Jaswant Rai vs Harbans Lal

B.S. Yadav, J.—This judgment will dispose of the above titled revision petition as well Revision Petition Nos. 3164 of 1983 (Jaswant Rai v. Harbans Lal) and 3165 of 1983 (Jaswant Rai v. Harbans Lal) at the facts and law point involved in all these cases are similar.

It appears that Jaswant Rai filed three ejectment petitions under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short ''the Act'') against the present Respondent Harbans Lal in respect of three rented premises. In all of them arguments were heard on 27th November, 1982. On the same day the tenant, under the rules framed by this Court, filed application for supplying to him the copies of the orders that might be passed in the cases Orders in these ejectrrent applications were announced on 30th November, 1982 and those went against the tenant. The tenant took delivery of the copies on 10th December, 1982. On each of the copies it was endorsed that those were ready on Ist December, 1982 Three different appeals were filed on 4th January, 1983 in the Court of Appellate Authority, Ludhiaua, appointed under the Act. Notices in the appeal was issued to the landlord. He appeared before the said authority and took objection that the appeals were time-barred Thereupon the tenant presented an application in each of the appeals u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. It was stated by him in the applications that when the orders were announced on 30th November, 1982 and thus be took delivery of the copies on that latter date He further pleaded that the appeals were filed on ?5th November, 1982 and thus those were within time. (The plea of the tenant that he had filed appeals on 25th November, 1982 is not correct as those were filed on 4th January, 1983. It was not disputed that the civil Courts were closed from 24th December, 1982 to 3rd January, 1983, both days inclusive). Before the Appellate Authority the only dispute was whether the tenant was entitled to exclude the period from Ist December, 1982 to 10th December, 1982 while computing the period of 15 days prescribed u/s 15(l)(b) of the Act for preferring an appeal to the Appellate Authority having jurisdiction. The Appellate Authority came to the opinion that the tenant was entitled to the above exclusion of time and otherwise also there were sufficient grounds for entertaining the appeals filed beyond the period prescribed for filing the appeal as the delay was neither intentional nor was the result of any negligence on the part of the tenant. He accordingly held the various appeals to be within limitation and adjourned them for arguments on merits. The landlord has now filed these 3 revision petitions challenging the orders passed in those three appeals.

The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that by lapse of time a valuable right has accrued to the Petitioner and, therefore, the Appellate Authority should not have extended the time as there were not sufficient reasons for doing the same. Reliance was placed upon Bootamal Vs. Union of India (UOI), , cited by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner wherein it was remarked by their lordships: -

Ordinarily, the words of a statute have to be given their strict grammatical meaning and equitable consideration are out of place, particularly in the provisions of law limiting the period of limitation for filing suits or legal proceedings.

He has also relied upon State of Assam and Others Vs. Naresh Chandra Das and Another, wherein it was remarked:-

Now, let us consider whether the claim for extension of time made u/s 5 of "the Art" should not be allowed on the facts and circumstances of the case The principles of extension of time u/s 5 of "the Act" may be summoned up as follows:-

(a) party seeking relief has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal etc. within the prescribed time ; (b) the explanation has to cover the entire period of delay (c) A litigant should not be easily permitted to take away a right which has accrued to his adversary by lapse of time ; (d) the proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. After sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire, whether in its discretion it should condone the delay ; (e) The discretion conferred on the court is a judicial discretion and must be exercised to advance substantial justice ; (f) No liberal view should be taken merely because the defaulting party is Govt. (g) Even sheer indifference of the Advocate cannot stand in the way of condoning the delay when there is no laches on the part of the litigant ; (h) When there is remiss on the part of the Advocate, the questions come up for consideration whether the mistake was bonafide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in any underhand way.

There is no dispute with the above proposition but it may be noticed here that there is a slight difference in the language used in the provisions of the Limitation Act and Section 15(1)(b) of the Act about the period of limitation. This can be best highlighted by juxtaposing the material portions of the sections of the two statutes.

Limitation Act

East Punjab Urban Rent. Restriction Act

"3(1). Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up at a defence."

"15(1)(b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date of such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the period of fifteen days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded."

''5. Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or tie applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for non preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

XX XX XX XX

It is to be noted that under the Limitation Act suit/appeal/application instituted/preferred or made after the prescribed period of limitation has to be dismissed and no discretion has been left with the Court. u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court has been empowered to admit the application or appeal after the prescribed period of limitation if the applicant/Appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the same within such period. Under the Act there is no prevision like Section 3 of the Limitation Act. u/s 15(1) (b) of the Act the appellate authority has been given power to allow an appeal to be preferred beyond the prescribed period of limitation for reasons to be recorded in writing The word ''sufficient'' has not been used in Section 15(1)(b of the Act and this ommisston cannot be unintentional. It cannot be said that the legislature was not aware of the Limitation Act while enacting Section 15(1)(b) of the Act. Of course, I do agree with the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the reasons to be recorded by the appellate authority should not be whimsical. The reasons should be reasonable ones.

In the present case, while excluding the period from 1st December, 1982 to 10th December, 1982 while computing the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal, the Appellate Authority bad taken into consideration, the fact that there was no evidence to show that any docket was issued by Stenographer attached to the Rent Controller, to the tenant specifying the date on which the tenant was required to collect the copies. Admittedly the copies were not ready on 30th November, 1982 on which date the orders were announced. No duty was cast upon the tenant to contact the Stenographer of the Rent Controller daily to enquire if the copies were ready or not.

When the tenant had applied for the copies and they were ready on the date on which the orders were announced, the Stenographer attached to the Rent Controller ought to have issued notice either to the tenant or his lawyer to collect the copies.

The Appellate Authority has also taken into consideration that perhaps the copies were not ready on Ist December, 1982 because the landlord had also applied for the copies of the orders on 27th November, 1982 and he took delivery of the same on 17th December, 1982

The Appellate Authority while holding that the appeals were within time further held that otherwise alto there were grounds for entertaining the appeals beyond the period prescribed under the Act. According to him, the tenant was vigilant enough and he had applied for copies on 27th November, 1982 and since on 30th November, 1982, ejectment was ordered, he must be anxious to receive the copies as soon as possible. He also believed the statement of the tenant that he was asked to come on 10th December, 1982 to collect the copies as stated by him Therefore, he held that the delay in filing the appeal was neither intentional nor as a result of any negligence on the part of the tenant.

The reason given by the learned Appellate Authority cannot be said to be whimsical or arbitrary The Appellate Authoriy bad the jurisdiction to pass the order and it has recorded reasons for entertaining the appeals beyond the period of limitation Therefore, the discretion exercised by the Appellate Authority is not liable to be interfered with lightly. In this respect, reference can also be made to Ashutosh Bhadra and Another Vs. Jatindra Mohan Seal and Another, where Sinha, J. while recording a note of dissent, which was not pressed, remarked as follows:-

However, the learned Judge has exercised his discretion u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and the exercise of the discretion should not be lightly interfered with by the Appellate Court. As my Lord is also of opinion that the learned Judge has exercised his discretion properly, I do not like to press my doubt to the point of dissent.

The tenant is not asking anything more than that his appeal be heard on merits.

I have taken the broader aspects of the case The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, of course, had advanced lengthy agrarians to show that the tenant had not led any evidence to show that on 30th November. 1982 he had been asked to collect copies on 10th December, 1982 or that his lawyer advised him on that date that appeals could be filed within 15 days and that the Appellate Authority had wrongly held that the onus was upon the landlord to controvert the allegations of the tenant that he had been asked to collect the copies on 10th December, 1982 I may, however, mention here that prima facie there does not appear to be any reason to doubt the statement of the tenant. When he had received copies on 10th December, 1982, there were still 5 days to file the appeals. The lawyer, who advised the tenant on 10th December, 1982 that there were 15 days for filing the appeals might not have seen the endorsement on the copies that the same were ready for delivery on Ist December, 1982. Circumstances clearly show that the tenant was misled by the advice given by his lawyer.

For the reasons given above, I do not find any force in these revision petitions and the same are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.