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Judgment
Anoop Chitkara J
FIR No.
Dated
Police Station
Sections
368
19.09.2020
Farakpur, District Yamuna Nagar
406, 420 and 506 IPC & 10 of Immigration Act
The peoners, arraigned as accused in the above ca poned FIR, have come up before this Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of th e FIR and all consequenal proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved persons.
During the pendency of the peon, the accused an d the aggrieved person have compromised the maer, and its copy is annexed with this peon as Annexures P-2 to P-5.
This court had asked the pares to appear before the concerned court and had asked the said court to give its report as per the format. The report reads as follows:
Name of the reporting Court
Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri
FIR No.
Dated
Police Station
Sections
368
19.09.2020
Farakpur, District Yamuna Nagar
406, 420 and 506 IPC &
10 of Immigration Act
1.
Names of the complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s)
Rajat Tyagi
2.
Dates on which the statement(s) of the
complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) were recorded
31.01.2023
3.
Has the identity of the complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been verified?
Yes
4.
Whether all the victims/ all the aggrieved persons have compromised the matter?
Yes
5.
Is there pressure, threat, or coercion upon the victim(s)/aggrieved person(s)/complainant?
No
6.
Names of the accused person(s)
Monika
Jai Parkash
Jitender
However, during investigation, Monika and Jai Parkash were found innocent. Now only one accused namely Jitender
Kumar is facing trial.
7.
Dates on which the statement(s) of the accused persons(s) recorded
31.01.2023
8.
Whether all the accused have compromised the matter? If no, then the names of the accused who have compromised.
Yes
9.
Whether proclamation proceedings are pending against any accused?
No
10.
Has the police report been filed or not?
Police report has been filed only against the accused Jitender.
11.
Notice of accusation /Charges have been framed or not?
Yes only accused Jitender
12.
Sections of statutes invoked in the matter
406, 420, 506 and 10 of Immigration Act
13.
Whether the court is satisfied with the genuineness of the compromise?
Yes
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
Despite the severe opposion of the State’s couns el to this compromise, the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this peon: -
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably seled the maer between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the se lement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boycos, bribes, or other dubious means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullificaon of criminal proceedings;
d) There is no objecon from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maers concerning public policy;
f) The rejecon of compromise may also lead to ill w ill. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i)The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequenal proceedings is jusfied to secure the ends of jusce.
In the present case, the offence under Section 10 o f Immigraon Act is not compoundable under Section 320 of Code of Criminal P rocedure, 1973 (CrPC). However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecuon qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.
In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can i n our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a convicon against the accused and the enre exercis e of a trial is desned to be an exercise in fulity. There is a su btle disncon between compounding of offences by the pares before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecuon under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against convicon, may not be com petent to permit compounding of an offence based on a selemen t arrived at between the pares in cases where the offences are n ot compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may q uash the prosecuon even in cases where the offences with whi ch the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedu re Code are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Crimi nal Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and cauon. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that connuance of the prosecuon would be nothing but a n abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situaons in which the exercise of po wer under Section 482 may be jusfied. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jusce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be jusfied in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a peon under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure C ode. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
In ParbatbhaiAahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: -
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following proposions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of jusce. The provision does not confer new p owers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocaon of the jurisdicon of the Hig h Court to quash a First Informaon Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a selement has been arrived at between the offender and the
vicm is not the same as the invocaon of jurisdic on for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is aracted even if the offen ce is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdicon under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether th e ends of jusce would jusfy the exercise of the inherent po wer;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of jusce or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Informaon Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and vicm have seled the dispute, revolves ulmately o n the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhausve elabora on of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 4 82 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been sele d, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the vicm or the family of the vicm have se led the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to connue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As disnguished from serious offences, ther e may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a disnct foong in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercanle, partnership or sim ilar transacons with an essenally civil flavour may in appropriate situaons fall for quashing where pares have seled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a convicon is remote and the co nnuaon of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an excepon to the principle se t out in proposions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implicaons which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be jusfied in decl ining to quash where the offender is involved in an acvity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on 29.09.2021, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such aempt by the court would amount to alteraon, addion and modificaon o f Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Seco n 320 Cr.P.C., which may jusfy its wider interpretaon and includ e such offences in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdicon to compound an offence within th e framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoki ng inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for jusfiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of jusce.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that pares have amicably sele d their dispute and the vicm has willingly consented to the nullifi caon of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offence s are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequenal effects of the offence beyond the body o f an individual and thereaer adopt a pragmac approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not nker with or paralyze the very object of the administraon of cr iminal jusce system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespecve of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convicon. Handing out punishment is not the sole f orm of delivering jusce. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful excepons. It goes without saying , that the cases where compromise is struck post convicon, the High Court ought to exercise such discreon with rectude, keeping in v iew the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and aer the incidence. The touchstone for e xercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of jusce. There can be no hard and fast l ine constricng the power of the High Court to do substanal jusce . A restricve construcon of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. may lead to rigid or specious jusce, which in the given fac ts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injusce. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cauously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maers conce rning public policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potenal to impact the so ciety at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘selement’ through duress, threat s, social boycos, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided.”
In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Jusc e arises propiously when pares, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of pares, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objecves point towards its acceptance .
In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Associaon v State o f Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon’ble Supreme Court holds “[47]. As far as Writ Peon (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that maer was already pendin g as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Peons against the order of the High Court r ejecng their peon for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ peon has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automacally stands viated.”
Considering the enre facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-menoned judicial precedents, I believe that connuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiul purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdicon under Section 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the peoner(s). The bail bonds of the peoners are accordingly discharged. All pending applicaon(s), if any, stan d closed.
Peon allowed in the terms menoned above .