Jaswant Rai Gupta vs Ram Sarup

B.R. Tuli, J.—This order will dispose of Civil Revision Applications Nos. 1168 of 1971, Jaswant Rai Gupta v. Ram Sarup and 1169 of 1971, Jaswant Rai Gupta v. Banarsi Dass, as they relate to the same building.

The facts are that Jaswant Rai, an Advocate of Jind, purchased the building in which Banarsi Dass and Ram Sarup are tenants. He made two applications against the said tenants for their ejectment u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act on the ground that he required the said building for his own occupation. The tenants resisted the petitions and the following issues were framed-

(1) Whether the petitioner requires the house in dispute for his personal requirements?

(2) Whether the petitioner requires the house in dispute for the construction to live in it thereafter?

(3) Whether the application is not maintainable on the ground that the petitioner is already in occupation of another house?

(4) Whether the petitioner has vacated a residential house within six months without reasonable cause; If so, to what effect?

(5) Whether this application is liable to be stayed till the decision of the Pre-emption suit pending between the parties?

(6) Relief.

Another additional issue was added reading as under:-

Whether notice served on the respondent under Transfer of Property Act u/s 106 was invalid, illegal and void as per grounds mentioned in the written statement, if so, to what effect?

The learned Rent Controller allowed the applications for ejectment by order dated May 31, 1971 and granted time to each tenant for vacating the portion of the building in his possession till August 31, 1971. The tenants filed appeals which were accepted by the Appellate Authority by orders dated August 28, 1971. The only point decided against the petitioner was that he had stated that he would first demolish the building and would occupy it after re-constructing it to suit his requirements. The learned Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the landlord must occupy the building as it is in the occupation of the tenant and since the petitioner was not in a position to do so, his requirement for personal occupation of the building in possession of the tenants was not proved. The interpretation placed by the learned Appellate Authority on Sub-clause (a) of section 13(3)(a)(i) is not correct in view of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta Vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth, In that case, the provisions of section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, were under consideration which read as under:-

13(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of S 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied-

(g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust.

In that case the landlord had stated in his plaint that he would take up residence in the premises after overhauling it. It was on this account that the tenants submitted that the landlord wanted the premises for immediate purpose of demolishing it and erecting a new building and not for personal occupation. Repelling this contention, it was observed as under:-

Section 13 provides exceptional cases in which the landlord can eject the tenant even though he had been paying rent regularly or be ready and willing to pay rent. The provisions of section 13 are for the advantage of the landlord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the exercise of the landlord''s general right to eject his tenant. There is, therefore, no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not, therefore, agree with the contention that clause (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them i.e. to occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies. There is no justification to give such a narrow construction either to the word ''premises'' or to the word ''occupies''.

A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Krishna Das Nandy Vs. Bidhan Chandra Roy, Paras 44 to 50 of the report may be read with advantage. In para 50 towards the end, the learned Judges observed-"there is nothing in the Act which compels such acceptance and section 15, to which, our attention was particularly drawn by Mr. Gupta, does not present any obstacle to our point of view as occupation of the premises for purposes of building and or rebuilding in order to make it fit for one''s own occupation would be part of such occupation." In view of these judgments, the Learned Counsel for the tenant-respondents has only been able to urge that in the Bombay Act which was being considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and in the West Bengal Act which was under consideration before the Calcutta High Court the word used is ''premises'', and not ''building'' and that section 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act uses the word ''building'' and ''it'' which implies that the building as in occupation of the tenant must be required by the landlord for his personal occupation, The distinction pointed out by the Learned Counsel is of no significance. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court used the word ''building'' because in that context building and premises were synonymous. A Landlord cannot be deprived of the right to eject his tenant, if he bonafide requires the building for his occupation after re-constructing it. The object of the Legislature is that the tenants are not evicted on a fake ground. The requirement of the landlord must be bonafide and it must be for his personal occupation of the building If the building as constructed is fit for his occupation, he can occupy it as it is, but if it is not, he is at liberty to carry out repairs and if that does not satisfy his requirements, he can certainly pull it down and re-construct a new building which may satisfy his requirements. In the present case, the landlord purchased this building with a view to set up his residence and office as a lawyer therein. For that purpose the building as it is constructed at present is not suitable. He has, therefore, to make extensive alteration or may reconstruct and then occupy it personally. I am therefore, of the opinion that the bonafide requirement of the petitioner is proved in these cases. The learned Appellate Authority was in error in holding to the contrary.

For the reasons given above, these petitions are accepted, the orders of the Appellate Authority are set aside and it is ordered that the respondent-tenant in each revision petition shall vacate and deliver the possession of the building in his occupation to the petitioner within two months from today. The parties are left to bear their own costs.