Jatinder Aggarwal vs State of Punjab

P.K. Jain, J.

This petition has been filed under sections 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ''the Code'') for quashing the complaint dated 11.12.1990 (Annexure P.1) and the summoning order dated 21.2.1991 (Annexure P.2), passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Mansa.

The facts necessary for the disposal of this petition are that Vinod Kumar, respondent No. 2 herein, has filed a complaint under section 323/504/34, I.P.C., against the petitioners and their father Om Parkash Aggarwal. It has been alleged in the complaint that on account of business transactions certain amount is due from M/s Raman Trading Co., Bhatinda, of which the petitioners and their father are the partners. The complainant along with his father Ram Pal had been going to the firm of the petitioners many times to ask for the money and due to this fact the petitioners and their father had borne a grudge against him. On 9.12.1990 at about 11.00 a.m., the complainant was waiting for a bus at Bus Stand, Budhlada. The accused persons came to the spot and on seeing him, became aggressive and exhorted that since he was all alone, they would teach a lesson to him for asking about the money. Immediately thereafter, they caught hold of him by neck and gave slaps and fist blows to him and also hurled filthy abuses. In the meanwhile, Parmod Kumar and Dharam Pal, both residents of Mansa, happened to reach there who got him released from the accused persons. The complainant went to Police Station Budhlada but the police refused to take any action against the accused persons. Hence the complaint.

In support of his complaint, the complainant examined three witnesses including himself in his preliminary evidence. The Judicial Magistrate, Sunam on the basis of the averments made in the complaint read with the preliminary evidence recorded in support thereof, summoned the petitioner and their father to face trial under sections 323/504/34, I.P.C.

It has been alleged in the present petition that the petitioners have been carrying on cotton business at Bhatinda under the name and style of M/s Raman Trading Co. During the course of business they entered into an agreement for purchase of 50 bales of cotton on 23.3.1990 at the rate of Rs. 520/ per maund with Sh. Ram Pal, father of the complainant, a partner in the firm M/s Aggarwal Cotton Ginning and Dall Industries, Mansa. A dispute arose between the parties regarding the payment of money in respect of this deal. M/s Aggarwal Cotton Ginning and Dall Industries, Mansa filed a complaint under sections 206/420/421/422, I.P.C., against the petitioners, their father Om Parkash Aggarwal and Kamla Rani in the Court of S.D.J.M., Mansa, on 23.7.1990. After recording preliminary evidence in support of that complainant, the S.D.J.M. by his order 13.1.1990 (Annexure P.3) dismissed the complaint with a finding that no prima facie case for summoning the accused for the said offence was made out. It has been alleged that the father of the complainant, to put pressure on the petitioners to settle the civil dispute, has coined the present complaint through his son, that all the allegations in the complaint are false and frivolous, that the petitioners are residents of Bhatinda and the occurrence is alleged to have taken at Bus Stand, Budhlada, which falls within the jurisdiction of Courts at Mansa and thus evidently the complaint has been filed to cause inconvenience and harassment to the petitioners to attend Court at Mansa. It has also been alleged that the present complaint and the summoning order are an abuse of the process of law and liable to be quashed.

Notice was given to the respondents. Respondent No. 2 has filed a written statement. It has been stated by him that the present petition is not maintainable and the petitioners would be discharged or acquitted if no case is made out against them. He has reiterated the allegations made by him in his complaint and has stated that the trial Magistrate has issued the summoning order after perusing the evidence produced by him in support of his complaint. The allegations of mala fide levelled by the petitioners have been denied.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.

Shri A.P.S Deol, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued that admittedly there was a dispute between the petitioners and their father on the one hand and M/s Aggarwal Cotton Ginning and Dall Industries, Mansa, of which father of the present complainant is a partner, on the other, regarding nonpayment of certain amount in respect of an agreement to purchase certain bales of cotton. It has been further argued that to put pressure and harass the petitioners and their father, a criminal complaint No. 67 dated 23.7.1990, under sections 206/420/421/422, I.P.C., was filed in the Court of S.D.J.M., Mansa, which was dismissed vide order dated 23.11.1990 (Annexure P.3) at the initial stage. The learned counsel has further argued that having failed in their illegal attempt to use coercive measures, respondent No. 2 was put forward and the present complaint (Annexure P.1) was filed on the false and frivolous allegations with same oblique object. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel that there could be no occasion for the petitioners to go to Budhlada on the alleged date, nor it is probable for any of the alleged two witnesses of Mansa to be present at Bus Stand, Budhlada, at the alleged time of occurrence. It has also been pointed out that had respondent No. 2 been given beatings by the petitioners and their father, in the manner as alleged, the complainant would have immediately rushed to the hospital for his medical examination which could have been the best evidence in support of the allegations contained in the complaint. It has been argued that the earlier complaint was dismissed on 13.11.1990 and the present complaint was manipulated on 11.12.1990. The learned counsel has, thus, urged that the complaint being false and frivolous and having been filed with an oblique motive, is liable to be quashed.

On the other hand Sh. D.D. Sharma, Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has argued that this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code to quash the complaint, and the petitioners should be relegated to their remedy before the trial Magistrate. In support of this plea, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on the decision of the apex Court in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and another, 1992 Cri. L.J. 3779, and a judgment of this Court rendered in Bachan Singh and another v. Smt. Harpreet Kaur, 1996(2) R.C.C. 6. It has been further argued by the learned counsel that at this stage the Court is concerned with the allegations made in the complaint and the preliminary evidence produced in support thereof and should not interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Magistrate in summoning the petitioners and their father to face trial in the complaint case.

I have considered the respective arguments.

In Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 709, the apex Court expounded the law regarding the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code by the High Court in such like matter as under:

"The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and whether in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceedings even though it may be at a preliminary stage."

After a review of the entire case law available on the subject and examining the various provisions of the Code and the Constitution of India, their Lordships of the Supreme Court of India in a well known judgment rendered in State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, A.I.R. 1992 Supreme Court 604, illustrated certain categories of cases wherein a Court in exercise of its powers under section 482 of the Code or in exercise of their extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can quash a first information report or a complaint, Categories Nos. (5) and (7) read as under :

"(5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach at just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding it maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wraking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

Thus, where a criminal proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive or where the allegations made in the complaint are absurd and inherently improbable, this Court would be within its powers to quash the complaint.

Turning to the case in hand, the special feature pointed out in the petition as well as at the Bar by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners and their father are carrying on cotton business as partners under the name and style of M/s Raman Trading Co. They had entered into an agreement for the purchase of 50 bales of cotton from M/s Aggarwal Cotton Ginning and Dall Industries, Mansa, on 23.3.1990. Shri Ram Pal, father of the complainantrespondent No. 2 herein, is admittedly a partner in the latter firm. A complaint was filed against the petitioners, their father and one another by M/s Aggarwal Cotton Ginning and Dall Industries, Mansa, through their partner Vinod Kumar son of Labhu Ram, for the offences under sections 206/420/421/422, I.P.C. Preliminary evidence was recorded in support of that complaint. Thereafter, the S.D.J.M., Mansa, dismissed that complaint by order dated 13.11.1990 (Annexure P.3). These facts have not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent at the Bar. The impugned complaint was filed immediately thereafter on 11.12.1990 against those very accused although the scene of occurrence and the offences have been changed. If there had been any truth in the allegations contained in the complaint, the complainantrespondent No. 2, must have got himself medically examined in respect of the alleged injuries received by him. Further, the two eye witnesses cited by the complainant do not belong to Budhlada but are the residents of Mansa, where the complainant and his father reside. Still further the nature of the allegations made in the complaint appear to be highly absurd and improbable. Such like story can be concocted every moment with an oblique motive. It appears that the present complaint has been maliciously instituted, after the dismissal of the earlier complaint, to settle the civil dispute with the petitioners. To my mind, the circumstances of the case reveal that the allegations made in the complaint are so absurd that no reasonable man would ever accept the same. Present one is one of those fit cases where the High Court must exercise its powers under section 482 of the code for quashing the complaint and the subsequent proceedings thereon.

Consequently, this petition is allowed. The complaint dated 11.12.1990 (Annexure P.1) and the summoning order dated 21.2.1991 (Annexure P.2) passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Mansa, are hereby quashed.