Jhari Lal vs Emperor

James, J.—In this case the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Samastipur delivered sentences on 10th September 1928. The persons convicted appealed to the Court of Sessions, but they were unable to obtain a copy of any part of the judgment, except the final portion consisting of the findings and the sentences until 1st October when the judgment was completed.

Mr. H.L. Nandkeolyar argues that the failure to sign and date the complete judgment at the time of pronouncing it, vitiates the conviction and sentences. In Damn Senapati v. Sridhar [1894] 21 cal. 121 two Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that the failure to complete judgment before delivering the sentence was curable by the provisions of Section 537, Criminal P.C., but it is not clear that the judgment in that case was not actually completed on the day when the sentence was delivered.

In Queen Empress v. Hargobind Singh [1892] 14 All. 242. Sir John Edge held that it was illegal to pass sentence before judgment was written, and in Madras, in Bandanu Atchayya v. Emperor [1904] 27 Mad. 237. Sir Arnold White held that when the judgment was written some days after the passing of sentence, the defect vitiates the conviction and sentence. The provisions of Section 367, Criminal P.C., are mandatory; the judgment must contain the decision and the reasons for the decision and it must be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open Court at the time of pronouncing it. u/s 369, no Court, after signing its judgment, can alter or review it; and as the judgment must be signed at the time of pronouncing it, this implies that no sub-stantial alteration or addition can be made after delivery.

In the present case, essential parts of the judgment, that is to say, the statement of the points for determination, and the reasons for the decision, were not prepared until three weeks after the pronouncement of the judgment in open Court. This is clearly in contravention of Sections 367 and 365, Criminal P.C., and the convictions and sentences must be set aside. We do not consider it necessary that the accused should be subjected to the harassment of a retrial, particularly in view of the fact that the sentences imposed upon most of them were to run concurrently with the sentences passed in the case which has been disposed of in Criminal Revision No. 20 of 1929 in which the convictions were upheld.

We, therefore, set aside the order of the lower Court and direct that the petitioners in this case be acquitted.

Jwala Prasad, J.

I agree.