Jaswinder Kaur vs Harjinder Singh and another

V.S. Aggarwal, J. (Oral)

Petitioner seeks condonation of delay in filing of the criminal revision. Respondent was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, Faridkot on June 14, 1990. Petitioner claims that the delay in filing of revision which is of 3 years, 7 months and 4 days may be condoned because it is neither intentional nor deliberate. She pleads, inter alia, that it was made to understand by the prosecution that an appeal against acquittal would be filed. She was running from pillar to post but thereafter came to know that no appeal had been filed. On this ground, it was prayed that the delay in filing of revision may be condoned.

Notice of the application had been issued to the respondents.

Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relies upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353. In the cited case there was a land acquisition dispute pertaining to compensation in respect of acquisition of land for public purpose. The delay in filing of the appeal was of four days. The question that came up for consideration was as to what would be true meaning of expression "sufficient cause'' occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held :

".......The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiable liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :

Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

"Every day''s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour''s delay every second''s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, course of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice, being done because of a nondeliberate delay.

There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

In light of the above, one has to look back at the facts of the case in hand. In the present case it is not a delay of few days but the delay runs into years and as per the petitioner''s own case, the delay in filing of the revision is of 3 years, 7 months and 4 days. The sole ground taken tip is that she had been told that the appeal against acquittal would be filed.

Indeed, the assertions made by the petitioner are vague and indefinite. It is not known as to when she approached the authorities of the State to know if appeal against acquittal is to be filed or not and when he was told that such an appeal in due course would be filed. Most important aspect of the matter is that though it is not clear that she had in fact approached the authorities as to if the appeal is to be filed or not, but even if for sake of argument the said fact is admitted, the net result would be the same. In case there was any such fact disclosed to the petitioner, then after the period of limitation for filing the appeal came to an end, she could have approached the Court on an earlier occasion. Initially, in the present case the petitioner waited for years. on the face of it, such contention, indeed, cannot be accepted.

It is true that the line of thought is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be liberally construed to advance substantial justice. It would be difficult to define precisely the meaning of substantial cause or sufficient reason. To do that would in act crystalise a rigid definition that judicial power and discretion which the legislature has for the best of all reasons left undetermined and unfettered. The delay in filing the appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate the negligence of the party. It would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. Necessarily, the Court has to use the discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice but such discretion cannot be used where, after exercising due diligence, care and attention, the delay could have been avoided. Total inaction will not be a ground for condonation of delay or to show sufficient cause.

While it will not be appropriate for the petitioner on the assertions to explain each day''s delay but in the peculiar facts even the explanation for delay of months and years is not forthcoming in a prescribe manner. There is no sufficient cause for condonation of delay and, therefore, I find no reason to condone the delay. As a consequence thereto, the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed. Corollary would follow and revision petition also fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.