High CourtsSingle Bench

Jas Ram vs Financial Commissioner and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 10 May 1966 · Citation: (1966) 05 P&H CK 0028

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.C. Pandit, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 — Section 18
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ No. 173 of 1966
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

14 paragraphs · 1,713 words

P.C. Pandit, J.—This order will dispose of three connected writ petitions Nos. 173-175 of 1966 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution They have been filed by Jas Ram, Neki and Gopal, the three tenants of Siri Chand and are directed against the order dated 1st of January, 1966 passed by Mr A. L. Fletcher, Financial Commissioner, Punjab, Chandigarh, respondent No. 1.

2.

Siri Chand, respondent No. 6 is a displaced person from Pakistan and he was allotted 52 standard acres and 2 1/2 units of land, which is equivalent to 189 ordinary acres, in village Nagpur, tehsil Fatehbad, District Hissar, before 1953. On 7th of February, 1953 the allotment with respect to 5 standard acres and 11 1/2 units was cancelled and instead he was allotted an orchard, measuring roughly 4 ordinary acres and 10 marlas according to the landlord and 5 standard acres and 11 units according to the tenants, in village Kanganpur, tehsil Sirsa, District Hissar in 1957. He transferred 3/4th share of his entire holding to his three sons and kept the remaining l/4th with him In May, 1963 these three tenants applied to the Assistant Collector for the purchase of the land under their tenancy u/s 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Act). On 14th of May 1964, their applications were rejected on the ground that respondent No. 6 was a ''small landowner''. During the pendency of these applications, in January, 1964, respondent No. 6 applied to the Assistant Collector for the ejectment of these tenants under sections 9 and 14 of the Act. These applications were accepted by the Assistant Collector. The tenants then filed a appeals before the Collector against both the decisions of the Assistant Collector. These appeals were dismissed on 26th of October, 1964 and the tenants than filed revisions to the Commissioner which too were rejected on 20th July, 1965. Thereafter further revisions to the Financial Commissioner were also dismissed by means of the impugned order. That led to the filing of these three writ petitions by the three tenants.

3.

It is common ground that respondent No. 6 could eject the tenants only if he was a ''small landownor'' and the tenants could purchase the tenancy land if their landlord i.e. respondent No. 6 was not a ''small landowner''. The question for decision, therefore, is whether respondent, No. 1 was right in holding that respondent No. 6 was a ''small landowner''. ''Small landowner'' has been defined in section 2(2) of the Act and it means a landowner whose entire land in the State of Punjab does not exceed the ''permissible area''. ''Permissible area'' has been defined as under in subclause (3) of section 2 of the Act :

"Permissible area" in relation to a land-owner or a tenant, means thirty standard acres and where such thirty standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres exceed sixty acres, such sixty acres :

(i) no area under an orchard at the commencement of this Act, shall be taken into account in computing the permissible area;

(ii) for a displaced person -

(a) who has been allotted land in excess of fifty standard acres, the permissible area shall be fifty standard acres or one hundred ordinary acres, as the case may be,

(b) who has been allotted land in excess of thirty standard acres, but less than fifty standard acres, the permissible area shall be equal to his allotted area,

(c) who has been allotted land less than thirty standard acres, the permissible area shall be thirty standard acres, including any other land or part thereof, if any, that he owns in addition.

Explanation. - For the purposes of determining the permissible area of a displaced person, the provisions of proviso (ii) shall not apply to the heirs and successors of the displaced persons to whom land is allotted.

Respondent No. 6 undoubtedly was a displaced person and according to proviso (ii) (a) to section 2(3), the ''permissible area'' for a displaced person who had been allotted land in excess of 50 standard acres would be 50 standard acres or 100 ordinary acres as the case may be and if a displaced person had been allotted land in excess of 30 standard acres but less then 50 standard acres then according to proviso (ii) (b) of section 2(3), the permissible area in his case would be equal to his allotted area. It is common ground that respondent No. 6 was originally allotted 52 standard acres and 2 1/2 units. Later on the allotment of 5 standard acres and 11 1/2 units was cancelled in February, 1953 and he was given an or chard in village Kanganpur in its place. He was thus left with only 46 standard acres and 11 units besides the orchard, According to proviso (i) to section 2(3), no area under an orchard at the commencement of the Act (i.e. 15th April, 1953) shall be taken into account in computing the ''permissible area''. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners however, is that the area under the orchard would be added to the holding of respondent No 6 and thereafter the allotment in his favour would exceed 50 standard acres, and thus, his holding would exceed the ''permissible area'' which would be 50 standard acres in his case. Proviso (i) to section 2(3) according to the learned counsel, applies to the permissible area of persons who are non-displaced, because the proviso relating to displaced persons is (ii) to section 2(3) which comes after proviso (i). There is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for petitioners. ''Permissible area'' of a landowner or a tenant is defined in the opening part of section 2(3). It is significant to note that in this opening part it is not stated that the ''permissible area'' is of a non displaced person. No distinction is made between a displaced person or a non-displaced person in this definition which applies to all the landowners or tenants. Landowner includes both displaced and non displaced persons. Two provisos are then added to this definition of ''permissible area''. According to proviso (i) while computing the permissible area'' of a landowner, be he displaced or non-displaced, if an area under an orchard has been allotted to him, it shall not be taken into account. Proviso (ii) (a) then says that if the landowner is a displaced person who has been allotted land in excess of 50 standard acres, then the permissible area in his case would be 50 standard acres or 100 ordinary acres as the case may be. According to proviso (ii)(b), if the displaced person has been allotted land in excess of 30 but less than 50 standard acres, the permissible area in his case shall be equal to his allotted area. It would thus be seen that proviso (i) refers to the area under an orchard allotted to all landowners whether displaced or otherwise and proviso (ii) qualifies the definition of permissible area given in the opening part of section 2(3) so far as it applies to displaced persons. The mere fact that proviso (i) is placed first in this sub-section is no indication of the fact that it does not apply to displaced persons. This proviso is available to all the landowners, whether displaced or otherwise.

4.

Learned counsel for the petitioners then contended that under proviso (ii) (b) to section 2 (3), the permissible area'' of a displaced person, who has been allotted land in excess of 30 standard acres but less than 50 standard acres, would be subject to the upper limit of 100 ordinary acres, because this limit was fixed under proviso (ii) (a) to section 2 (3), even in the case of those displaced persons who had been allotted land in excess of 50 standard acres. The learned Financial Commissioner and the other officers under him, have however, taken the view that under proviso (ii) (b) the permissible area is the area actually allotted to the displaced person, even if on conversion into ordinary acres this area exceeds 100 ordinary acres. There is no substance in this contention of the learned counsel as well In the instant case, if the area under the orchard is not to be taken into account in computing the permissible area of respondent No. 6, as I have already held above then the allotment in his favour would be in excess of 30 standard acres but less than 50 standard acres, In that case proviso (ii) (b) will apply to him and the permissible area under the same would, in his case, be his allotted area. In the first place, in my opinion, the wordings of proviso (ii) (b) are quite clear and unambiguous and not capable of any other interpretation except this that for a displaced person who has been allotted land in excess of 30 but less than 50 standard acres, the permissible area shall be equal to his allotted area. Secondly, there is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that an outside limit of 100 ordinary acres has been fixed under proviso (ii) (a). The permissible area under this proviso has been laid down as 50 standard acres. If on conversion they exceed 100 ordinary acres, the same would be the permissible area and not 100 ordinary acres as contended by the learned counsel. This point was recently settled by a Full Bench of this Court in Khan Chand v. State of Punjab and others 1966 (68) P.L.R. 543 (F.B ), (C.W. No. 396 of 1963) derided on 24th March, 19t''6, where it was held that the permissible area of such allottees was 50 standard acres irrespective of the fact that on conversion the area would exceed 100 ordinary acres.

5.

It may be mentioned that a preliminary objection was raised as to whether the petitioners had to file six writ petitions in this Court, because the learned Financial Commissioner had disposed of six revision petitions by the impugned order. It is needless to decide this point, as I am rejecting these petitions on merits.

6.

The result is that these petitions fail and are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs in all these petitions.