Jati Ranjan Banik vs The State of West Bengal

Sudip Ahluwalia, J.—This Revisional application has been preferred by the petitioner Dr. Jati Ranjan Banik, after he himself had filed the Complaint Case No. 420 of 2012 in the Court of the Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar, North 24 Parganas, U/Ss. 120B /307 /325 /326 /341 /34 of the IPC, against 6(six) accused persons who are the Opposite Parties in this revision.

The Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate after recording the statements of the complainant/petitioner and his other witnesses U/S 200 of the Cr.P.C. was of the view that a prima facie case against 5(five) accused persons was made out U/Ss/323 /506 /341 of the IPC, while no case was made out against 2(two) other accused persons namely Dr. Rupashree Bhattacharyya and Dr. Gour Mohan Chatterjee, who are the respondent Nos. 3 and 7 respectively in this revision. The complaint was therefore dismissed by the Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate as against those 2(two) accused persons. The petitioner/complainant is not only aggrieved with the dismissal of the complaint against those 2(two) accused persons, but also with the observation that a prima facie case was made out only U/Ss. 323 /506 and 341 of the IPC against the remaining accused persons, and not under the other Sections disclosed in the petition of the complaint, including the offence U/S 307 of the IPC, which is Triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions.

The contention of the petitioner is that the Ld. Magistrate had no authority to meticulously consider the evidence led U/S 200 of the Cr.P.C. when the offence Triable by the Court of Sessions was attracted, and so issuance of process by excluding that particular Section was illegal. He has therefore approached this Court for having the impugned summoning order to be set aside and for a direction on the Ld. Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Sessions in relation to all the accused persons named in the complaint.

The revision has been contested on behalf of the Opposite Party Nos. 2 and 3, who filed their in Affidavits-in-opposition. They have prayed not only for dismissing the revision, but also for quashing the proceedings of the complaint case pending in the Ld. Court below. According to them the complaint is not maintainable in as much as already an FIR was lodged earlier by the petitioner''s own wife with the Officer-in-Charge of the North Bidhannagar P.S. against all the Opposite Parties and another, in respect of the self same incident of 10th July, 2007, which is the subject matter of the present complaint case. The aforesaid FIR No. 104 lodged on 23.06.2008 was drawn up U/Ss. 341 /325 and 34 of the IPC. After completion of investigation a charge-sheet under those very offences was submitted against the accused persons. The complainant/petitioner''s wife thereafter filed an application for further investigation on the ground that the offence U/S 307 of the IPC should also have been included in the charge-sheet. But the Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected the prayer for further investigation on the 25th of June, 2010. Such order of rejection was however not challenged by the petitioner or his wife, who was the de-facto complainant in the FIR, on account of which the same attained its finality.

The accused persons, who are the present opposite parties were subsequently discharged by the Ld. Magistrate after a prayer to that effect was made on their on behalf. The relevant order of discharge was passed by the Ld. Court below on 7th January, 2011. The petitioner''s wife challenged the aforesaid order of discharge by way of CRR 2002 of 2011, which was however dismissed by this Court on 18.05.2011. She thereafter preferred an Appeal by way of a Special Leave Petition (Criminal Case No. 6121 of 2011) in the Supreme Court of India, which was dismissed on 16.09.2011. Subsequently the review petition (Cr.) No. 173 of 2012 filed by her against the aforesaid dismissal of the SLP was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 18.4.2012.

It was only thereafter that the petitioner filed the complaint in the Ld. Court below six months later, on 17.10.2012, in respect of the self same occurrence. As such according to the Opposite Parties, when the accused persons have already been discharged after a full-fledged investigation and such order has been affirmed even by the Highest Court of the land, the second complaint filed against them at a belated stage after more than five years is palpably frivolous and non-maintainable, on account of which it deserves to be quashed out right.

On the other hand the assertion of the complainant/petitioner is that the investigation conducted in the previous FIR case was biased and ineffective, and in the circumstances he is well within his right to lodge a private complaint subsequently in order to ensure that the offenders do not go unpunished.

It has also been asserted on his behalf that the scope of this revision is restricted to the legality and propriety of the impugned order of cognizance which was taken by the Ld. Magistrate after a rather meticulous evaluation of the evidence led under section 200 Cr. P.C., which he was not empowered to do in respect of any "Sessions Triable" offence(s), if made out in the complaint. As such according to the petitioner there is no scope for this Court to quash the complaint itself, as sought for on behalf of the opposite parties.

In the given circumstances, the following questions have emerged for determination before this Court:--

"(1) Whether the Ld. Magistrate acted with illegality or material irregularity by meticulously examining the evidence led U/S 200 Cr.P.C., even though an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions was allegedly made out therein?

(2) Whether this Court can at all entertain the contentions raised on behalf of the opposite parties when the grievance of the petitioner/complainant is restricted to the order of cognizance and issuance of process by the Ld. Magistrate after excluding the relevant Sessions Triable offence made out?

(3) Whether the subsequent complaint filed in the Ld. Court below should be allowed to continue, after the same accused persons had already been discharged in the earlier FIR case in respect of the self-same occurrence.?"

After considering the submissions raised on behalf of the contesting sides in the light of the decisions cited by them, the observations and decisions of this Court in relation to the aforesaid three questions are put on record in the succeeding paragraphs.

Question (1):-- In Sanjay Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the Supreme Court observed -

"3. Secondly, it is not open to the committal court to launch on a process of satisfy itself that a prima facie case has been made out on the merits. The jurisdiction once vested in him under the earlier Code has been eliminated now under the present Code. Therefore, to hold that he can go into the merits even for a prima facie satisfaction is to frustrate the Parliament''s purpose in re-mouldings. 207-A (old Code) into its present non-discretionary shape. Expedition was intended by this change and this will be defeated successfully if interpretatively we hold that a dress rehearsal of a trial before the Magistrate is in order. In our view, the narrow inspection hole through which the committing Magistrate has to look at the case limits him merely to ascertain whether the case, as disclosed by the police report, appears to the Magistrate to show an offence triable solely by the Court of Session. Assuming the facts to be correct as stated in the police report, if the offence is plainly one under s. 201 I.P.C. the Magistrate has simply to commit for trial ''before the Court of Sessions. if, by error, a wrong section of the Penal Code is quoted, he may look into that aspect."

In "Kewal Krishna v. Suraj Bhan and Anr." reported in Cr.L.J. 1989 P. 2153 the Supreme Court observed -

"9. In the instant case, there was prima facie evidence against Suraj Bhan accused which required to be weighed and appreciated by the Court of Session. At the stage of Sections 203 and 204 , Criminal Procedure Code in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 , Criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge leveled against the accused. All that he has to see is whether or not there is "sufficient ground for proceeding" against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinising the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. This Court has held in Ramesh Singh''s case (ibid), that even at the stage of framing; charges the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the complainant produces or proposes to adduce at the trial, is not to be meticulously judged."

The above decisions of the Supreme Court were followed in Makool Khan Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , in which the decision of a Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court was -

"7. This Court in Nunaram and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, had occasion to deal in similar situation. After discussing various judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court, it was indicated thus (para 20)-

In this behalf, suffice is to lend support from the decision in Kewal Krishan Vs. Suraj Bhan and Another, :. At the stage of Sections 203 and 204 , Cr. P. C. in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202 , Cr. P. C. there is prima facie evidence in support of the allegations made against the accused; and whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial Magistrate/Judge. Even, the Magistrate is debarred from scrutinising the evidence because the standard to be adopted by him in doing so is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. The stage of framing charges in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions arises within the competence of the Court of Sessions and not the Magistrate before whom the complainant or police report is filed. That apart, as held in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, , even at the stage of framing charges the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the complainant produces or proposes to adduce at the trial, is not to be meticulously judged. Moreover, Section 209 , Cr. P. C. itself dispenses with the inquiry preliminary to commitment in cases triable exclusively by a Court of Session, irrespective of whether such a case is instituted on a criminal complaint or a police report. In my considered view, in such cases the preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate is restricted to find out whether or not the evidence collected in the preliminary inquiry discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. The Magistrate before whom any complaint or police report is filed, lacks inherent jurisdiction to launch on a process of satisfying himself that a prima facie case has been made out on the merits. Thus if the Magistrate is allowed to go into the merits even for a prima facie satisfaction, it would be an act to frustrate the Parliament''s purpose in remoulding Section 207-A (old Code) into its present non-discretionary shape. Thus, by change in the scheme under the new Code, the scope of preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate before whom the police report or complaint is filed, has been made subject to narrow inspection through which he (Committing Magistrate) has only to look at the case merely to ascertain whether the case, as disclosed by the police report or the complaint appears to him to show an offence triable solely by the Court of Session. I lend the view from the decision in Sanjay Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In this view of the matter, it is not open to the subordinate Magistrate before whom the complaint or police report is filed to launch on a process of satisfying that a prima facie case has been made out on the merits, if the case is triable by the Court of Session."

In view of the position of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it follows that the Ld. Magistrate was not justified in coming to the view that only the offences under Sections 323 /506 /341 of the IPC were attracted, since he appears to have studied the evidence led under Section 200 rather meticulously, which was not permissible when there was an allegation regarding commission of an offence triable by the Court of Sessions. As such, this question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the petitioner.

Question (2):-- Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. grants an inherent power to a High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore when the petitioner has sought a particular relief against the opposite parties/accused persons in the context of any particular order passed in the course of a complaint filed by him, the hands of this Court cannot be tied for the limited purpose of considering only the grievance raised by the petitioner, and not what the opposite parties might have to say against the sustainability of the original complaint itself. Undoubtedly once notice of the revisional application is issued on the opposite parties, it presupposes that they are to be heard on all such issues which they might raise in relation to maintainability of the basic proceeding which has given rise to the revision, even though the grievance of the petitioner himself is limited to a particular order alone. This question is therefore also answered in the affirmative.

Question (3):-- The submission of the opposite parties in this regard is that the complaint should be quashed in view of the fact that already an FIR was lodged in respect of the selfsame occurrence by the petitioner''s wife. After submission of chargesheet, the Ld. Magistrate had rejected that complainant''s prayer for further investigation for the purpose of inclusion of the offence under Section 307 of the IPC in the chargesheet. Such order was never challenged before any forum and therefore became final. Subsequently the charges against the opposite parties/accused were dropped after hearing and on consideration of the material available on record. The revision preferred against such discharge was dismissed by the High Court, the SLP preferred against the High Court''s decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court, and the review petition against such dismissal was also dismissed. The complainant/petitioner thereafter filed the complaint on the same set of allegations more than five years after the alleged occurrence. The opposite parties therefore contend that such complaint is not sustainable on the same set of allegations, as nothing new has transpired to justify a fresh complaint after the first proceeding was terminated in favour of the accused.

On the other hand the submission of the petitioner is that there is no legal bar to filing of a fresh complaint even after the accused might be discharged in any previous proceeding, and the order of discharge is upheld by the superior Court. In fine, the contention of the petitioner is that the principle of "double jeopardy" under section 300 is applicable only in the case of an "acquittal or conviction" after a regular trial, and not where the accused is simply "discharged" in any proceeding. The citations placed on behalf of the petitioner in this regard are discussed in the following paragraphs.

In "Rama Sharma v. Pinki Sharma" reported in Cr.L.J. 1989 2153, the Patna High Court had observed -

"16. A discharge does not amount to acquittal because a discharge is at the stage of enquiry, whereas an acquittal is at the stage of final hearing when the entire evidence is adduced by the parties with examination and cross-examination of the witnesses. A discharge can be by a police officer when he does not send up the accused during the investigation and puts his name in col. 2 of the charge-sheet. An accused can be discharged under Section 203 , Cr. P.C. when no prima facie case is made out and the Court does not issue notice. Section 300 , Cr. P.C. provides that if a person who has once been convicted or acquitted cannot be tried for the same offence. But this bar does not apply when a complaint is dismissed or accused is discharged as both of them are not acquittal for the purposes of this case.

Thus from all these it appears that even a person who has been discharged in any manner as mentioned above comes under the clutches of Section 319 , Cr. P.C. if in the opinion of the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge it appears from the evidence during the trial after framing of the charge that the discharged accused has committed the offence. Thus the discharge does not give a benefit to a person even if the discharge has been affirmed by the superior Court or the charge against the said persons has already been quashed. Therefore following the said observations of the Supreme Court referred to above and the Full Bench and Division Bench cases of this Court and agreeing with the findings given by the learned single Judge of the Gujarat High Court I, with great respect and regret, disagree with the above mentioned observations of the learned single Judge in the case of Radhe Shyam Mishra v. State of UP. 1986 All LJ 1341 (supra) and I hold that the Court has got power to proceed Under Section 319 , Cr. P.C. against a person even if he has been discharged."

In "Malti Ghosh v. State" reported in Crimes 1987-2-Page 284, the decision of a single Judge of this Court was -

"2. The petitioner who is one of the accused of the above case has challenged the fresh issuing of process against the present petitioner and others on the selfsame petition of complaint filed on 16.12.1985 after the first complaint on the same facts filed in 1982 ended in the discharge of the accused on 8.10.1985 on the ground of cognizance not having taken validly......It is contended that when the first complaint was found to be illegal on the ground that the cognizance of the offence was not validly taken the fresh complaint on the same facts was quite maintainable and second complaint cannot be quashed......

I have carefully perused on record of the case. I have seen the order dated 8.10.1985. As the parties agreed that the cognizance was not validly taken the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate discharged the present petitioner and others from the bail bond. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate however fixed a date for the opposite party No. 2 to take steps in the matter. But after discharging the accused no such order could be passed. However, a fresh complaint was filed on 16.12.1985. the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued a process against several accused including the petitioner under S. 498 /109 of the IPC. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has produced before me the decision of Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. V. Arun Kumar Dhar. It has been held in that decision that when the cognizance of the first complaint was held to be illegally taken and the accused were discharged, a second complaint lodged on the selfsame facts even after the period of limitation was entertainable. On behalf of the opposite party No. 2 no decision could be cited that in such circumstances second complaint cannot be filed. So when admittedly the accused was discharged from the first case on the ground that the cognizance had not been validly taken of second complaint on 16.12.1985 could be entertained by the learned Magistrate.....

In the circumstance I am not of the view that the Criminal proceeding which was initiated against present petitioner on the second complaint filed on 16/12/1985 is liable to be quashed...."

On the other hand the opposite parties have cited certain decisions to the contrary. In Pramatha Nath Taluqdar Vs. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, it was observed by the Supreme Court -

"48. An order of dismissal under s. 203 , Criminal Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e.g, where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interests of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquired into. Allah Ditta v. Karam Baksh (1), Ram Narain Chaubey v. Panachand Jain (2),Hansabai v. Ananda (3), Doraisami v. Subramania (4). In regard to the adducing of new facts for the bringing of a fresh complaint the Special Bench in the judgment under appeal did not accept the view of the Bombay High Court or the Patna High Court in cases above quoted and adopted the opinion of Macleam, C. J. in Queen Empress v. Dolegobinda Das (5) affirmed by a full Bench in Dwarka Nath Mandal v. Benimadhab Banerji (6). It held therefore that a fresh complaint can be entertained where there is manifest error, or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous order or when fresh evidence is forthcoming.

In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the bringing of the fresh complaint is a gross abuse of the process of the Court and is not with the object of furthering the interests of justice."

In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh Vs. Kali Singh, it was held =

"4.......We are, however, unable to agree with this contention because there was no fresh complaint and it is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out. This has been held by this Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar(1). For these reasons therefore, the appeal is allowed...."

In Punjab National Bank and others Vs. Surendra Prasad Sinha, the decision was -

"5. It is also salutary to note that judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needles harassment. The complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence against the juristic person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued. At that stage the court would be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process lest it would be an instrument in the hands of the private complaint as vendetta to harass the persons needlessly. Vindication of majesty of justice and maintenance of law and order in the society are the prime objects of criminal justice but it would not be the means to wreak personal vengeance. Considered from any angle we find that the respondent had abused the process and laid complaint against all the appellants without any prima facie case to harass them for vendetta."

In Poonam Chand Jain and Another Vs. Fazru, the Supreme Court observed-

"8. The learned Judge posed the question as to what would be those exceptional circumstances. Noticing the decisions in Queen Empress v. Dolegobinda Dass, ((1901) ILR 28 Cal 211 ), In re : Koyassan Kutty, ( , AIR 1918 Mad 494) , Kumariah Naicker and Others Vs. Chinna Naicker, , and several other decisions, the learned Judge came to the conclusion : "It will be noticed that in the test thus laid down the exceptional circumstances are brought under three categories; (1) manifest error, (2) manifest miscarriage of justice, and (3) new facts which the complainant had no knowledge of or could not with reasonable diligence have brought forward in the previous proceedings. Any exceptional circumstances coming within any one or more of the aforesaid three categories would fulfil the test. In Ram Narain Chaubey Vs. Panachand Jain, it was observed that an exhaustive list of the exceptional circumstances could not be given though some of the categories were mentioned. One new category mentioned was where the previous order of dismissal was passed on an incomplete record or a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint. This new category would perhaps fall within the category of manifest error or miscarriage of justice.

It appears to me that the test laid down in the earliest of the aforesaid decisions. Queen Empress v. Dolegobinda Dass is really wide enough to cover the other categories mentioned in the later decisions. Whenever a Magistrate is satisfied that the previous order of dismissal was due to a manifest error or has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, he can entertain a second complaint on the same allegations even though an earlier complaint was dismissed under S. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure..."

Yet again in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh Vs. Kali Singh, this Court followed Pramatha Nath Talukdar''s case (supra) holding:--

"..... It is now well-settled that a second complaint can lie only on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out..."

The Bombay High Court in Hansabai Sayaji Payagude Vs. Ananda Ganuji Payagude, had held -

"2. It is now well-settled that the discharge of an accused person does not operate as a bar to the institution of fresh criminal proceedings against him for the same offence, and that it is competent for a Magistrate to entertain another complaint on the same facts and to enquire again into the case against the accused. (See In Re: Mahadev Laxman Satardekar, , Emperor Vs. Amanat Kadar, and Alimahomed Joosab Vs. Kasturchand Balabhai Jhaveri, The Third Class Magistrate, Haveli, was, therefore, competent to entertain the third complaint brought by the complainant against the accused. Section 203 , Criminal Procedure Code, provides that the Magistrate before whom a complaint is made may dismiss the complaint, if after considering the statement of the complainant and the result of the investigation or inquiry under Section, if any, there is, in his judgment, no sufficient ground for proceeding. In coming to a decision whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint, the Magistrate must take into consideration previous proceedings, if any. Where an accused person has been discharged after consideration of all the evidence produced by the complainant, and a fresh prosecution is instituted thereafter on the same facts, the Magistrate cannot be said to have sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint unless he is satisfied that some additional evidence is forthcoming, of which the complainant was not previously aware or which it was not within his power to produce in the previous trial, or that there has been manifest error apparent on the face of the record or manifest miscarriage of justice. It cannot be said to be in the interests of justice that a party who has obtained a decision from a Court after a full consideration of his case should be given an opportunity to seek from the same Court or another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction a different decision on the same facts and on the same evidence. The proper remedy for the complainant, who is dissatisfied with an order of discharge passed under Section 253(7) , is to move the superior Court to set it aside and order further enquiry in the case under Section 436 , Criminal Procedure Case. For, otherwise it would be open, to a complainant to file a series of complaints on the same facts, a new complaint being brought as soon as or shortly after the accused has been discharged in the previous case, and thus continue indefinitely the harassment of the accused.

(Emphasis added).

The complaint in the present case was filed in the year 2012, more than five years after the date of the alleged occurrence. In the meantime the petitioner was privy to all the proceedings starting from the first FIR lodged by his wife in 2008. He was admittedly one of the witnesses questioned during investigation, and at no stage he himself thought it fit to intervene in case he entertained any misgivings regarding the fairness of the investigation in spite of being the actual victim. He continued to watch the proceedings from the Magistrate''s Court to the High Court and right up to the Supreme Court after the accused persons were discharged, and the discharge was upheld by all the fora including the Highest Court of the land, which even went to the extent of rejecting the review petition filed by the de facto complainant, who is his own wife, and also a qualified Doctor in her own right. After having all those remedies exhausted, the petitioner again chose to file his complaint on the selfsame cause of action several years after the date of the alleged occurrence. It is verified from the list of witnesses in his complaint that all of them had been questioned during the course of investigation. In fact during the investigation two additional witnesses had also been examined, whose names now do not figure in the subsequent complaint.

It also not in dispute that as far back as on the 3rd of August 2007, the respondent number 2 had filed a petition under section 156(3) Cr. PC, on the basis of which the North Bidhan Nagar PS Case number 104 of that date was drawn up under Sections 420 /467 /471 /477A /406 /120 B of the IPC read with Section 7 of the West Bengal Clinical Establishments Act, 1950, in which both the petitioner and his wife (De-facto complainant in the previous complaint) were the accused. The petitioner was arrested in connection with that case and remained in custody for more than two months till he was finally released on bail by an order of the Supreme Court. Charge sheet in that case was submitted against the petitioner and his wife after investigation in the month of December 2007. He subsequently challenged the same and those proceedings are now stayed. His wife thereafter lodged the first complaint against the opposite parties more than six months after the chargesheet was submitted against her and her husband. In these circumstances an element of "vendetta" as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of "Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Surendra Prasad Sinha" (supra) would appear to palpably appear to exist considering that the first complaint was filed by the petitioner''s wife an year after the alleged occurrence, and more than six months after submission of chargesheet against her and her husband i.e., the petitioner, who had in the meantime remained in custody for more than two months.

The petitioner now harps upon the application of the offence under section 307 IPC even though the specific prayer for inclusion of the same offence in the previous FIR lodged by his wife was rejected by the Magistrate by a reasoned order on 25.6.2010, and such order of rejection was never challenged in any superior forum. Further, after discharge of the accused persons in that particular case, the petitioner''s wife challenged the order of discharge in this Court. But her revisional application was dismissed. The SLP preferred against that dismissal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, and even the review application preferred was rejected by the Supreme Court. Even assuming academically that the investigation in the FIR was not conducted fairly or properly, still the concerned Courts had clearly gone through all the material on record, as also any additional documents or material which would have been available with the petitioner or his wife, and only then dismissed the revision as well as the subsequent SLP. It is not the case that the petitioner now has come across any new material, or any new facts in support of his complaint have emerged, which were not already available or known earlier. As such none of the conditions in which a fresh complaint can be filed, as enunciated in the decisions of the Supreme Court in "Pramatha Nath Talukdar & Anr. v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar" and "Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru" (supra) are fulfilled the present case.

The decision in "Rama Sharma v. Pinki Sharma" (supra) relied upon by the petitioner is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In that decision it was held that an already discharged accused can be tried again if any material emerges later on under Section 319 of the of the Cr.P.C., i.e., in the course of an actual trial. But there is absolutely no application of Section 319 in this case as the opposite parties are now sought to be prosecuted in a fresh complaint, and no material has emerged against them during any pending trial.

Again the decision in "Malti Ghosh v. State" (supra) does not help the petitioner. In that particular case the material point was that cognizance had not been validly taken in the earlier complaint which had led the accused to be discharged, and both the contesting sides had agreed that such cognizance was not in accordance with law. As such there was no bar to filing of a fresh complaint. But in the present case, the opposite parties were discharged on merits on the basis of the available material on record, and not on account of the cognizance having been taken invalidly or illegally.

To sum up therefore, this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the complaint filed by the petitioner is not sustainable in the eyes of law. It is a visibly belated and motivated outcome of grudge and vendetta arising out of the unhappy chain of events pertaining to the earlier implication of the petitioner and his wife in a criminal case, and his prolonged detention, as already taken note of in paragraph 26. Its continuation would clearly be an abuse of the process of Court. The answer to this question is therefore in the negative, i.e., against the petitioner.

Now the question arises whether this Court can quash the proceedings of the complaint case even though no independent revisional application has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties for that purpose? As already noted in deciding the Question(2) earlier, the inherent powers vested in this Court under section 482 authorise it to make such orders "as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

In Cricket Association of Bengal and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, , the Supreme Court had observed -

"16. We accordingly hold that the Division Bench was not justified in interfering with the orders dated March 20, and June 8, 1967 passed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, in the circumstances of this case. We, however, make it clear that we have no doubt that in proper cases the High Court can take action suo moto against the orders passed by the subordinate courts-without being moved by any party."

As such there is clearly no bar for the High Court to quash any pending criminal proceeding/complaint even in the absence of any formal prayer or application for that purpose. Of course, such power has to be exercised only when warranted to prevent the abuse of the Court''s process, or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. As already observed earlier, continuation of the complaint would clearly be an abuse of the process of Court.

The revisional application is therefore rejected and proceedings of the Complainant Case No. 420 of 2012 in the Court of the Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar, North 24 Parganas are now ordered to be quashed with immediate effect.

Later:

On prayer of learned counsel for the petitioners let Photostat plain copy of this Judgment, duly countersigned, by Assistant Court Officer be given to the petitioner on usual undertakings.