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Judgment
Sunil Gaur, J.
C.M. No. 19744/2010 (Order 6 Rule 17 CPC) & W.P.(C) No. 8531/2008
An important jurisdictional issue which arises for consideration herein is whether this writ petition, though filed prior to invoking of jurisdiction of
Competition Commission of India (which became fully operational during the pendency of the writ petition), would be still maintainable for
primarily assailing Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 between the first respondent- Ministry of Railways and the third
respondent- Steel Authority of India (SAIL), as the petitioner has already challenged it before Competition Commission of India being anti-
competitive.
Since preliminary objection regarding maintainability of this writ petition was raised by learned senior counsel for the respondents, when
petitioner had come up with an application to amend the writ petition to specifically challenge the Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February,
2003, therefore, submissions advanced by both the sides on the aspect of maintainability of this writ petition as well as on the applications for
amendment of the writ petition and directions, were heard together and are being dealt with in this common order.
Though the relief sought in this writ petition and before the Competition Commission of India is not identical but in substance the nature of relief
sought in these two proceedings is substantially the same, as is asserted by Mr. Dutta learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-railways, who
fervently urged to terminate these writ proceedings forthwith because according to the respondents, prosecution of the two remedies i.e. the writ
petition and the petition before the Competition Commission of India, not only amounts to multiplicity of proceedings leading to conflicting
decisions, but would also amount to abuse of the process of this Court.
What was precisely emphasised by Mr. Dutta learned senior counsel for the respondent-railways was that purpose to be achieved by pursuing
these two overlapping remedies by the petitioner is singular i.e. to render the aforesaid Memorandum of Understanding sterile. It is urged that this
purpose can be achieved by resorting to one remedy and not by simultaneously pursuing both the remedies. To put it differently, what is said is that
it would be ridiculous to permit the petitioner to ride on two boats simultaneously for reaching one destination i.e. for getting the aforesaid
Memorandum of Understanding set at naught.
Mr. Singhvi learned senior counsel for the petitioner astutely urged that statutory remedy cannot dilute the constitutional powers vested in this
Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India, as infringement of fundamental rights of the petitioner is alleged in the writ petition, whereas the
extent and jurisdiction of Competition Commission of India under The Competition Act 2002, is entirely different and the two remedies are
concurrent and so Public Law Remedy cannot be barred. In other words, what is emphasised by learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that
the efficacy of the remedy under The Competition Act, 2002, is circumscribed whereas the extra ordinary remedy availed of under Article 226 of
Constitution of India by way of this writ petition is infact efficacious one.
To contend that the question of resorting to parallel proceedings by the petitioner does not arise, learned senior counsel for the petitioner during
the course of hearing, had drawn the attention of this Court to Section 62 of The Competition Act, 2002 to urge that the provisions of the
aforesaid Act are in addition to and not in derogation of provisions of any other law for the time being in force.
Mr. Singhvi learned senior counsel for the petitioner with his usual persuasiveness had highlighted that The Competition Act, 2002 provides for a
mechanism for ensuring fair competition in the Indian market and it does not supplant or impinge upon the writ jurisdiction of this Court and the
doctrine of election does not really come into play, as Competition Commission of India is really not a Forum because Competition Commission of
India can suo moto proceed u/s 19 of The Competition Act, 2002.
On the aspect of maintainability of the writ petition, the applicability of doctrine of election of remedies put forth by the Respondents, was
disputed by learned senior counsel for the petitioner and by relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Transcore Vs. Union of India (UOI)
and Another, , it was urged that the doctrine of election will apply only where the remedies in question are repugnant or inconsistent with each
other and this doctrine would not apply to the instant case to frustrate the legitimate claim of the petitioner based on promissory estoppel and of
legitimate expectation of being considered for empanelment for supply of steel rail tracks to the Respondent - Railways and because the relief
sought in the writ petition springs out of the fundamental rights of the petitioner which can be granted by this Court while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the relief sought in the writ petition cannot be granted by Competition Commission of India in
proceedings under The Competition Act, 2002.
To highlight that the two remedies, i.e., on under Article 226 of Constitution of India and another under The Competition Act, 2002 are co-
existent, the chart relied upon by learned senior counsel for the petitioner, is as under:-
Article 226 Writ ProceedingsCompetition Commission
Proceedings
A writ proceeding is intendedA CCI proceeding is confined to
to enforce a legal right, enforcing the provisions of the
usually under the ConstitutionCompetition Act, in particular
or under administrative law. Section 3 which regulates and
prohibits anti-competitive
Agreements, Sec.4 which regulates
and prohibits the abuse of
dominance, and Sec.6 which
regulates and prohibits acquisitions,
mergers and amalgamations. Under
Sections 3 and 6, the CCI is
required to determine whether these
practices have ""appreciable adverse
effect on competition"" but Sec.4
equally presupposes it because a
dominant or monopoly position
necessarily implies that the market is
not competitive. u/s 18 of the Act, it
shall be ""the duty of the
Commission to eliminate practices
having adverse effect on
competition, promote and sustain
competition, protect the interest of
customers, and ensure freedom of
trade carried on by other
participants, in market in India...
Carriage of proceedings lie Although an ""informant"" may bring
with the petitioner in the writ to the notice of the CCI violations
proceedings. of the Competition Act, the CCI u/s
19 of the Act can act suo motu.
Therefore, even if an informant
wants to withdraw his complaint,
the CCI can and must proceed if
the practices complained against
have an adverse effect on
competition.
Remedy under Article 226 is The Competition Act has an
for the protection of overriding effect over all other
constitutional (including statutory bodies. Section 60 of the
fundamental) and other legal Competition Act envisages that the
rights. provisions of the Act shall have an
overriding effect on any other law
and all matters concerning matters
of competition shall be dealt with
exclusively under the Act.
A s Article 226 is a Section 61 of the Act provides for
constitutional provision, the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil
neither Parliament nor the courts to ""entertain any suit or
State Legislatures may proceedings"" and the CCI alone
abridge Article 226 by may enforce the Act.
passing a law. Even a
constitutional amendment
would be subject to the basic
structure doctrine.
The remedy under Article Section 62 of the Competition Act
226 is also in addition to the states that the provisions of the Act
other remedies that are ""shall be in addition to, and not in
available in law including derogation of the provisions of any
under Statutes. Although it is other law for the time being in
a constitutional remedy that force"". Therefore, no one can stop
cannot be taken away by Competition Act proceedings on
statute, the High Courts will the grounds of any other
refrain from exercising their proceedings pending before any
jurisdiction under Article 226other forum.
where an equally efficacious
alternate remedy is available,
subject only to certain well
recognized exceptions.
On the strength of the decisions in M/s. Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and another Vs. N.K. Modi, ; State of Karnataka Vs. Vishwabarathi
House Building Coop. Society and Others, ; Indian Medical Association Vs. V.P. Shantha and Others, ; Ankur Exports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission & Ors.,"" 2010 (116) DRJ 518 (DB) ; Transcore Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ; Man
Roland Druckimachinen AG Vs. Multicolour Offset Ltd. and Another, ; Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling
Mills and another, ; Rabindra Nath Ghosal Vs. University of Calcutta and Others, ; Smt. Nilabati Behera alieas Lalita Behera Vs. State of Orissa
and others, , relied upon on behalf of the petitioner, the elaborate submissions advanced by learned senior counsel for the petitioner can be
summarized as follows:-
(a) As a constitutional court, a writ Court will only adjudicate upon whether a constitutional right including a fundamental right or other legal right
has been violated that would permit a writ or other order or direction to issue to correct the violation. On the other hand, the CCI being a creature
of statute with limited jurisdiction and powers can never interpret or enforce the provisions of the Constitution or enforce legal rights not provided
under the Competition Act.
(b) The CCI will only enforce the provisions of the Competition Act under the powers granted to it by that Act. Thus, u/s 18, the CCI is to
eliminate practices that have an ""adverse effect on competition"" and to promote competition. At the same time, a writ Court will never seek to
enforce the provisions of the Competition Act per se because Section 61 expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the civil courts, thus giving only the
CCI jurisdiction with respect to the provisions of the Competition Act.
(c) As such, there can never be an overlap between the Judgment of the writ Court and an order of the CCI in terms of substance because the two
would operate in entirely different fields. The writ Court''s order will only hold that the challenged action violates constitutional or fundamental rights
or administrative law principles, while the CCI will only find that an anti-competitive Agreement or an acquisition, merger or amalgamation has had
appreciable adverse effect on competition"" or there has been an abuse of dominance, which only the CCI is competent to do.
(d) To test the proposition that there will never be an overlap, if this Court were to find in the present case that the Railways"" decision-making
process in entering into the MoU by which it procured its rail requirements only from SAIL or its failure to conduct an annual review of the
arrangement with SAIL violates Article 14, there would be no inconsistency if the CCI were to find that the MoU did not have appreciable
adverse effects on competition and could continue. The result would be that the Railways would be forced to terminate the MOU but could enter
into it again after taking into account relevant considerations while eschewing irrelevant considerations.
(e) On the other hand, if this Court were to find that the Railways"" decision-making process in entering into the MoU or its failure to conduct an
annual review did not violate Article 14, the CCI could still find that the MoU does have appreciable adverse effects on competition for purposes
of Section 3 of the Competition Act and must be terminated.
(f) In no case, therefore, could there ever be any inconsistency or repugnancy between the Judgment of this Court in the writ petition and that of
the CCI because they operate in entirely different fields.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner thus submitted that in the instant case fundamental rights of the petitioner cannot be curtailed and so,
the petitioner ought to be allowed to pursue parallel proceedings as the merits of the writ petition cannot be pre-judged while deciding on the
maintainability aspect because the averments in the writ petition have to be read as it is, while deciding the issue of maintainability of the writ
petition.
Whereas Mr. Tripathi, learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondent-SAIL contended that parallel remedies in two different forums
in respect of the same matter are not permissible. To contend so, reliance has been placed upon the decisions in K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi and
Others, ; Jai Singh Vs. Union of India and Others, ; Shri Mahabir Prasad Jain Vs. Shri Ganga Singh, & Manish Goel Vs. Rohini Goel, .
It was also urged by learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondent-SAIL that public sector undertakings like respondent No. 3 stand
on a different footing and can be treated preferentially and in support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon Hindustan Paper Corpn.
Ltd. Vs. Government of Kerala and Others, ; Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. Vs. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, ; Union
of India (UOI) and Another Vs. Ladu Lal Jain, ; Shashikant Laxman Kale and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ; M. Jhangir
Bhatusha Vs. UOI AIR 1989 AC 1713; and Indian Drugs and Pharm and Others Vs. Punjab Drugs Manufactures Association and Others, .
To assert that auction is not the only constitutional permissible way of awarding the contract and several accepted departures from the Auction
Route are recognized, learned Additional Solicitor General for the respondent-SAIL placed reliance upon decisions in State of M.P. and Others
Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, ; M.P. Oil Extraction and Another Vs. State of M.P. and Others, and Netai Bag and Others Vs. The State of
West Bengal and Others, .
It was asserted by learned Additional Solicitor General for the Respondent-SAIL that the proceedings under the Competition Commission of
India have come to their logical end and the orders have been reserved in those proceedings and if it is assumed for the argument sake, that the
petitioner succeeds in those proceedings before the Competition Commission of India and if the writ proceedings are allowed to continue and
petitioner fails herein, then it would lead to conflicting decisions and to avoid such an eventuality, the doctrine of election of remedies ought to be
applied in the instant case.
Petitioner''s application seeking amendment of the writ petition is based upon the twin considerations, i.e., (i) to clearly demarcate the grounds
and the relief''s sought in the writ petition from those in the CCI proceedings; and (ii) the additional information sought by the petitioner under the
RTI Act from the Railways, which includes Railways file nothings relating to the MoU with SAIL that confirm that no annual review has ever been
conducted by Railways as required under the MoU.
Although there are averments in respect of the Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 in the writ petition but for undisclosed
reasons, the said Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 was not challenged in the writ petition and is now being sought to be
challenged being in violation of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Singhvi, learned
senior counsel that the proposed amendment is necessary to decide the dispute herein and it does not result in any injustice to the opposite side
and for the delay occasioned, the opposite side can always be compensated with costs. It was also urged by Mr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel
for the petitioner that the merits of the amendments sought is not required to be gone into, as the same would be seen if the proposed amendment
is allowed and solely on the ground of delay, the amendment sought ought not to be refused. To contend so, reliance is placed upon decisions in -
North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwan Das (D) by Lrs., ; Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and Others Vs. K.K. Modi and
Others, ; Prem Bakshi and Others Vs. Dharam Dev and Others, ; B.K.N. Narayana Pillai Vs. P. Pillai and Another, ; Surender Kumar Sharma
Vs. Makhan Singh, ; A.K. Gupta and Sons Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation, ; Pankaja and Another Vs. Yellappa (D) by Lrs. and Others, ;
Lipton India Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal No. II and Another, ; Rabindra Lal Aich and Others Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others, ;
Om Prakash and Another Vs. Delhi Development Authority ; G. Nagamma and Another Vs. Siromenamma and Another, ; Bakshish Singh vs.
Prithi Pal Singh and Others, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 577; (1994) 2 SCC 29 (SC); Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh Vs. State of Bombay (Now
Gujarat), ; Ram Kumar Barnwal Vs. Ram Lakhan (dead), .
The opposition to this application for amendment of the writ petition by learned senior counsels for the Respondents is on the ground that the
amendment sought is not bona fide one and is just to keep this matter alive and petitioner has come up with this application when the Respondents
had raised the issue of maintainability of this writ petition and just to forestall the decision on the maintainability issue, this application has been
brought in and the real purpose of the petitioner is to pursue this remedy in the event of failing before the Competition Commission of India and
since the Forum shopping by the petitioner ought not to be permitted, therefore this application deserves rejection.
At the very outset, it was made clear to learned counsel for the parties, during the course of hearing that first the application for amendment of
the writ petition would be dealt with and thereafter the issue of maintainability of the writ petition. Upon conclusion of hearing on these two aspects
and on perusal of the record of this case and the decisions cited, I proceed to deal with the application for amendment of the writ petition in the
first instance.
It needs no reiteration that law regarding amendment of pleadings is quite liberal. Apex Court in a recent decision in Surender Kumar Sharma
Vs. Makhan Singh, has gone to the extent of declaring that even belated application for amendment is not liable to be rejected merely on the
ground of delay, if the Court finds that by allowing such application, real controversy between the parties can be resolved, then the wide discretion
to deal with such applications should be exercised in such a manner that full and complete justice is done to the parties and for the delay
occasioned, the opposite side can be always compensated with costs.
Though the averments regarding the Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 in question are very much there in the writ petition
but it appears that perhaps due to inept drafting, prayer for declaring the Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 as null and void
was not made in the writ petition. Since this Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 is the real dispute between the parties,
therefore, even if the application for amendment is belated, still it cannot be thrown out on this ground as for effective hearing and decision in this
matter, this Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 has to be taken into consideration. Therefore, without commenting upon the
merits of the proposed amendment, petitioner''s application is allowed subject to costs of Rs. 30,000/- to be deposited with the Delhi High Court
Legal Services Committee within four weeks.
Now the main issue; i.e. of the maintainability of the writ petition.
In the pursuit of globalisation, India has responded to opening up its economy, removing controls and resorting to liberalisation. The natural
corollary of this is that the Indian market should be geared to face competition from within the country and outside. The need to shift the focus from
curbing monopolies to promoting competition was recognised by The Competition Bill, 2001, whose notable objects are as under :-
a) The Competition Bill, 2001 seeks to ensure fair competition in India by prohibiting trade practices which cause appreciable adverse effect on
competition in markets within India and, for this purpose, provides for the establishment of a quasi-judicial body to be called the Competition
Commission of India (Hereinafter referred to as CCI) which shall also undertake competition advocacy for creating awareness and imparting
training on competition issues.
b) The Bill also aims at curbing negative aspects of competition through the medium of CCI. CCI will have a Principal Bench and Additional
Benches and will also have one or more Merger Benches. It will look into violations of the Act, a task which could be undertaken by the
Commission based on its own knowledge or information or complaints received and references made by the Central Government, the State
Governments or statutory authorities. The Commission can pass orders for granting interim relief or any other appropriate relief and compensation
or an order imposing penalties, etc. An appeal from the orders of the Commission shall lie to the Supreme Court. The Central Government will
also have powers to issue directions to the Commission on policy matters after considering its suggestions as well as the powers to supersede the
Commission if such a situation is warranted.
c) The Bill confers power upon the CCI to levy penalty for contravention of its orders, failure to comply with its directions, making of false
statements or omission to furnish material information, etc. The CCI can levy upon an enterprise a penalty of not more than ten per cent. of its
average turn-over for the last three financial years. It can also order division of dominant enterprises. It will also have power to order de-merger in
the case of mergers and amalgamations that adversely affect competition.
The aforesaid objects were achieved when the Competition Bill, 2001 became The Competition Act of 2002 effective from 13th January,
2003 and it became substantially operative with effect from 15th May, 2009 i.e., after the filing of this writ petition. Upon close scrutiny of the
provisions of the Competition Act, 2002, it transpires that it is a complete Code in itself which even provides for award of compensation to the
affected/aggrieved party.
For deciding this issue of maintainability of the writ petition, it has to be kept in mind that the averments made in the writ petition have to be
read as it is and the merits of the averments are not to be gone into for deciding this issue. Apart from the Memorandum of Understanding of 1st
February, 2003, the larger issue raised in the writ petition is the legitimate expectation of the petitioner for being considered for empanelment for
supply of steel rail tracks to the Respondent - Railways and the averments made in the writ petition to invoke the principle of promissory estoppel
in view of the huge investments made by the petitioner, are the matters which would strictly come within the domain of this Court in the writ
petition, which cannot possibly be considered by the Competition Commission of India.
Keeping in mind the principles governing the doctrine of election of remedies, what emerges is that in the instant case, the two co-existent
remedies available to the petitioner cannot be said to be repugnant or inconsistent. Rather, the public law remedy availed by the petitioner to seek
redressal of the infringement of the fundamental rights in the writ petition appears to be in addition to and not in derogation of the remedy availed
by the petitioner by invoking the provisions of The Competition Act, 2002. It so appears, as in the petition complaining of breach of Section 3 and
Section 4 of The Competition Act, 2002 before The Competition Commission of India, initiated in October, 2009 petitioner had on the aspect of
cause of action, jurisdiction and the remedies had averred as under :-
10.2 Understanding the differences between the actions :
10.2.1 Causes of Action : The writ petition before the Hon''ble Delhi High Court has been filed against IR on the grounds of, inter alia, violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and other guidelines of the Central Government, promissory estoppels, breach of legitimate expectations,
discrimination and being against public policy. SAIL has also filed an application for being impleaded as a party to those proceedings, which is also
pending. On the other hand, the present information s in respect of SAIL, on grounds of breach of the Sections 3 and 4 of the Act relating to anti-
competitive agreements and abuse of dominance.
10.2.2. Jurisdiction : Whereas the writ jurisdiction of the constitutional law action lies with the Hon''ble Delhi High Court, the Act specifically
excludes the jurisdiction of the civil courts u/s 61. Any decision as to breach of the provisions of the Act is to be taken by the Hon''ble Commission
with a provision to appeal to the Competition Appellate Tribunal. As such, the Hon''ble Delhi High Court cannot admit or entertain an action under
the Act. Similarly, the Hon''ble Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with the issues related to breach of Constitutional rights, promissory
estoppels, legitimate expectations, etc. which can be decided by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
10.2.3 Parties: The writ petition in the Hon''ble Delhi High Court has been filed against Union of India. On the other hand, under the Act, the action
is being brought against SAIL. By an application dated 1st July, 2009, SAIL requested the Hon''ble High Court that it be impleaded as an
interested party to the writ proceedings. The decision of the Hon''ble High Court on SAIL''s application is still pending.
10.2.4 Remedies: The remedies sought pursuant to the writ petition are to :
a) pass an writ of mandamus or order, as appropriate, directing IR to procure the rails by way of a competitive bidding process.
b) direct IR to empanel JSPL for the purpose of purchase of rails; and
c) strike down the policy of IR to procure its entire requirement of rails from only a single supplier without following a competitive and transparent
process.
Under Section 27 of the Act, if there is a finding of an existence o abuse of dominance or anti-competitive agreement, the Competition
Commission of India can :
(d) direct SAIL to discontinue and not to re-enter into an agreement which amounts to an abuse of dominant position or an anti-competitive
agreement;
(e) impose such penalty as it may deem fit on SAIL;
(f) direct the MoU to be modified to the extent and n the manner specified; and/or
(g) pass such other order or issue such directions as it may deem fit.
The Hon''ble Commission also has the power u/s 28 of the Act, if it considers appropriate and notwithstanding any other law for the time being in
force, to direct the division of SAIL (being a dominant enterprise) to ensure that it does not abuse its dominance. Therefore, the relief''s granted by
the Hon''ble High Court and the Hon''ble Commission would be different in nature though the desired outcome of each set of relief''s may be
similar.
10.2.6 Therefore in light of above, it is humbly submitted that, although emanating from same set of facts, as there are two separate causes of
actions before separate authorities against different parties seeking different remedies, the information before the Hon''ble Commission does not
overlap with the jurisdiction of the Hon''ble High Court which is also seized with issues arising out of same set of facts and both actions may be
pursued concurrently.
While considering the question whether discretionary jurisdiction would be refused to be exercised solely on the ground of existence of an
alternative efficacious remedy, Apex Court in Mrs. Sanjana M. Wig Vs. Hindustan Petro Corporation Ltd., had observed as under:-
However, access to justice by way of public law remedy would not be denied when a lis involves public law character and when the forum
chosen by the parties would not be in a position to grant appropriate relief.
After having thoughtfully deliberated upon the submissions advanced by both the sides and upon scrutiny of the averments made in the writ
petition and the decisions cited, I am of the considered view that though Memorandum of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 is essentially a
subject matter of the proceedings before this Court as well as before the Competition Commission of India, therefore, even if parallel proceedings
are allowed to continue, still the ends of justice demands that conflicting decisions have to be avoided. Since orders are awaited in the proceedings
before the Competition Commission of India, therefore though the writ proceedings are allowed to continue as issue of promissory estoppel and
legitimate expectation cannot be pre-judged at this stage, but the final order in this matter has to be put on hold till the validity of the Memorandum
of Understanding of 1st February, 2003 is finally decided in the proceedings under the Competition Act, 2002. While declaring that the doctrine of
election of remedies cannot be applied to the instant case, it is held that this writ petition is maintainable and the parallel proceedings are permitted
to continue in the manner as indicated above.
Accordingly, in terms of paragraph no: 21 of this order allowing C.M. Appl. No. 19744/2010, petitioner is granted four weeks to place on
record the amended writ petition and Respondents are also granted four weeks time to respond to it. Rejoinder, if any, within two weeks
thereafter.
List before the Registrar on 10th February, 2012 for completion of pleadings.
C.M. No. 3268/2010 (Directions)
This application by Respondent - SAIL for staying the proceeding in this writ petition filed on 26th February, 2010, till the issue regarding the
maintainability of writ petition is decided, is rendered infructuous as the writ petition is held to be maintainable vide aforesaid order of even date.
When this application was heard alongwith the application for amendment of the writ petition, what was urged by learned senior counsel for the
Respondent - SAIL was that pendency of this writ petition is being construed as an impediment for taking a decision by the concerned authority
u/s 54 of The Competition Act, 2002, which was strongly objected to by learned senior counsel for the petitioner by pointing out that this aspect
cannot be urged in the writ petition as this aspect could possibly fall for consideration in proceedings before the Competition Commission of India.
Certainly, pendency of this writ petition cannot possibly be construed as an impediment for the authority concerned to proceed u/s 54 of The
Competition Act, 2002 as in this writ petition, the aforesaid enactment is not the subject matter of consideration.
With these observations, this application is disposed of as infructuous and CM No. 19744/2010 is allowed in aforesaid terms.