Jatin Patel vs State Of Madhya Pradesh & Anr

The petitioner has filed this petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C originally seeking quashment of FIR in connection with crime No.261/2018 registered by Police Station Kotwali District-Khandwa against the petitioner for having committed offence under sections 383, 385, 294 & 506-II of IPC and further proceeding thereon.

According to the case of prosecution, on 27.3.2019 the complainant lodged a written report at Police Station Kotwali Khandwa alleging that the accused persons, namely Gopal & Jagannath are causing mental pressure on the complainant for purchase of an insurance policy from the Bajaj Allianz, though he is not in position to buy the policies, present petitioner-being one of the friends of aforesaid accused persons, is also involved in commission of the offence of extortion. On that FIR the aforesaid offence against the petitioner is registered.

It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the allegations levelled against him are false and frivolous and the petitioner is falsely implicated in the present case due to his presence in the place of incident. The complainant has also filed an objection/application before the Trial Court to cite the present applicant as a prosecution witness and in the statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C, no allegations have been made against the present applicant. It is further submitted that after about 5 months from the date of lodging of the report, merely on surmises, the name of the present petitioner has been foisted in commission of the alleged offence. It is submitted that the applicant is a reputed businessman of the locality and has no criminal antecedent against him.

It is further averred in the petition that the parties have entered into a compromise and the complainant has made an application to cite the present petitioner as a prosecution witness. It is submitted that in State Of Haryana And Ors. vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors AIR 1992 SC 604, the Apex Court has laid down certain conditions and principles which have to be taken into consideration and if no offence is made out and the re-investigation and registration of the offence is tainted and has been initiated merely to wreak vengeance, therefore, the proceedings ought to have quashed in this petition. Learned Senior Counsel also invited my attention to the principle laid down in the case of Anita Maria Dias v. State of Maharashtra 2018 (3) SCC 290. He further invited attention of this Court in the order passed in M.Cr.C.No.1024/2018 and in M.Cr.C.No.31777/2018, wherein the Hon'ble Courts have quashed the entire proceedings. On the aforesaid grounds, learned Senior Counsel prayed that the FIR lodged against the petitioner be quashed.

Learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State has opposed the prayer for quashment of FIR stating that applicant has a right to raise all the grounds raised herein, at the stage of defence during trial. Therefore, the petition has no substance and it be dismissed.

I.A. No.1005/2019 and I.A. No.1007/2019, applications under Sections 320(2) and 320(5) CrPC have been moved by the respective parties for disposal of the present petition under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties. Vide order dated 23.1.2019, the matter was sent to the Registrar (J-II) for verification and recording of the factum of compromise between the parties. The Registrar (J-II) has submitted a verification report dated 1. 2.2019 stating therein that the parties have voluntarily entered into a compromise. The statements of the parties recorded before the Registrar are annexed with the verification report, which reads as under :

"...... In view of this stand of the complainant Umesh Mishra, I am satisfied that a compromise has taken place between parties appeared today i.e., on 01.02.2019 voluntarily without any force, compulsion, pressure, inducement or fraud. Therefore, this compromise is verified only between parties appeared today before the undersigned."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anita Maria Dias & another Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors 2018 (3) SCC 290 in Paragraph-7 has held under :

"7. In a case like this, where the proceedings are still at initial and nascent stage, the High Court should have exercised its discretion in quashing the proceedings. Law in this behalf is well settled by catena of judgments of this Court including Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2017) 9 SCC 641 and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303. We may also quote the following passage from the case of Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.(2014) 6 SCC 466:

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in 1 (2017) 9 SCC 641 2 (2012) 10 SCC 303 3 (2014) 6 SCC 466 the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

On consideration of the above legal and factual position and on consideration of the fact, it seems that in this case the proceeding is still in initial stage, the matter is still under investigation, charge-sheet has not been filed against the present petitioner. The offences registered against the present petitioner does not come under the offences of murder, rape, decoity etc. Though the offence is not compoundable but Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of V.S.Joshi Vs. State of Haryana 2003 (4) SCC 675 & Nikhil Merchant Vs. CBI & Another 2008 (9) SCC 677 has held that on the basis of compromise even in non-compoundable offences, if the parties want to withdraw all claims and allegations against each other, then technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way. In the present case, the complainant does not want to proceed against the present petitioner. The grievances of the complainant have been satisfied, therefore, no useful purpose will be served looking to the compromise reached between the present petitioner and the complainant in continuing FIR and proceedings against the present petitioner.

Consequently, the FIR against the present petitioner in Crime No.261/2018 registered at Police Station City Kotwali Khandwa for having committed offence under Sections 383, 385, 294 & 506-II of IPC and proceedings against the present petitioner in the above matter are hereby quashed.

Accordingly, the present petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C is disposed of in above terms.