Jitendranath Biswas vs State Of West Bengal & Ors.

This writ application is directed against an order dated December 5, 2017 passed by the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, First

Bench in the original application bearing O.A. No. 2032 of 2015 (LRTT). By virtue of the order impugned to this writ application, the above original

application was admitted for final adjudication rejecting the objection raised by the petitioner/respondent.

It is the contention of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the subject matter of challenge in the original application was an

order dated April 28, 2015 passed by the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, Tehatta-I, District â€" Nadia relating to a claim under Section 7 of the

West Bengal Acquisition of Homestead Land for Agricultural Labourers, Artisans and Fishermen Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said

Act of 1975’).

According to the petitioner, there was a provision under Section 9 of the said Act of 1975 to prefer an appeal before the statutory appellate forum.

Therefore, in view of the legal bar created under the provisions of Clause (b) Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act,

1997, the original application was not maintainable. The learned Tribunal, after taking into consideration the subject matter of challenge involved in the

original application arrived at a conclusion that there was no legal bar in entertaining an original application in view of the provisions to prefer a

statutory appeal.

After prima facie consideration of the facts and circumstances of the subject matter of challenge involved in the original application, we find that the

original application was filed on the ground, amongst others, raising a point of law with regard to a proceeding No. 3/B-II/2000 before the Block Land

& Land Reforms Officer concerned during the pendency of a Title Suit No. 157 of 1995 before a Civil Court of law. The issue of entertaining an

original application instead of availing of an opportunity to prefer a statutory appeal has already been dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in

which one of us (Debasish Kar Gupta, J.) was the Presiding Judge. In the matter of Bidyapati Pal & Ors. â€" Vs. â€" The State of West Bengal &

Ors. reported in 2016(4) CHN (Cal) 127 and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:

“12. After considering the aforesaid provisions of the WBLRTT Act, 1997, we find that the learned Tribunal while considering the original

application of the petitioners had the jurisdiction and power to adjudicate the challenge to any order made by an authority under a specified Act which

includes the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

Section 7 of the WBLRTT Act, 1997 confers a power upon the learned Tribunal to exercise all the jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable

immediately before that day by any Court including the High Court, except the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India

exercised by a Division Bench of the High Court, but excluding the Supreme Court, for adjudication or trial of disputes and applications relating to land

reforms and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and other matters arising out of any provisions thereof.

According to sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the WBLRTT Act, 1997, the learned Tribunal has examined that the applicant has availed of all

remedial measures before approaching the learned Tribunal as also to exercise its discretional power where the remedial measures available under the

provisions of relevant specified Act, under the provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 in this case, are not adequate or should cause

undue hardship to the applicant.

It will not be out of context to refer to thedecision of L. Chandra Kumar â€" Vs. â€" Union of India & Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0261/1997 :

AIR 1997 SC 1125 for the purpose of taking into consideration the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above decision and the

relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:

“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude

the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the

Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction†clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same

extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of

the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may

perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article

323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All

decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned

Tribunal falls. The Tribunal will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been

constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory

legislation (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.

Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.

All these matters may now be listed before a Division Bench to enable them to be decided upon their individual facts in the light of the

observations contained in this judgment.â€​

It is the settled principles of law that the provision of an Act has to be interpreted by its harmonious reading. After harmonious reading of the

provisions of the WBLRTT Act, 1997, as discussed hereinabove together with ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision of L.

Chandra Kumar (supra), we are of the opinion that the learned Tribunal while examining the scope of entertaining an original application filed within its

jurisdiction as prescribed in Section 6 of the WBLRTT Act, 1997 should act as a Court of first instance as provided in Section 7 of the WBLRTT Act,

1997 read with the decision of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) on the touchstone of provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the

WBLRTT Act, 1997.â€​

In view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, we do not find any scope of interfering with the order impugned to this writ application.

Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied

for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible on compliance of all necessary formalities.