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Judgment
76 paragraphs · 1,680 wordsRajbir Sehrawat, J.
This revision petition is filed against the judgment dated 05.12.2016 passed by the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dabwali vide which the petitioner
was convicted and sentenced for a period of one year under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and to pay a fine of `500/- and in default of
payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for the period of one month and judgment dated 01.06.2018 passed by the Sessions Judge, Sirsa vide
which the impugned judgment and order of sentence passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dabwali was upheld.
Alongwith the revision petition, the petitioner filed an application CRM No.25863 of 2018 for grant of permission to compound the offence, as the
parties had arrived at a compromise and the petitioner was ready to pay 15% of the cheque amount as costs. The sentence of the petitioner was
suspended by this Court vide order dated 27.08.2018. Thereafter, the petitioner deposited the compounding charges as per the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Damodar S.Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H 2010 AIR SC 1907 amounting to Rs.52500/- i.e 15% of the total amount with the High
Court Legal Services Authority. Deposit slip has been placed on record of the case.
Accordingly, vide order dated 27.08.2018, the parties were directed to appear before the trial Court, for getting their statements recorded; as to the
genuineness of the compromise. In compliance thereof, report of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dabwali dated 19.09.2018, has been received,
wherein, it has been noticed that the compromise arrived at between the parties is genuine and without any undue pressure and no other criminal case
is pending against them.
The ultimate aim, objective and goal of a legal system is to reconcile the social conflicts. Law is required only to ensure that people do not have to
fight with each other just to protect their right to property, right to life and liberty and other rights secured to them by the legal system. The civil
disputes are the conflicts between two parties, having lesser overtones for the social order, social harmony or the society as such. Hence absolute
freedom is given to the parties to settle their disputes by compromises, of course, coming with certain legal consequences as well. However, the
criminal disputes do not necessarily restrict themselves to only two parties to the dispute in terms of their scope, consequences and effect. The
criminal acts tend to cast their effect and consequences even upon the society at large. Therefore, the law prescribes punishment, severe punishments
and the extreme punishments, including death penalty for criminal acts.
However more often then not the civil disputes or inter-se conflicts of two parties transforms themselves into criminal aspect. Therefore, the legal
system plays empire to resolve the conflict between two parties; with the added task of ensuring that the adverse impact of dispute qua society at
large is minimized. But still the core idea is to resolve the conflict between two sides by putting it to rest. Therefore, even the criminal law is required
to give due regard to the wishes of the parties to dispute. Recognizing this principle only, the Indian legal System also provides for recognizing the
compromise between two sides of a criminal dispute. Section 320 Cr.P.C. is an express provision in this regard. This section not only provides for
compounding during the trial, but permits compounding even at appellate or revisional stage. However by its very nature and scope, Section 320
Cr.P.C. cannot be the sole repository; wherein the recognition to a compromise between the parties have; necessarily; to be confined. This section
relates only to the offences prescribed under the Indian Penal Code. There are a lot more offences prescribed outside IPC. Even to the offences
existing in the IPC new dimensions are added from time to time, making the existing offences to be lighter or stringent and even new modalities of
proof of offences are being recognised in view of technological advancement. This necessitates and requires the need for looking beyond Section 320
Cr.P.C. to recognise the compromise between the parties to dispute. But to maintain the sanctity of the procedure prescribed for criminal trial; the
Trial Court cannot be permitted to travel beyond the scope prescribed under that procedure. Hence the need for invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the
High Court.
But, as observed above, the wishes of only parties to the criminal dispute would not always be sufficient to terminate a criminal trial in view of the
patent, latent or subtle effect; their conduct would have left qua the society at large. Therefore the oftences committed by persons involved in
governance or administration for acquiring official power or while exercising office power cannot be permitted to be compromised. Likewise, even the
oftences involving only two private persons, but reflecting depravity of character or involving causing intentional loss of life or causing intentional loss
of property by extending imminent threat of loss of life; cannot be permitted to be compromised. Except the above mentioned grave offences, there is
every reason that all other offences should be permitted to be compromised by the Court. Since the proof of offences before the Court, again would
involve the conduct of the parties to dispute, therefore if the Court does not permit the same to be compromised then the parties would tend to play
tricks upon the Court to ensure the acquittal of accused by subverting the administration of criminal justice. And it is never in the interest of
administration of criminal justice to force the citizen to learn and adopt the tricks designed to be played upon Courts to subvert the justice system. So it
would always be in the interest of justice itself; that the compromise between the parties is recognized and the citizen remain moored and committed
to the essentials of the system of administration of justice, at least, qua those offences, which the interest of society does not permit to be
compromised.
Hon'ble the Supreme Court has amply clarified the legal position on recognizing compromising in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and
another, 2012(4) RCR (Criminal) 543, and has observed as under:-
“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding
or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement
and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the
answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.â€
The present case does not fall in anyone of the exceptions envisaged above. Hence, in view of the report of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate,
Dabwali dated 19.09.2018 made in pursuance of the order dated 27.08.2018 passed by this Court, the Court feels that no useful purpose would be
served by keeping the proceedings alive. It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted.
Accordingly, the permission to compound the offence is granted and the present revision petition is allowed and the impugned judgment dated
05.12.2016 passed by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dabwali, convicting and sentencing the petitioner under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act and to pay a fine of `500/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for the period of one month
and judgment dated 01.06.2018 passed by the Sessions Judge, Sirsa vide which the judgment and order of sentence passed by the learned Sub
Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dabwali was upheld, are set aside.
