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Judgment
10 paragraphs · 677 wordsLeave granted.
The petition filed for quashing the First Information Report ('FIR') dated 29th January, 2002 registered on the ground that offences under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 384 IPC was rejected by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad ('the High Court'). Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the Appellant has filed the above Appeal. Though the FIR was registered in the year 2002, the writ petition for quashing the FIR was filed in the year 2018.
In the meanwhile, the Appellant retired on attaining the age of superannuation in August, 2015. Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the criminal case against the appellant was vitiated by malice and deserves to be set aside. He also referred to the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604) to submit that the FIR which was lodged 17 years back should be quashed. We are not impressed with the contention of the appellant that FIR needs to be quashed and we decline to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
When the matter was listed for hearing for admission on 10th December, 2018, we issued notice to the State of Uttar Pradesh to show cause as to why action should not be initiated against those responsible for not taking any steps pursuant to the FIR which was registered against the Appellant. Later, when the matter was listed on 01st March, 2019, this Court was informed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh that the grant of sanction against the Appellant was deferred on 14th June, 2006 due to the pendency of trial of a connected case arising out of FIR No.167 of 2001 registered under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 307 IPC. Finally, sanction was granted to proceed with the prosecution against the Appellant on 27th July, 2017.
As this Court was not satisfied with the explanation given for the inordinate delay in deciding the sanction for prosecution against the Appellant, the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Organisation was directed to conduct an enquiry regarding the real reason for the delay that was caused in processing the matter pertaining to the sanction of prosecution against the Appellant. This Court also directed the identification of the officers who were responsible for the delay. We further directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to give the details of pending requests for sanction of prosecution against public servants in the State.
Thereafter, the case was listed on 12th July, 2019.
An affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary, Home Department, State of Uttar Pradesh was placed before us by Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh. On a careful scrutiny of the material placed before us, we found that a number of requests for sanction of prosecution were pending for a long period of time. By giving a direction to the State of Uttar Pradesh to expedite the disposal of the pending requests for sanction of prosecution against public servants, we directed the above Appeal to be listed three months thereafter.
The above Appeal was listed again on 08th November, 2019. After going through the papers that were placed before us, we are satisfied with the progress that was made in disposal of the applications filed for sanction of prosecution against public servants.
In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
However, we direct the State of Uttar Pradesh to ensure disposal of all pending matters pertaining to grant of sanction for prosecution against public servants within two months from today. The State should also ensure the expeditious disposal of the requests made for sanction of prosecution by giving directions to the authorities concerned not to keep the matters pending for a period of more than three months. We have not expressed any view on the merits of the above Appeal.
