Jit Singh Jaimal and Others vs Khullar Enterprises and Others

Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.

This order shall dispose of two petitions bearing CR No. 3588 of 1999 titled as "M/s. Jit Singh Jaimal and others v. M/s. Khullar Enterprises and another" [for short ''Ist petition''] and CR No. 4173 of 1999 titled as "M/s. Jit Singh Jaimal Singh and others v. M/s. Khullar Financiers" [for short ''IInd petition''] The question involved in both the petitions is the same as to whether an application for making an award rule of the Court could be filed beyond the period of 30 days prescribed under Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963?

In the 1st petition, the Arbitrator announced his award on 7.2.1986. This fact is admitted by O.P. Khullar in his cross-examination while appearing as RW1. In the IInd petition also O.P. Khullar had appeared as RW1 and admitted in his cross-examination that the Arbitrator announced his award orally on 7.2.1986.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that in the 1st petition, application under Section 14 and 17 of the Arbitration, 1940 [for short ''the Act''] was filed on 18.7.1987 for making the award rule of the Court in which the petitioner filed the objection, inter alia, on the ground that the application is barred by limitation as it has been filed beyond the period of 30 days. Although it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that there are other points also involved in this case but if the revision petition is allowed on the ground of limitation, the other points are not required to be urged, therefore, I am taking up his first objection regarding the order passed by the Court below, deciding his objection in respect of limitation, in filing of the application under Order 14 & 17 of the Act. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that even in the application filed under Section 14 & 17 of the Act, there is no reference of the date on which respondent had acquired knowledge of the pronouncement of the award.

Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that when the award was pronounced on 07.02.1986, it was on the plain paper and was reproduced on a stamp paper on 1.6.1986. He came to know about the award when the application was filed, therefore, it was within limitation.

In reply, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that it is also not mentioned in the application that respondent had acquired the knowledge of the pronouncement of the award and then the application was filed.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the record, I am of the considered opinion that the 1st petition [CR No. 3588 of 1999 titled as "M/s. Jit Singh Jaimal and others v. M/s. Khullar Enterprises and another"] deserves to be allowed.

Before I advert to the reasons recording my conclusion, it would be relevant to refer to Section 14 & 17 of the Act as well as Article 119 of the Limitation Act, which read thus:--

"14. Award to be signed and filed:

(1) When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award.

(2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, together with any depositions and documents which may have been, taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.

(3) Where the arbitrators or umpire state a special case under clause (b) of section 13, the Court, after giving notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to, and shall form part of, the award.

Judgment in terms of award:- Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with, the award."

According to Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act, the period for filing the award in Court is 30 days from the date of service of notice of making of the award. The learned Court below has rejected the contention of the petitioner on the ground that there is no evidence available on record to the effect that either of the parties had appended their signatures on the award, therefore, it is not barred by limitation. This observation of the Court below is totally erroneous because admittedly the award was announced on 7.2.1986 and the only question is as to whether the respondent had the knowledge of the award or not. The period of limitation starts running from the notice of the award by the respondent and would expire after 30 days in terms of Article 119 of the Limitation Act. The respondent, namely, RW1 O.P. Khullar in his cross-examination himself had admitted that the award was announced in Court on 7.2.1986 which means that he had the knowledge about the pronouncement of award, even if the award was announced orally or prepared on a plain paper. The limitation had started running and he could have always filed the application for making award rule of the Court within the period of limitation but the application was filed after expiry of more than 1 year and 5 months that too without giving any reason much less cogent and disclosing the date of acquisition of knowledge. In view thereof, as it is well settled that limitation bars the remedy, the remedy of the respondents for making the award rule of the Court was over immediately after expiry of the period of 30 days. Thus, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Court below has erred in rejecting the objection of the petitioner regarding the fact that the application filed by the respondent under Section 14 and 17 of the Act was not barred by limitation. Insofar as the IInd petition is concerned, in that case also the award was announced on the same day but in that case even no application was filed for making the award rule of the Court. In that circumstance, there is hardly any reason to make the award rule of the Court and accordingly, the IInd petition [CR No. 4173 of 1999 titled as "M/s. Jit Singh Jaimal Singh arid others v. M/s. Khullar Financiers"] is also allowed.