Jaswant Singh vs Shrimati Prem Kumari

Grover, J.—This order will dispose of Second Appeals from order Nos. 214-D of 1963 and 215-D of 1963.

The respondent purchased the property in dispute from the Rehabilitation Department. According to the sale certificate, which was granted to her, dated 31st January, 1961, she was declared purchaser with effect from 16th November, 1956. In February, 1961 she filed applications for fixation of standard rent payable by both the tenants and the standard rent was fixed by agreement at a figure higher than the one at which it was being paid in each case. Soon afterwards she applied for eviction of the tenants on the ground of bona fide personal requirement.

It was stated in the eviction application that the petitioner had purchased the house from the Ministry of Rehabilitation in a public auction held on 5th January 1956 and a sale certificate dated 31st January, 1 61 had been granted to her. She as owner bona fide required the premises for occupation as residence for herself and the dependent members of her family and that the accommodation in her occupation was "reasonably unsuitable and meager". In the written statement Jaswant Singh respondent took up inter alia a preliminary objection that no application for the recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified u/s 14(1)(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, lay unless a period of five years had elapsed from the date of the acquisition of the property. It was further stated as follows :

In this case the date of transfer is when the sale certificate is granted to the petitioner i.e. 31st January, 1961, the date alleged by the petitioner in the petition. Presuming though not admitted by the respondent the date alleged by the petitioner for the grant of provisional possession as 16th November, 1956 to be considered as the date of confirmation of the sale, even then the period of 5 years elapsed on 15th November, 1961 whereas this petition has been filed on 11th November, 1961 as is apparent from the date mentioned in the petition. So this petition as premature is not maintainable, it deserves dismissal on this very ground.

The Additional Rent Controller held that a period of 5 years had elapsed at the time when the applications for eviction of the tenants were filed and repelled the objection based on the provisions of section 14 (6). It was further found that the requirement of the present respondent was bona fide. Both the eviction applications were consequently decided in favour of the present respondent. Before the Additional Rent Controller, the only points that appeared to have been argued were that the husband, two sons, three daughters and the mother-in-law of the present respondent were not dependent members of her family and, therefore, eviction could not be ordered on that ground. The question of bona fides was also raised. The Rent Control Tribunal decided both these matters against the tenants. They have come up in appeal to this Court.

The first point that Mr. S.N. Chopra, the learned counsel for the tenants, has sought to raise is that according to the provisions contained in section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub-section (1) of section 14 on the grounds specified in clause (e), namely, personal requirement unless a period of 5 years had elapsed from the date of the acquisition. According to Mr. Chopra, the sale certificate was granted to the present respondent in the year 1961 and until a period of 5 years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition, it was not open to the respondent to ask for eviction on the ground that the premises were required bona fide for occupation as residence either for herself or for members of her family depending on her. Now, although this point was raised in the written statement by Jaswant Singh in clear words and was even adverted to by the Additional Rent Controller but before the Rent Control Tribunal neither in the grounds of appeal nor at the stage of arguments this point appears to have been raised or pressed. In these circumstances I do not consider that the question, though one of law, ought to be allowed to be raised at this stage. At any rate, it seems to me that there is not much force in the point. A Division Bench of this Court has held in Mst. Ranjit Kaur v. Harbel Singh (1963) 65 P.L.R. 1023, that where the conveyance deed specifically provided that the property was being transferred with effect from 1st October, 1955 by virtue of rule 34 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, the property would be deemed to have been transferred with effect from 1st October, 1955, although the conveyance deed in that case had been executed much later on 14th June, 196(sic). Although this question came up for consideration in a somewhat different context but clearly the view expressed was that the transfer should be deemed to have taken effect from the date which is mentioned in the deed of conveyance itself. In my opinion, this matter is covered by the Bench decision of this Court and the contention raised by Mr. Chopra cannot be acceded to.

The next point that has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the husband, the sons, the daughters and the mother-in-law of the respondent cannot be regarded to be dependent on her so as to attract the applicability of section 14(1)(e). It was stated by the husband of the respondent as A.W. 2 that the eldest son, who was 22 years of age at the time when the statement was recorded, was studying in B.A. and the second son aged 19 was studying in the Higher Secondary Classes. The daughters were aged 16, 15 and 13 and it was further stated by him that for purpose of residence all these persons were depending on the respondent. It has been held in C.L. Davar v. Amar Nath Kapur (1963) 64 P.L.R. 521, that the word "dependent" appearing in section 14(1)(e) cannot be construed as meaning nothing but wholly dependent in the sense not earning anything at all and being entirely dependent on the parent (in that case the father) for board, lodging and food. The term must be construed to mean somebody not wholly independent or self-supporting and in a position to set up separate residence. It has further been observed in that case that dependence may not in ail circumstances be entirely a matter of finance and this would particularly be so in the case of an unmarried daughter who may be employed, but in whose case for various reasons it would not be desirable for her to attempt to live away from her parents and on her own. In this view of the matter the Rent Control Tribunal was justified in considering and holding that the persons mentioned before were dependent on the respondent for residence. I can find no such error in the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal which can be said to raise substantial question of law on which a second appeal would lie.

Mr. Chopra has also sought to agitate the point of lack of bona fides on the part of the respondent in making the applications for eviction. It is contended by him that in 1959 certain other portion of the house in dispute fell vacant because of the eviction of the tenants there from and that the respondent allowed her sister and her husband to occupy the same as a tenant. It is further pointed out that the applications for fixation of standard rent were made only some time before the applications for eviction were filed and that these applications were filed after the rent had been fixed at a fairly high figure by mutual consent. The Additional Rent Controller as also the Rent Control Tribunal took into consideration all the relevant matters including the accommodation which is in possession of the respondent at present and the bona fide requirements of the members of her family and came to a conclusion in favour of the respondent. No substantial question of law can be said to arise on this finding.

In the result, the appeals are dismissed, but I make no order as. to costs. The appellants shall have three months for vacating the premises.