Jayalakshmi and others vs Kaliaperumal

Maheswaran, J.—The defendants are the appellants. One Arumuga Asari, owner of the suit property, donated it to Kamalakshmi Ammal,

his sister-in-law who is also the mother-in-law of the plaintiff under Ex. A1 on 22nd April, 1970. He revoked that deed under Ex. B1 on 24th

August, 1973. On the same day he executed another deed of donation under Ex. A3, in favour of the defendants. The defendants have taken

possession of the suit property. The plaintiff, in whose favour Kamalakshmi Ammal has executed the gift deed, has filed the suit on the ground that

the deed of donation dated 24th August, 1973 under Ex. A3 is null and void and that it was obtained by coercion and for recovery of possession

of that portion of the property occupied by the defendants. The first defendant in her answer stated that Ex. A3 is not obtained by coercion or

under undue influence but was executed voluntarily by the donor, that Arumuga Asari donated the property in favour of Kamalakshi in the hope

that she will maintain him, but as she has failed to maintain him he has cancelled the deed.

The trial Court found that Ex A3 was not executed under coercion, but however decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground that Arumuga

Asari cannot revoke the gift deed to favour of Kamalakshi. The appellate Court confirmed that decree and dismissed the appeal.

A learned Judge of this Court while admitting the second appeal has formulated the following substantial questions of law:

Whether the revocation of the gift is valid ?

Whether the deed of donation, dated 24th August, 1973 was obtained by coercion and fraud and therefore invalid ?

The second point of law framed by the learned Judge need not detain us any longer in view of the finding of the trial court that Ex. A3 was not

obtained by coercion. The appellate Judge does not deal with this point. But, however, there is absolutely no evidence to show that Ex. A3 was

executed under coercion or undue influence. In fact P.W. 1 does not anywhere say that Ex. A3 was obtained by coercion or by fraud or by undue

influence. In the circumstances, the trial Court was correct in coming to the conclusion that Ex. A3 was not obtained by undue influence, coercion

or fraud. That disposes of the second question of law.

The deed of gift was cancelled under Ex. B1. S. 126 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the question of revocation or suspension of the gift.

It reads that the donor and the donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor, a gift

shall be suspended or revoked. The latter part of S. 126 says that a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will

of the donor is void wholly or in part, as the case may be. The second part of S. 126 says that a gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save

want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract it, might be rescinded. Then follows the more important clause ''save as aforesaid, a

gift cannot be revoked''. That will show that except in the circumstances mentioned in S. 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, a gift cannot be

revoked. A gift may be revoked as if it were a contract, but not on the ground of want of consideration or failure of consideration. A gift maybe

revoked for coercion, fraud or misrepresentation or undue influence in the same way as a contract may be rescinded. It has already been pointed

out that Ex. A3 was not obtained under coercion. The four essential conditions for revocation under S. 126 are:-

that the donor and the donee must have agreed that the gift shall be suspended or revoked on the happening of a specified event;

such event must be one which does not depend upon the donor''s will;

the donor and the donee must have agreed to the condition at the time of accepting the gift;

the condition should not be illegal or immoral and should not be repugnant to the estate created under the gift.

In the present case, in Ex. A1 no condition is stipulated. The cancellation deed, Ex. B1, mentions that the donor had the fond hope that

Kamalakshi Ammal will maintain him, but he was disillusioned with that hope and that he is therefore revoking the deed Ex. A1 does not contain

any condition that Kamalakshi should maintain the donor. It is therefore clear that the donor has revoked the gift under Ex. A1 at his pleasure. As

already pointed out, a gift may be revocable by being subject to a condition subsequent, but the condition cannot depend upon the will of the

donor, for, a gift revocable at pleasure is no gift at all. In this connection, the observations of Lord Nottingham in the case of Villers v. Beaumont

1682�1 Vern. 101 which are apt may be extracted:

If a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, this Court will not

loose the fetters he hath put upon himself, but he must lie down under his own folly, for, if you would relieve in such a case, you must consequently

establish this proposition, namely, that a man can make no voluntary disposition of his estate, but by his wilt only, which would be absurd.

It is therefore clear that except in the circumstances mentioned in S. 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, a gift cannot be revoked. Such

circumstances having not been made out the gift under Ex. A1 cannot be revoked. The result is the second appeal fails and is dismissed, but

without costs.