Jaya Pandey and Others vs Nirmal Kumar Singh and Others

Radha Mohan Prasad, J.—This appeal by the claimants is decocted against the judgment and award dated 4th June, 1999 passed by 3rd Additional Motor Vehicle Accident Claim Tribunal, Bhagalpur in Claim Case No. 27 of 1998

Briefly stating the facts are that one Alok Kumar Pandey son of Hari Narain Pandey, resident of Indumati Path, Vikramshila Nagar, Kahalgaon died in motor accident on 9.10.1997 due to rash and negligent driving of the Bus bearing registration No. BR-10 A 8035 on way to Hospital. The wife, minor children and mother of the deceased claimed compensation of Rs. 7,84,168/- u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'' for his death. The deceased was aged about 33 years and was a Government servant earning Rs. 4282/- per month and according to the claimants there was bright prospect of promotion of the deceased. The Bus was owned by Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 was the Driver. Respondent Nos. 3, and 4 are Insurer of the Bus. The owner and the Insurer appeared and filed separate written statement contesting the claim. In support of their case the parties led evidence and the Tribunal on consideration of the same has awarded compensation of Rs. 4,17,600/- besides Rs. 10,000/- as loss of consortium (sic-consortium?) loss of estate and for funeral expenses. Out of the said amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid by way of ad interim compensation and, therefore, after holding that Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation directed the Insurer to pay Rs. 3,77,600/- along with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. 21st April, 1998 within one month. The Tribunal has also mentioned the manner in which the compensation amount is to be utilised on the interest of minor children, mother and wife of the deceased. Admittedly, no appeal has been preferred by the owner or the Insurer. In the present appeal, the Claimant-Appellants have only challenged the method applied by the Tribunal for the award of compensation amount.

It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has not considered the future prospect of promotion as well as pay revision and only monthly income of the deceased getting at the time of death has been considered for the purpose of compensation, which is contrary to the order of the Division Bench passed in the case of Kumari Anupama and Anr. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. (L.P.A. No. 382 of 1999 disposed of on 11.12.2001). According to him, after the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum Vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas and others, the legislature has brought ma for changes in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the Amendment Act 54 of 1994 to be effective from 14.11.1994. As such, according to the learned Counsel for the Appellants, adopting of the multiplier ''12'' is not permissible in terms of Section 163A of the Act. According to him, till Section 163A of the Act is not declared ultra virus, the Tribunal is bound to follow and pass award in accordance with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

On the other hand, Mr. Ashok Priyadarshi, learned Counsel for the Respondents has submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and award and, in fact the learned Tribunal has fixed the compensation by applying multiplier of ''12'' which is also much more than the mode prescribed by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others Vs. Trilok Chandra and Others, which provides that the multiplier should be Such that if the total amount of compensation is allowed to be deposited in some term deposit scheme of the Bank the interest coming from that should be the same which the claimant would have been getting if the deceased was alive. Further he submitted that on the face of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Trilok Chandra (supra) that the schedule attached in the Motor Vehicles Act for choosing multiplier is not a sound one and the Tribunal is not bound to follow that; there is substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that until Section 163A of the Act is declared ultra vires, Tribunal is bound to follow and pass away in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule.

This Court finds substance in the submission of Mr. Priyadarshi. In view of the provisions contained in Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the territory of India. In the case of P.L.O. Corporation v. Labour Court reported in (1990) 3 S.C.C. 632 (paragraph 59 and 81) the Apex Court has considered the scope of Article 141 and held that recognises the role of the Supreme Court to alter the law, in course of its function interpret legislation, in order to bring the law in harmony with social changes. Once the Apex Court has held that the schedule attached with the Motor Vehicles Act to choosing multiplier is not a sound one and the Tribunal is not bound to follow that, the question of declaration of Section ultra vires has no relevance. In fact, the Supreme Court has approved the important changes introduced by the Amendment Act 54 of 1994 in regard to determination of compensation by insertion of Sections 163-A, 163-B and 165-A. How ever, in regard to the calculation of compensation and the amount worked out of the Second Schedule, the Apex Court had held that it suffers from several defect Neither the Tribunal nor the Court can go by the ready reckoner, and that it can only be used as a guide. It has also been held that the selection of multiplier cannot in a cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. As such, this Court does not find any substance in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that until Section 163-A of the Act is declared ultra the Tribunal is bound to follow and award in accordance with the provided contained in Second Schedule. How as regards the quantum of compaction it is true that the Division Bench in order passed in the case of Kumari Anupama and Anr. v. National Insurance Co. Limited and Ors. (supra) has also in into consideration the bright future of deceased and that he would have (sic) more money than what he was (sic) at the time of his death, and, thus, professed the judgment of the learned Single judge and restored the judgment of the Tribunal. But that is not the law laid down or the only question involved in the said Tribunal was as to whether the multiplier of the used or some other multiplier be and the Division Bench considering act that the deceased was aged about appears and his wife was also approximately of the same age held that the age by of them can be taken into consideration for deciding the application of multiplier In the present case, learned Tribunal consideration of the principle laid down the Apex Court in the case of Trilok Chandra (supra) that in choosing the multiplier the age of the deceased or of the Respondent, whichever is higher, is also taken consideration as also that the multiplier had be such that if the total amount of sensation is allowed to be deposited in term deposit scheme of the Bank, interest coming from that should be the which the claimant would have been in if the deceased was alive, found the proper multiplier would be ''12'', and a sum of Rs. 4.17.600/- has been had to be the of compensation the besoms the (sic) expenses, and the loss of dependency on that basis is Rs. 34,800/- per annum, in my opinion, learned Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier of ''12'' following the principle laid down by the Apex Court that if the total amount of compensation allowed is deposited in some term deposit scheme of the Bank the interest coming from that should be the same which the claimant would have been getting if the deceased was alive. The maximum rate of interest on term deposit scheme of the Bank as on today is much lower, yet the Tribunal has awarded the compensation on taking into consideration the maximum rate of interest of 10% which a term deposit in the Bank would fetch.

Accordingly, this Court does not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment and award. The appeal is, thus, dismissed.