the report, transmitted to this Court, by the learned Magistrate concerned reveals that the settlement/compromise,

arrived at inter se the petitioners, and, the respondent No.2, is a sequel of both, being ad idem qua it, besides the compromise/settlement being a sequel

of no pressure or coercion, being exercised upon each other. Moreover, the compromise is compositely drawn, and, thereons exist the signatures of all

concerned, in the penal transactions concerned. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has reported that the settlement/compromise, depended upon by the

petitioners, for seeking quashing of the FIR (supra), is both voluntary, and, also is free from vices of duress, and, or of compulsion, being exercised

upon each other, besides is genuine.

Today, the learned counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, has contended before this Court, that the relief, as claimed by the petitioners, in the

petition, cannot be granted, as some of the offences constituted against the accused-petitioners, inasmuch as, those under Sections 325/148, 149 IPC,

are non-compoundable.

However, for the reasons to be assigned hereinafter, the afore prayer, as made by the learned State counsel, cannot be accepted by this Court. The

pre-eminent reason for dispelling the vigour of afore made argument, is rested, upon the factum of also a statement, being made before this Court, by

the learned counsel for the petitioners, that the investigating officer has not yet preferred a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., before the learned

Magistrate concerned.

The effect of the afore statement, as made with extreme vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioners, and, also the effect of the statement

made by the learned counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, is that the relevant parameters as encapsulated in a verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court,

rendered in case titled as, Gian Singh versus State of Punjab and another 2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 543, inasmuch as a postulate/occurring therein, that

the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as vested in the High Court, through recourse being made to the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C., for

quashing of criminal proceedings, as/of FIR or complaint, rather being distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court, hence for

compounding the relevant offence, being enjoined to become tested vis-a-vis the facts in hand, for apposite application thereons. However, it has also

been held therein, the afore power vested in the High Court, is of the widest plenitude, with no statutory limitation, being placed thereon, yet it has to

be exercised to secure the ends of justice, and, to prevent the abuse of process of any Court. Though no straightjacket formula, has been

contemplated therein, for recourse being made to the mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence for quashing of an FIR, or criminal proceedings or

complaint, yet the essential rubric viz-a-viz its valid exercising, is comprised in the principle, that if the accused and the complainant rather enter into a

valid ad idem settlement, and, when thereupon the conviction of the accused becomes remote and bleak. Consequently, it has been mandated, that

unless the offences sought to be quashed, through the exercising of the power vested under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are not serious and heinous,

inasmuch as the afore, do not embody offences appertaining to murder, rape, dacoity etc., and, or when the offences are in relation to special statutes

like Prevention of Corruption Act or offences committed by public servants, while working in that capacity, thereupon it can be permissibly exercised.

However, upon evident existences of embargos (supra), spelt in the verdict (supra), thereupon, the High Courts are barred, through recoursing the

mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., hence, to quash the FIR or quash the criminal proceedings appertaining to serious/heinous offences (supra).

It is apt to extract the relevant paragraph of the verdict made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gian Singh's case (supra).

“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or

FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences

under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline

engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute

would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High

Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,

dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not

private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under

special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for

any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour

stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or

such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or

personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its

view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case

would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and

complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the

interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law

despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is

put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal

proceeding.â€​

Since the offence(s) under Sections 325/148, 149 IPC does not, prima facie, appear to be so grave and nor are so heinous, so as to attract the rigour

of the embargo (supra) foisted upon the High Court in verdict (supra).

Therefore, the settlement/compromise, as validly entered into, enjoins its being revered. Consequently, even if the afore offences are non-

compoundable, this Court does not deem it fit to accept the contention(s) of the learned State counsel, that this Court, may not through recoursing the

mandate of Section 482 Cr.P.C., quash the FIR. In aftermath when rather thereupons, the chances of the petitioners being convicted are remote as

well as bleak. In sequel, the ordering for the trial of the accused, would result in harassment and humiliation, being caused to the accused, besides

would defeat the ends of justice.

Furthermore, an immense support to the afore made view, is also derived from the judgment rendered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

case titled as Vinod @ Boda and others versus State of Haryana and another 2017(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 571, wherein also, the above view has been

reiterated.

There is merit in the petition, and, the same is allowed. Consequently, after accepting the report of the learned Magistrate concerned, this Court

proceeds to quash the DDR (supra).

Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and, the DDR (supra), and, also all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the

petitioners.

Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand(s), disposed of.